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CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT
PART ONE: LIENS ON NEW YORK REAL
PROPERTY
DAVID GRAY CARLSON
Thus when it is said that a creditor has a right to require his
debtor to pay his debt, this does not mean that he can remind the
debtor that ... reason itself puts him under obligation to
perform this; it means, instead, that coercion which constrains
everyone to pay his debts can coexist with the freedom of
everyone, including that of debtors, in accordance with a
universal external law. Right and authorization to use coercion
therefore mean one and the same thing.-Immanuel Kant1
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INTRODUCTION
Personal obligation-otherwise known as tort and contract-
dominates the first year law curriculum in America. The
fantastic assumption behind these courses is that, if a court
awards a money judgment against a defendant, she or at least
her insurance company will certainly pay. The civil procedure
course is no less deluded. Typically, the course sputters out with
the JNOV, or perhaps with perfecting an appeal. The fate of the
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money judgment is left off the syllabus, as if judgment debtors
never fail to pay.
Debt enforcement, however, is what all of civil procedure
aims for.2 It is the very telos of private law. Yet, the mechanisms
of debt enforcement are treated as an embarrassment by civil
procedure teachers. They are consigned to a nether world, darkly
alluded to, but never discussed openly in class.
Why is the telos of private law so pitifully neglected?
Undoubtedly, the advent of a federal bankruptcy law in 1898 has
discouraged interest in debt enforcement in the state courts. The
truly spectacular debtors with substantial assets know how to
file a bankruptcy petition in the federal courts. In bankruptcy, a
judicial lien obtained upon the debtor's property within ninety
days of the bankruptcy petition can be avoided entirely by a
bankruptcy trustee.' Thanks to competition from the federal
courts, state enforcement has become a foetid and insalubrious
backwater.
Nevertheless, the subject of state debt enforcement has some
considerable importance. Practicing lawyers often observe
debtors go limp after the money judgment and refuse to pay.
This is especially so in family law cases, where spite thoroughly
overwhelms paternal obligation, even in the presence of
substantial assets. Fortunately for creditors, civil procedure's
nether side exists to liquidate debtor assets so that judgments
can be paid. Yet, precious little detailed knowledge has been
accumulated about the fine points of end game procedure. In
New York,4 no detailed study of judicial liens on real property
2 See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 804 (4th ed. 2005) ("In many
respects this topic gives law its ultimate test .... If [a money] judgment can't be
enforced, law is bound to fall several notches in the estateem of the plaintiff, which
makes the enforcement of judgments a key moment in a test of this system.").
3 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The creation of a lien is a
transfer of property. Id. § 101(54)(A) (2000).
' The New York court system says of itself that is most important jurisdiction
for private litigation. Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 581,
404 N.E.2d 726, 730, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1980) (referring to New York's
"undisputed status as the preeminent commercial and financial nerve center of the
Nation and the world"). It has been said that other states like to ape New York and
so the knowledge of New York law is tantamount to universal legal knowledge. See
Daniel H. Distler & Milton J. Schubin, Enforcement Priorities and Liens: The New
York Judgment Creditor's Rights in Personal Property, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 458
(1960). In truth, the law of every state is completely different when it comes to
enforcing money judgments. As Professor Stefan Riesenfeld once wrote:
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has ever been published by a law review. The last study of
judicial liens on personal property is over forty years old and in
any case precedes the dubious reforms instituted by the New
York legislature in the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR").'
In this Article, I hope to fill that gap. This Article is the first
installment of an in-depth study of judicial liens in New York.
This installment focuses on judicial liens on real property, as
regulated by the CPLR.6 A sequel covers liens on personal
property.7 In general, New York's real estate regime radically
differs from its personal property regime, thereby justifying the
division of labor between this installment and the sequel.
In exploring the nature of the judicial lien on New York real
property, I proceed as follows. Part I gives some necessary
information about money judgments. Part II discusses the point
at which a lien is created and how long it endures-crucial
information for understanding the post-judgment enforcement
mechanism. Once the lien exists, and only so long as it exists,
the sheriff is prepared to sell the property. Part III describes the
execution sale, which in New York, is beset with constitutional
difficulties that the courts have yet to confront. Part IV describes
the status of the judicial lien against unrecorded conveyances.
Although it is a nostrum that judgment creditors have no status
under New York's recording act, this is not exactly accurate. The
sheriff at an execution sale has power to convey free and clear of
Unfortunately, even cursory familiarity with this branch of the law will
produce in the student the impression that the field possesses hopeless
prolixity and diversification which does not find its match in any other
sector of the legal system. The basic reason for this certainly unsatisfactory
state of affairs is the unhappy tendency of American jurisdictions on the
one hand to cling with amazing tenacity to outmoded preconceptions and
traditions of the common law, and on the other hand to give haphazard and
unsystematic legislative relief to the pressing needs of the business
community.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical
Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155, 155 (1957).
5 See Distler & Schubin, supra note 4, at 458-59.
6 Article 52 Went into effect on September 1, 1963. Some deliberate reforms
were intended; in particular, post-sale redemption powers were abolished as tending
to depress bids at execution sales. See David D. Siegel, The Sale of Real Property
Pursuant to an Execution Under the CPLR, in REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR THE
JUDICIAL YEAR JULY 1, 1963 TO JUNE 30, 1964 120, 122-23 (1965). This legislation
was conceived as mainly codifying prior New York statutes and traditions.
I David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part II: Liens on New York
Personal Property, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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unrecorded conveyances to bona fide purchasers for value who
record first. New York case law on this subject, however, is
wobbly and mostly over a century old. The best interpretation of
it is that the sheriff does indeed have power to sell free and clear
of the unrecorded conveyances of the judgment debtor.
Part V discusses the priority of future advances extended by
mortgage lenders after judgments are docketed. As we shall see,
discretionary advances that the lender need not have made are
entitled to priority, but if these sums are advanced with the
knowledge that an intervening party will be "squeezed" out of its
collateral, courts will apply principles of equitable subordination
to protect the intervening party. In spite of some recent
legislation designed to facilitate discretionary future advances, it
is still probably the rule that mortgage lenders may not
deliberately harm judicial lien creditors by prejudicial
discretionary advances made after their judicial liens are
created.
Part VI discusses acquisitions of real property by debtors
after a money judgment is docketed against them. As we shall
see, the rule of "first in time is first in right" doesn't function
when two or more judgments are docketed before the debtor
inherits or buys real estate. Rather, liens on after-acquired
property all attach to the acquisition at the same time. In such
cases, New York imposes a rule of pro rata sharing. Part VII
describes the disturbing New York rule when a debtor
fraudulently conveys away real property before a creditor obtains
a judicial lien. The New York rule seems to be that docketing a
judgment against the debtor is also docketing against the
debtor's transferee, a rule I will criticize as planted in the
uncertain soil of metaphoric confusion. The rule, if taken
seriously, creates havoc for title searchers.
Part VIII considers the right of New York debtors to claim a
$50,000 homestead. It turns out that New York has some
irksome case law that deprives the debtor of her homestead in
the near-universal case where the homestead is encumbered by a
mortgage. Bankruptcy is needed to rescue New York residents
from some bad state law. Part IX considers an ersatz homestead
exemption in New York-the tenancy by the entirety. Although
creditors of individual spouses can supposedly reach his or her
property interests in such a tenancy, New York courts (especially
in Nassau County) have used their discretion to put the tenancy
1295
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by the entirety off limits to creditors. Finally, Part X considers
the fate of the New York judicial lien on real property if the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") claims a lien for unpaid taxes.
The United States Supreme Court, ever puckish on the subject of
private law, has been up to mischief of late, holding that the IRS
beats any judicial lien on after-acquired property of the debtor. I
will take a detailed look at United States v. McDermott,8 to show
that it was incorrectly decided and what it means for New York
money judgments.
Finally, I conclude by setting forth a program of modest
legislative reform, designed to cancel some small number of the
absurdities that plague and embarrass the current system.
I. MONEY JUDGMENTS IN GENERAL
According to CPLR 5011, a judgment is "the determination of
the rights of the parties in an action or special proceeding and
may be either interlocutory or final."9  A money judgment is
defined as "a judgment, or any part thereof, for a sum of money
or directing the payment of a sum of money."10
The key points in the life of a money judgment are entry,
judgment-roll, and docketing. Each of these moments merits
scrutiny.
A. Entry
Typically, the winning side of a law suit drafts the judgment
for the judge to sign. Once this is done, the judge sends it to the
clerk's office for "entry." Entry of the judgment occurs when the
clerk signs it and files it in a chronologically organized file called
the "judgment book."1 Only after entry is a money judgment
enforceable.12
8 507 U.S. 447 (1993).
9 A "special proceeding" need not detain us. This refers to an action under
article 78 of the CPLR and covers actions against government officials. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
7801 (McKinney 2008). Our concern is with money judgments, which will typically
be a very simple statement that the defendant owes the plaintiff a sum of money.
See also id. 105(k) ("The word judgment' means a final or interlocutory judgment.").
10 Id. 105(q).
11 Id. 5016(a).
12 Musso v. Ostashko, 468 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2006).
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B. Judgment-roll
The judgment-roll is the record of the litigation-the stuff
that dreams of res judicata are made of. It contains the
summons, pleadings, admissions, and orders "involving the
merits or necessarily affecting the final judgment.""3  The
attorney for the winning side is assigned the merry task of
preparing the judgment-roll. 14 It is "filed by the clerk when he
enters judgment."' 5  That is to say, it may not be filed before
entry of the judgment. The time of the judgment-roll is key for
defining the duration of judicial liens on real estate.'6
Accordingly, the clerk must state the date and time of its filing.'7
C. The Docket
Docketing consists of the clerk putting the judgment into an
alphabetical file by name of the defendants. 8 Once docketed, the
judgment becomes searchable. As we shall see, docketing is the
moment when a judicial lien arises on real property.' 9 Title
searchers are therefore much concerned with the docket.
The docket is the nerve and bone of the bookkeeping system
that the New York courts operate to monitor the satisfaction of
judgments. The basic concept is that, every time the sheriff' °
obtains funds from the judgment debtor ("JD"),21 the sheriff
13 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5017(b).
14 See id. 5017(a).
15 Id.
16 Id. 5203(a) (stating that liens die ten years after the judgment roll is filed).
" Id. 5017(a).
18 The entry under the first named defendant must include the amount of the
judgment, the date and time of the judgment roll, the court in which the judgment
was entered, etc. Id. 5018(c)(1). The entries for additional defendants contain a
cross-reference to the first-named defendant. Id. 5018(c)(2).
19 Id. 5203(a).
20 Id. 105(s-1) ("The term 'the sheriff,' as used in this chapter, means the county
sheriff as defined in subdivision (a) of section thirteen of article thirteen of the
constitution and in counties in the city of New York, the city sheriff as defined in
[NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 58, § 1526 (Command Information Services 2001)].
For the purposes of article fifty-two of this chapter relating to the enforcement of
money judgments and for the purposes of any provision of law which in effect applies
any such provision of article fifty-two of this chapter, such term shall also mean any
'city marshal' as defined in article sixteen of the New York city civil court act, except
that city marshals shall have no power to levy upon or sell real property and city
marshals shall have no power of arrest."). This provision goes out of effect on June
30, 2009, unless the Legislature has wit enough to extend it.
21 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(m).
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reports back to the clerk who first entered the judgment, This
clerk notes the amount of the payment, so it is always possible to
tell from the docket the amount JD actually owes.22
Where JD pays the judgment creditor23 ("JC") directly, JC is
required to file a "satisfaction-piece" with the clerk, so that the
docket accurately reflects the amounts JD actually owes.24
1. Lower Courts
The chief judicial bookkeeper in New York is the county
clerk. The county clerk is the clerk of the supreme court, which
is organized in every county in New York. This clerk also
services the county court, if any.2" Accordingly, creditors who
have judgments from courts other than the supreme or county
court are expected to obtain transcripts of their judgments and
file these transcripts with the county clerk.26 The county clerk
then notifies the clerk issuing the transcript that the transcript
has been docketed, and this lesser clerk humbly notes the
docketing on his or her own file. The significance of docketing
with the supreme court is that only this docketing creates the
lien on real estate located within the county where the supreme
court is located.28 In addition, the power of enforcement officers
of the lower court to execute is eclipsed by the sheriffs exclusive
22 Id. 5021(b).
23 Id. 105(l) ("A 'judgment creditor' is a person in whose favor a money judgment
is entered or a person who becomes entitled to enforce it.").
24 Id. 5020(a). The scant penalty of $100 is imposed if the judgment creditor
does not file a satisfaction-piece within twenty days after receiving full satisfaction.
Id. 5020(c). A slander of credit action may lie if the judgment creditor fails to file.
See Jimenez v. Shippy Realty Corp., 163 Misc. 2d 121, 124, 618 N.Y.S.2d 963, 965
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1994) (finding statute of limitations for slander and
equitable actions had run).
25 See N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 525 (McKinney 2008). The boroughs of New York
City have city courts, rather than county courts.
26 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5018(a). The clerk of the supreme court is also the clerk of the
county court, so that no new docketing from the county court to the supreme court is
necessary. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 525; In re Sterling Die Casting Co., 132 B.R. 99, 100
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
27 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5018(a).
28 Id. 5203(a). In The Lambs, Inc. v. Diven, No. 2941/2001, 2001 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1259, at *8 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County Sept. 7, 2001), the court thought it
could not order the sale of cooperative shares per 5206(e). This seems wrong.
Cooperative shares are deemed personal property in New York. E.g., State Tax
Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d 151, 154, 371 N.E.2d 523, 524-25, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806
(1977). The sale could have proceeded.
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jurisdiction, once the judgment is docketed with the supreme
court clerk.29
2. Federal Courts
Creditors with federal judgments must also file with the
clerk of the supreme court, if they wish to have liens on New
York real property. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64
authorizes federal marshals to receive and enforce writs of
execution according to the state law where the federal court is
located.30  But executions as such create no liens on New York
real property. 31 Therefore, it is prudent for federal judgment
creditors to docket with the supreme court, if the defendant owns
real property.3 2 Only this docketing 3 creates a lien for a federal
JC.34
CPLR 5018(b) permits filing of federal transcripts only with
regard to "the judgment of a court of the United States rendered
or filed within the state."35 Where the district court in New
29 Schleimer v. Gross, 46 Misc. 2d 931, 932, 261 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1965); 54 N.Y. JUR. 2D Enforcement and Execution of Judgments § 70
(2008).
30 See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kalish & Rice, Inc., 693
F. Supp. 1436, 1438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
31 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (indicating that only local docketing with the
county clerk or levying creates a lien).
32 Unlike state JCs in other counties who must docket in the home county and
docket again in the county where the real property is located, federal JCs can docket
in the county where the real property is located as soon as the federal judgment is
entered. In re Sterling Die Casting Co., 132 B.R. 99, 104 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
3- It is possible for a federal marshal to levy on real property, but because of
severe restrictions on the levying option, this seems never to have been done. See
infra text accompanying notes 104-111.
34 In Sterling, JC's federal judgment was docketed with the federal clerk ninety-
seven days before JD's bankruptcy. See Sterling, 132 B.R. at 100. The judgment was
docketed with the clerk of the New York Supreme Court eighty-five days before the
bankruptcy. JC's judicial lien was therefore declared a voidable preference. JC tried
to argue that section 5018(b) ("upon such filing the clerk shall docket.., with the
same effect as a judgment entered in the supreme court within the county") provided
for a relation-back of the judicial lien to the time of the federal docketing, but this
was properly rejected on the plain wording of the statute. Any other holding would
have wreaked havoc with title searching. Id. at 103.
35 The effect of federal judgments on real estate is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1962
(2000), which provides:
Every judgment rendered by a district court within a State shall be a lien
on the property located in such State in the same manner, to the same
extent and under the same conditions as a judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction in such State, and shall cease to be a lien in the same manner
and time. This section does not apply to judgments entered in favor of the
1299
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Jersey, for example, renders judgment against JLD with real
estate in New York, JC will have to obtain local recognition of
the judgment under article 54 of the CPLR, which is slightly
more procedurally demanding than proceeding under article 50.36
II. CREATION OF JUDICIAL LIENS ON REAL ESTATE
A. What Is a Lien?
1. First in Time Is First in Right
The creation of a lien is the transsubstantial moment at
which a plaintiffs in personam right graduates into a right in
rem. At this point, the plaintiff with a money judgment becomes
a property owner. The name of the plaintiffs property interest is
a lien. It is commonly called a judicial lien or judgment lien to
differentiate it from consensually created liens (mortgages or
security interests) or tax liens. 7
A lien is a power of sale. Classically, it is the power to sell
whatever the debtor could have sold at the time the lien was
created. This formulation of the power to sell is vital to all that
follows. Notice that the power has a temporal aspect to it. The
power of sale is adjudged at the time the lien was created. In all
lien regimes, the moment of a lien's birth is key.3
United States. Whenever the law of any State requires a judgment of a
State court to be registered, recorded, docketed or indexed, or any other act
to be done, in a particular manner, or in a certain office or county or parish
before such lien attaches, such requirements shall apply only if the law of
such State authorizes the judgment of a court of the United States to be
registered, recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise conformed to rules and
requirements relating to judgments of the courts of the State.
Prior to the enactment of the predecessor to this statute in 1888, a federal judgment
created a direct lien on real estate. See Rhea v. Smith, 247 U.S. 434, 441 (1927).
" See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 815 F.2d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Pearson, 258 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that a
Virgin Islands District Court judgment could not be filed with the clerk per N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5018(b)).
17 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(36) (West 2008) ("The term 'judicial lien' means lien
obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or
proceeding.").
38 The drafters of the CPLR everywhere forget the fact that the owner of
property encumbered by the judicial lien may well not be JD. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5203(b) (McKinney 2008) (providing that a motion to extend life of docketing lien
requires service of notice on the judgment debtor only). One court has hinted that
movants under section 5203(b) had better serve the owner of the property to which
1300
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Let us rehearse the above formula in a few very basic
scenarios.
First Scenario
t1 : D owns a fee simple absolute estate in Blackacre. D grants A
a mortgage (which A promptly records).
t2: A declares a default and holds a foreclosure sale, where X is
the buyer.
At t2, A has the power to sell whatever D had at the time A's lien
was created. Since D had fee simple absolute at ti, X buys fee
simple absolute at t2. Just prior to X's purchase, A owned a
mortgage and D owned the equity-the right to possess, redeem,
etc. In effect, X buys A's mortgage and D's equity. These merge
into a fee simple estate owned by X. After the sale at t2, neither
A nor D own anything. Their interests have been sold to X, who
has paid cash for this title. A and D will have a claim to the
proceeds X has paid in. As to the proceeds, the rule is "first in
time is first in right," with the proviso that the residual owner
(D) is always the last taker after all D's transferees have been
paid.
Let us now add a second lien creditor.
Second Scenario
t1 : D owns a fee simple absolute estate in Blackacre. D grants A
a mortgage (which A promptly records).
t2 : The clerk of the supreme court in the county where Blackacre
is located dockets a judgment in favor of JC. JC therefore has a
judicial lien on D's real property.39
t3 : A declares a default and holds a foreclosure sale, where X is
the buyer.
In the Second Scenario, D has made a junior transfer to JC
(involuntarily, by operation of law). Yet, JC is subject to A's
senior mortgage. A's power of sale cannot be affected by D's
subsequent transfers. Therefore, at t3, X still buys fee simple
absolute, because that is what D had at t, (even though D had
less than that after t2). This time, proceeds go to A first and JC
second, according to the principle of "first in time is first in
the judicial lien attaches, though the statute does not require it. G. Roma Roofing
Co. v. Marcotrigiano, 156 A.D.2d 638, 639, 549 N.Y.S.2d 137, 137-38 (2d Dep't
1989).
3' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
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right." D, as the residual equity owner, is in last piace, once A
and JC are paid in full.
Finally, we analyze the situation where JC is the first to sell.
Third Scenario
t1: JD owns a fee simple absolute estate in Blackacre. JD
grants A a mortgage (which A promptly records).
t2 : The clerk of the supreme court dockets JC's judgment in the
county where JD's real property is located. JC therefore has a
judicial lien on JD's real property.
t3 : JC serves an execution on the sheriff, who schedules a sale.
At the sale, Y is the buyer.
t4: A declares a default and holds a foreclosure sale, where X is
the buyer.
At t 3, JC, a junior lien creditor, is the first to sell. At this sale,
JC (via the agency of the sheriff) has the power to sell whatever
JD had at t2--a fee simple estate encumbered by A's mortgage.
So Y buys JD's equity interest subject to A's mortgage. At t3 ,
JC's lien disappears, as does JD's interest in the equity. Both JC
and JD have a claim to the proceeds Y has paid at t3. A has no
such claim, as A didn't sell anything to Y. A's mortgage survives
the sale at t3, as JC had no right to sell free of A's mortgage.
A second sale occurs at t4, at which time JD no longer has
any interest in Blackacre. JD's interest was sold to Y at t 3. So
just before t4, A owns a mortgage and Y owns the equity (which Y
bought at t3). These disappear into X's fee simple absolute estate,
purchased at t4. The proceeds go first to A. Y, the residual owner
of the equity, is in last place with regard to the proceeds.
In the above scenario, A and JC had the power to sell
whatever JD had at the time their liens were created. A has the
power to sell what JD had at t, (fee simple absolute). When A
sells at t4, A sells the full fee simple absolute. When JC sells at
t3 , JC sells fee simple as encumbered by A's mortgage. So JC's
power was less than-subordinate to-that of A. This
formulation honors the concept of first in time is first in right.
2. Second in Time Is First in Right
Often, for policy reasons, lien regimes empower a debtor to
destroy a lien in order to encourage its publication (or
"perfection," to use the phrase favored by the Uniform
Commercial Code). At these moments, the party that is second
in time is first in right. For example:
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Fourth Scenario
ti: D owns a fee simple absolute estate in Blackacre. D grants A
a mortgage. A does not record it.
t2 : D conveys all right, title and interest to X, who pays a fair
price and who has no knowledge of A's unrecorded mortgage. X
promptly records her deed.
According to New York's recording act, an unrecorded conveyance
(such as A's mortgage)
is void as against any person who subsequently
purchases... the same real property.., in good faith and for a
valuable consideration, from the same vendor or
assignor... whose conveyance... is first duly recorded .... 0
Since X is a good faith purchaser who has recorded and who
purchased with no knowledge of A, X takes free of A's mortgage.
X was second in time but first in right.
When it comes to judicial liens, we shall see that the CPLR
creates both the rule of "first in time is first in right" and the rule
of "second in time is first in right." JC 1 might be first in time,
but JC 2 can sell free of JC1 and might conceivably have priority
to the proceeds.41
B. The Birth of the Judicial Lien on New York Real Property
A lien is the power to sell whatever the debtor had at a
specific time-the time of lien creation. So the birth of the lien is
the all-important datum. It is the time at which in personam
rights of the creditor become in rem rights. It is here that the
mediocre fields of tort and contract give way to the nobler realm
of property.
This moment is established in the preamble to CPLR
5203(a). The wording of this establishment is confusing, and it
pays to quote it at length:
No transfer of an interest of the judgment debtor in real
property... is effective against the judgment creditor either
from the time of the docketing of the judgment with the clerk of
the county in which the property is located ... or from the time
of the filing with such clerk of a notice of levy pursuant to an
execution until the execution is returned ....
40 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2008).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 179-187.
42 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
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This sentence does not directly state that JC has a lien on real
property43 after certain points of time.44  Rather, it says that,
after those times, no other transfer is good against JC.
Nevertheless, the implication is that JC has something after two
particular points in time. This something we may as well call a
lien. The drafters of the CPLR were loathe to utter this
shiboleth.45  Only in CPLR 5208 and CPLR 5236(a), (c), and (e)
are the dreaded name of "lien" spoken.
The two points at which liens are created are local
docketing46 or, alternatively, levying. So there are in fact two
different judicial liens on real property in New York. 4 These two
points presuppose, however, that the debtor already owns the
43 Real property includes leasehold interests in land. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(s);
Alternate Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. Goodman, 151 A.D.2d 453, 453, 542 N.Y.S.2d 242,
243 (2d Dep't 1989).
4 The statute resists saying that JC has a lien as of a certain time. This was
not always the case. H.R. & C. Co. v. Smith, 242 N.Y. 267, 269-71, 151 N.E. 448, 449
(1926) (recounting the predecessors of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a)).
45 Two authors complain about the vagueness of the word "lien." "Principal
among the numerous factors that have created the present confused situation in
New York is the inadequacy of legal terminology. For example, the single term 'lien'
has been used regularly by the courts to define vastly different rights." Distler &
Schubin, supra note 4, at 459. The authors then give examples: sometimes A's lien
means that A's right to a specific asset is better than B's right. Sometimes it means
that A's right to all a debtor's assets is better than B's rights. I think the threshold
for confusion must have been lower in 1960 than it is today. Why are these examples
confusing? There's nothing wrong with the word "lien." It's rather like complaining
about the phrase "security interest." Article 9 experts have never had difficulty with
the term. Nor will we have the slightest inconvenience from our use of the word
"lien."
46 The docketing lien, at least, dates back to the early days of New York state
history. According to New York's English heritage, real property could be used to
satisfy money judgments under the writ of elegit. Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430,
435-37, 111 N.E. 70, 71-72 (1916). No sale was possible under this writ. Rather the
writ gave the judgment creditor a term for years over half the debtor's land of
sufficient duration that the creditor could raise the cash to satisfy the judgment,
presumably by collecting rent from the subtenants. New York initially followed this
rule in the colonial period, but in 1787 authorized the sale of land. Id., 111 N.E. at
71-72. The lien representing the right of sale dated from docketing the judgment.
Id., 111 N.E. at 71-72. Initially, there could be no enforcement against real estate
until the creditor had tried and failed to levy on personal property. Stewart v. Beale,
7 Hun. 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876). The CPLR no longer contains this requirement.
47 By fiat, cooperative apartments are deemed to be personal property, not real
property, even though ownership of a cooperative apartment involves a leasehold
grant to the owner of cooperative shares. State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d 151,
154, 371 N.E.2d 523, 524-25, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (1977); cf N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 339-g (McKinney 2008) (defining condominia as real property).
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48real property in question when the docketing or levy occurs.
For "after-acquired property," the rules are much different and
will be discussed separately.49
1. The Docketing Lien
By far, the more important of New York's two liens on real
property is the docketing lien. CPLR 5203(a) makes clear that
local docketing is what counts-"docketing of the judgment with
the clerk of the county in which the property is located."50 'Where
the judgment is entered in a court different from the supreme or
county court, the lien arises only when a transcript of the
judgment is filed with the county clerk.51
a. Its Duration
The docketing lien has a shelf life of no more than ten years.
According to CPLR 5203(a), no transfer is good against JC after
local docketing "until ten years after filing of the judgment-roll. 5 2
There is a tricky but important aspect to the duration of the
docketing lien. It would be an error to think that the docketing
lien lasts ten years. Rather, it lasts for ten years from the filing
of the judgment-roll. 53 Where docketing occurs the same day as
the filing of the judgment-roll, the duration of the docketing lien
will approach (but never reach) ten years.54  And the lien's
duration can be considerably less than ten years.
4' There are also some exceptions. When the judgment is entered after the death
of JD, no lien arises. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a)(4). Nor is there a lien when the
decedent's executor is made a party purely in her representative capacity. Id.
5203(a)(6); Manhanaim Resort Corp. v. Samples, 156 A.D.2d 342, 344, 548 N.Y.S.2d
295, 297 (2d Dep't 1989). This provision "operates in such a way so as to defer to the
Surrogate's Court the disposition of all claims against an estate and to render all
claimants, including judgment creditors, subject to the jurisdiction and proceedings
of the Surrogate's Court." Salomon Bros. Realty Corp. v. McFarland (In re
McFarland), No. 262853, 2005 WL 742294, at *1 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County Mar. 31,
2005).
4' See infra text accompanying notes 362-364.
50 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
51 See Alternate Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. Goodman, 151 A.D.2d 453, 453, 542
N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (2d Dep't 1989).
52 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
53 This duration dates back well into the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Faneuil
Hall Nat'l Bank v. Bussing, 147 N.Y. 665, 665-66, 42 N.E. 345, 346 (1895).
1 See Quarant v. Ferrara, 111 Misc. 2d 1042, 1042-43, 445 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-
87 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981).
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Though this be madness, there is method in it. The New
York system of accounting for judgments requires that a single
county clerk be the master cypher for purpose of determining
whether the judgment is paid. This is the clerk of the county
where the money judgment was actually entered. Where the
judgment is from the supreme or county court, it is with this
clerk that the judgment-roll must be filed. Where a lower court
entered the judgment, the judgment-roll must be filed with the
lower court, but a separate docketing with the supreme court
clerk is needed to create the docketing lien.55 Once this is
accomplished, executions may be issued to sheriffs throughout
the state,56 but the sheriff is instructed to return the execution to
the clerk of the county wherein the judgment was entered.5 1 It is
this clerk who reports definitively the outstanding amount of the
judgment.
Meanwhile, title searchers can draw comfort from the
duration rule. Instead of searching throughout all sixty New
York counties, a title searcher can check the docket of the court
in which the judgment is entered. If the title searcher observes
that ten years have passed since the filing of the judgment-roll,
then she knows that, even if there have been recent local
docketings, no lien on real property is associated with them. It
may well be that the transcript of a judgment in County X was
filed last year. Without more, it would appear that this local
docketing creates a lien on real property of the debtor in County
X. But if more than ten years has lapsed from the time the
judgment-roll was filed, the title searcher knows that local
docketing in County X implies no lien.
Reference has been made to filing transcripts of judgments
in other counties.5" If JC has a judgment in County X, she can
docket her judgment in fifty-nine other counties as well. But the
life of these other docketing liens will be less than ten years. All
liens die ten years after the judgment-roll.
" Id. at 1043, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
6 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(b).
5 Id. 5230(c).
See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
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b. Extension of the Docketing Lien
i. Necessity of a Motion
The docketing lien can be extended if JC delivers an
execution in the waning days of the lien's life. By making a
motion under CPLR 5203(b), JC can extend the docketing lien
"for a period no longer than the time ... necessary to complete
advertisement and sale of real property in accordance with
section 5236, pursuant to an execution delivered to a sheriff."5 9
We now confront our first major absurdity in the CPLR.
According to CPLR 5236(a), such a motion may not be necessary:
[Tihe interest of the judgment debtor in property which has
been levied upon under an execution delivered to the sheriff or
which was subject to the lien of the judgment at the time of such
delivery shall be sold by the sheriff pursuant to the execution at
public auction .... 60
The literal meaning of this sentence is that service of the
execution while the lien exists authorizes the sheriff to sell, even
if the lien has lapsed by the time of the sale. Or to say the same
thing in different words, the execution extends the life of the
docketing lien.61 But if this is true, why did the legislature waste
valuable time enacting CPLR 5203(b)? The matter remains, in
the main, a mystery.62
Possibly one court may have relied on this lien-extending
aspect of 5236(a) to award priority to a JC whose docketing lien
had died by the time of the sale. In Kazmeroff v. Ehlinger,63 the
following chronology was presented:
59 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(b). This provision also permits a motion where
enforcement of the judgment has been enjoined by an injunction for some time. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-81. If there has been neither an execution served
on the sheriff nor an injunction, the section 5203(b) motion must be denied. N. Fork
Bank v. Sawicki, 23 A.D.3d 632, 632, 804 N.Y.S.2d 415, 415-16 (2d Dep't 2005).
60 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(a) (emphasis added).
61 But see Place v. Albanese, 73 Misc. 2d 638, 639, 342 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (Sup.
Ct. Fulton County 1973).
12 Section 5203(b) of the CPLR also applies if execution is stayed by an
injunction, so its existence is not entirely a superfluity.
1 43 Misc. 2d 942, 252 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964).
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ti: JC, dockets. 64
t 2: JC 2 dockets.
t 3 : JC 1 serves an execution.
t4 : JC1's docketing lien dies.
t5 : JC 2 serves an execution.
65
t 6: Sale.
The Kazmeroff court awarded priority to JC 1 , even though JC,'s
lien was dead at the time of the sale.66 The case can be explained
if the service of the execution itself extended the lien until the
end of the execution sale, a result that accords with common
sense and the language of the CPLR. Just as litigation that
commences one day before a statute of limitations runs can
continue after lapse, so should an execution delivered to the
sheriff while the docketing lien still lives authorize the sheriff to
continue with the sale.
Disappointingly, the Kazmeroff court's expressed
justification for its decision is mystifying. JC 2 claimed that JC 1's
priority depended on extension of his lien pursuant to CPLR
5203(b). The court rejected the notion, observing that the section
was "designed for the protection of a purchaser, creditor or
mortgagee in good faith.., and was intended to protect such
persons who would not otherwise have notice of a pending levy
and Sheriffs sale."67 What this comment seems to be getting at
is this: Suppose D had granted A a mortgage just after t4. If A
had no knowledge that JC1 had served an execution on the
sheriff prior to the death of the lien, A should be entitled to a
senior lien, unless JC, moves to extend the lien. Or if JC 3 had
docketed a judgment after t4, JC3 should be entitled to priority
over JC, unless JC, had previously moved to extend. But, said
the Kazmeroff court, JC 2 knew of the service of the execution and
6 Of course, it is the job of the county clerk to docket. She would rather object if
JC, went behind the counter and began altering the records. Nevertheless, to save
words, I will refer to JC 1 as docketing.
65 See Kazmeroffv. Ehlinger, 43 Misc. 2d 942, 943, 252 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1964). Also on this day, the sheriff filed notice of levy pursuant to
section 5235. Id. at 943, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 560-61. But that provision requires the
sheriff to wait until the docketing lien is dead before levying. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5235. If
Community Capital Corp. v. Lee is to be believed, no lien would arise as a result of
this levy. 58 Misc. 2d 34, 36, 294 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968);
see also infra text accompanying notes 123-137.
' Accord Gaglione v. Mahoney, 306 A.D.2d 279, 280, 760 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (2d
Dep't 2003).
67 Kazmeroff, 43 Misc. 2d at 944, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
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so was not entitled to priority.68  The point makes no sense
whatever. CPLR 5203(b) requires only that JD be served with
notice, either by personal service or registered or certified mail.69
How does the motion to extend put A or JC 3 on notice that JC,'s
lien extends beyond its natural life? Furthermore, nothing in the
CPLR makes JC 2's priority turn on JC 2's knowledge. This factor
should have played no part in the court's reasoning.
ii. Tolling
A debtor may file for bankruptcy in the waning days of the
docketing lien, in which case bankruptcy's automatic stay
70
prevents the service of the execution. Is there a tolling principle
that applies to extend the life of the lien? Courts are divided on
this question.
In Gratton v. Dido Realty Co.,71 the court held against
tolling, on the following chronology:
ti: JC obtains entry of a money judgment (and presumably files
the judgment-roll) in Queens County.
t 2: JC dockets in Nassau County, where JD had real property.
t 3: JD files for bankruptcy.
t 4: JD obtains a bankruptcy discharge a year later.
t5 : Tenth anniversary oft1.
t6 : D serves an execution on the Nassau sheriff, six days after t5 .
We are not told the duration of the automatic stay on D's real
property. If D's property was overencumbered by mortgages and
judicial liens, the trustee will have abandoned the property, at
which point the stay would lapse once JD received the discharge
at t4.72 If tolling were a valid New York principle, then, so long as
the trustee retained an interest in the property for more than six
days after t3 (as is extremely likely), JC's execution would have
been timely delivered. The Gratton court, however, ruled that
JC's lien died at t5, ten years after the judgment roll was filed. It
therefore stands against the existence of a tolling principle.
In contrast, the court in Barer v. Berzak73 ruled that the JC's
right to move for an extension was extended by the automatic
6 See id. at 944, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
69 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(b).
10 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (2000).
"' 139 Misc. 2d 724, 725, 528 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1988).
72 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1)-(2).
73 No. 9553/92, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 519, at *5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County July
16, 2001).
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stay. Pending the motion, the docketing lien died at i5 , the tenth
anniversary of the judgment-roll. But if JC made a timely
motion, the lien, once dead, would live again. So, using the
Gratton chronology, had JC moved to extend at t 6 and if the
motion had been granted, service of the execution any time before
the first anniversary of t 4 would have been timely, and the
execution sale could proceed."4
Which of these two views is correct? Section 5203(b) does not
expressly require the motion to be made during the life of the
execution lien.75  There is no clear obstacle to the Barer
interpretation, which insinuates a tolling principle into the life of
the docketing lien. 6
iii. Motions To Extend During a Bankruptcy
Suppose JC1 moves to extend her lien during D's bankruptcy.
Has JC 1 violated bankruptcy's automatic stay? Of course,
enforcing the lien violates the stay.77 Our concern for the
moment is simply whether the extension motion under CPLR
5203(b) can be made without offense to the stay.
The answer is yes. Section 546(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
subordinates bankruptcy trustees to state laws that provide for
"the maintenance or continuation of perfection of an interest in
property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in
such property before the date on which action is taken to effect
such maintenance or continuation."" And section 362(b)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code expressly permits "any act to... maintain or
14 Gratton, 139 Misc. 2d at 726, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 771. The anniversary of t4 is
relevant because the bankruptcy lasted one year between t3 and t4. JC was eligible
for one year's worth of tolling. Where, however, no injunction existed during the life
of a lien, a motion after the ten-year outward limit comes too late to extend the lien.
See Brookhaven Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Hoppe, 65 Misc. 2d 1000, 1001, 319 N.Y.S.2d
564, 566 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
"' See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(b) (McKinney 2008).
16 See Barer, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 519, at *5; see also Place v. Albenese, 73
Misc. 2d 638, 639, 342 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County 1973) (denying the
right to extend nunc pro tunc), affd, 43 A.D.2d 817, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (3d Dep't
1973). The Barer decision, allowing for nunc pro tunc extensions after the lien is
dead, resembles a line of cases holding that, under pre-judgment attachment and
post-judgment executions, a creditor can revive a levy nunc pro tunc even after the
levy has lapsed. See Barer, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 519, at *5; see also Kitson &
Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 26, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507-08 (2d Dep't
2004), modified, 40 A.D.3d 758, 835 N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dep't 2007).
77 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2).
78 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(b)(1) (2006).
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continue the perfection" of a lien "to the extent that the trustee's
rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section
546(b) of this title ... ."19 These provisions describe section
5203(b) motions to extend a docketing lien. These provisions
were added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994. Even before that,
the Second Circuit ruled that the stay was not violated by a
motion to extend. According to Morton v. National Bank (In re
Morton):80
Action by a lienholder under [section] 5203(b) does not result in
an enlargement of the lien, nor does it threaten property of the
estate which would otherwise be available to general creditors.
To the contrary, extension under [section] 5203(b) simply allows
the holder of a valid lien to maintain the status quo-a policy
not adverse to bankruptcy law, but rather in complete harmony
with it.8
1
The Morton court went on to hold that, even where JC makes no
section 5203(b) motion to extend, the lien is extended by
operation of Bankruptcy Code section 108(c),8 2 which provides:
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law... fixes a period for
commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a
bankruptcy on a claim against the debtor.., and such period
has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then
such period does not expire until the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such
period occurring on or after the commencement of the case;
or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of
the stay under section 362 ... with respect to such claim.
8 3
Under this provision, the docketing lien cannot die during a
bankruptcy proceeding. 4 JC always has thirty days of lien life
after the automatic stay is finally terminated.8 5 If JC serves an
execution on the sheriff and moves to extend the lien under
section 5203(b), she can expect to realize on the debtor's real
property.
79 Id. § 362(b)(3).
80 866 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1989).
81 Id. at 564.
82 Id. at 565-66.
83 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
1 See id.
85 Id.
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Assuming that JC makes a motion under CPLR 5203(b) in
lieu of relying on the section 108(c) extension, the CPLR permits
an extension "for a period no longer than the time during which
the judgment creditor was stayed." 6 For example, suppose a
bankruptcy proceeding existed for 400 days in the middle years
of a docketing lien's life. In the waning days of the lien, it is open
for JC to obtain an extension for 400 days.
Or, alternatively, suppose bankruptcy occurs nine years,
eleven months, and thirty days after the judgment roll is filed.
The automatic stay prevents enforcement, but not extension. If
JC moves to extend before the death of the docketing lien, how
long will the extension be? The "time during which the judgment
creditor was stayed"8 7 has not yet been finally determined. So
how shall the court proceed? One possibility is that the court
could award an extension for the total time of the automatic stay,
whatever time that may turn out to be. Suppose later we find
that the automatic stay lasts for two years. By the time this is
determined, JC is thirty days into the eleventh month of the
eleventh year. So the two-year extension terminates one day
after the automatic stay ends, at the end of the twelfth year. JC
has exactly one day of lien life. Assuming she is paying
attention, if she serves the execution on the sheriff on this last
day and makes yet another section 5203(b) motion, she can still
accomplish the execution sale. On this example, the thirty-day
extension of Bankruptcy Code section 108(c) is a blessing
indeed. 8
In the Morton case, a state court granted JC's section
5203(b) motion by extending the docketing lien for the duration
of the bankruptcy proceeding, "plus three months after lifting of
[the automatic] stay. 's9 The Morton court did not rule on the
propriety of this order. But no doubt it is permitted by the
wildcard CPLR 5240, which refers to a court's discretion to
"extending... any enforcement procedure."90 If so, we would
have an example of section 5240 being used to help JC, for a
86 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(b) (McKinney 2008).
87 Id.
's See infra text accompanying notes 123-134 (noting that a quite separate
extension technique is the action on the judgment brought a year before the
docketing lien dies).
19 Morton v. Nat'l Bank (In re Morton), 866 F.2d 561, 562 (2d Cir. 1989)
(emphasis omitted).
90 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240.
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change. As we shall see, overwhelmingly it is JDs who have
obtained relief under section 5240.
iv. Proper Parties
Section 5203(b) has the flaw of requiring service only on
JD.91 Yet, where JD has quitclaimed her equity to X, should not
X be the one served? In G. Roma Roofing Co. v. Marcotrigiano,92
X was indeed served. X protested the extension of the lien by
pointing out that only JD who once owned the property, not JD's
co-defendants, were served with notice. All the codebtors
should have been served, X argued.94 The court disagreed and
held that the docketing lien could be extended so long as JD who
once owned the property and X were joined, though, literally, the
statute did not even require the joining of X.95 Indeed, if the
Morton case is correct that extending liens is not a taking of
debtor property, it is possible to say that X has no due process
right to be notified, as no property of X is being taken. For
that matter, section 5203(b) might omit service of any party;
extension might constitutionally be accomplished in an ex parte
procedure.
v. Death of the Judgment Debtor
Another event that extends the life of the docketing lien,
ironically, is the death of JD. According to CPLR 5208, "[a]
judgment lien existing against real property at the time of a
judgment debtor's death shall expire two years thereafter or ten
years after filing of the judgment-roll, whichever is later."96 In a
probate proceeding, the docketing lien guarantees that JC will
have a priority as to the encumbered asset over any unsecured
creditor.97 Execution, however, is not permitted, except by leave
91 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(b).
92 156 A.D.2d 638, 639, 549 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (2d Dep't 1989).
9 Id. at 639, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
Id.
95 Id.
96 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5208. Where the judgment debtor has conveyed away all
interest in the real property subject to his lien and prior to his death, section 5208
has no application. See Sylmar Holding Corp. v. Steinberg, 93 Misc. 2d 835, 836, 403
N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978).
17 See Estate of Pierce, 122 Misc. 2d 908, 912 472 N.Y.S.2d 275, 278 (Sur. Ct.
Onondaga County 1984), affd, 106 A.D.2d 892, 483 N.Y.S.2d 500 (4th Dep't 1984).
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of the surrogate court.9 8 On the other hand, where the execution
has issued to a sheriff under a docketing lien on real property,
and where death intervenes between the execution and the sale,
the sheriff may apparently proceed without leave of the probate
court.9  This is true even though section 5208 prohibits
"any... enforcement procedure [to] be undertaken" without the
surrogate's permission. 100
2. The Levying Lien
The alternative to the docketing lien is the levying lien.
According to CPLR 5235:
After the expiration of ten years after the filing of the judgment-
roll, the sheriff shall levy upon any interest of the judgment
debtor in real property, pursuant to an execution.., by filing
with the clerk of the county in which the property is located a
notice of levy describing the judgment, the execution and the
property. 101
The key language here is: "[a]fter the expiration of ten years
after the filing of the judgment-roll."10 2 This language ties into
the duration of the docketing lien, which lasts ten years after the
judgment-roll is filed. Therefore it is impossible for a creditor to
get a levying lien during the time a docketing lien is available.
In other words, docketing liens preempt levying liens until the
docketing lien has died. Is there any reason for such a rule? By
no means! The rule is arbitrary and unworthy of the great state
of New York. It should be possible for the sheriff to levy at any
time as an alternative to docketing a judgment.
98 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5208. Where the creditor already has a valid docketing lien, the
creditor need not file a proper claim against the decedent's estate in order to obtain
permission to execute. See In re Chester Nat'l Bank, 72 Misc. 2d 310, 312, 339
N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (Sur. Ct. Orange County 1972). The rule in section 5208 does not
seem to restrain federal courts. See Kashi v. Gratsos, 712 F. Supp. 23, 25 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). But in real estate cases, JC must docket in state court and enforce the
judgment via the sheriff, in which case section 5208 would apply after all. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5208.
1 Oysterman's Bank & Trust Co. v. Weeks, 35 A.D.2d 580, 580, 313 N.Y.S.2d
535, 537 (2d Dep't 1970).
100 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5208; see also Oysterman's Bank, 35 A.D.2d at 581, 313
N.Y.S.2d at 537 (Benjamin, J., dissenting).
101 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5235.
102 Id.
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In Community Capital Corp. v. Lee, 10 3 JC's docketing lien
was in its final weeks of life's fitful fever and was scheduled to
yield the ghost before the execution sale. JC did not move to
extend under CPLR 5203(b). Instead, the sheriff filed notice of
levy before the expiration of ten years after the filing of the
judgment-roll. The sheriff then conducted an execution sale
where JC was the buyer. The Lee court held that the levy was
invalid because it did not occur more than ten years after the
judgment-roll was filed.' °4 Accordingly, the sale was invalid
because no lien existed at the time of the sale. 115 The Lee court,
however, failed to attend to the precise wording of CPLR 5236(a),
which states:
[T]he interest of the judgment debtor in real property which has
been levied upon under an execution delivered to the sheriff or
which was subject to the lien of the judgment at the time of such
delivery shall be sold by the sheriff pursuant to the execution at
public auction .... 106
Properly, the sale should have been sustained. JC had a
docketing lien at the time the execution was delivered. That is
all section 5236(a) requires.
Just as the docketing lien has a duration, so has the levying
lien. According to the preamble to CPLR 5203(a), the lien
commences upon the levy, but it lasts only "until the execution is
returned."107
According to CPLR 5230(c):
An execution shall be returned to the clerk of the
court.., within sixty days after issuance unless the execution
has been served in accordance with.., subdivision (a) of section
5232. The time may be extended in writing for a period of not
103 58 Misc. 2d 34, 294 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
104 Id. at 36, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 338; accord Gratton v. Dido Realty Co., 139 Misc.
2d 724, 726, 528 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1988) ("CPLR 5235 does
not revive or extend the judicial realty lien itself but allows the judgment to become
a levy or 'temporary lien' entirely independent of the realty lien ... ").
105 The Weinstein-Korn-Miller treatise remarks, "In [Lee] the judgment creditor
had, for a bid of $197.25, acquired the judgment debtor's equity which was worth
$13,000. Consequently, that ruling might be closely confined to its facts." JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: C.P.L.R. 5203.06 (2d ed. 2004).
That JC had a bargain seems rather unrelated to the question whether the sheriff
had properly levied. If the bidding had been spirited, would the levy have been
authorized? Only a legal realist would say so.
'06 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(a) (emphasis added).
107 Id. 5203.
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more than sixty additional days by the attorney fo0 the
judgment creditor .... Further like extensions may be given by
the attorney for the judgment creditor ... unless another
execution against the same judgment debtor... has been
delivered to the same enforcement officer and has not been
returned.108
This provision makes it clear that the life of the execution (and
hence the life of the levying lien) can be extended by the
attorney. But the reference to CPLR 5232(a) is illuminating.
Section 5232(a) describes the levy of personal property not
capable of delivery. So the law of personal property is that a levy
obviates the need to return the execution. 1 9 If this is so for
personal property, why should the rule be different if the sheriff
levies real property? In truth, the different rules for duration of
the levying lien and the execution lien on personal property
cannot be explained or defended. On this matter the CPLR is
quite absurd.
3. Duration of a Money Judgment
The complex interrelation of the docketing lien and the
levying lien is partly explained by the duration of the money
judgment itself. According to CPLR 211(b):
A money judgment is presumed to be paid and satisfied after
the expiration of twenty years from the time when the party
recovering it was first entitled to enforce it. This presumption
is conclusive, except as against a person who within the twenty
years acknowledges an indebtedness, or makes a payment, of all
or part of the amount recovered by the judgment, or his heir or
personal representative, or a person whom he otherwise
represents.110
This period is not a true statute of limitations, but is merely a
presumption, though eventually a conclusive one."' For this
reason, tolling doctrines and waiver would not apply to it. 112 In
addition, the period for enforcing a judgment may exceed twenty
years where an earlier partial payment or acknowledgement of
10 Id. 5230(c).
109 No rule is supplied if the sheriff levies property capable of delivery.
110 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 211(b).
"1 See Jimenez v. Shippy Realty Corp., 163 Misc. 2d 121, 125, 618 N.Y.S.2d 963,
966 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1994).
112 See Palazzo v. Hyde, 82 Misc. 2d 765, 766, 370 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1975).
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the debt exists. After twenty years, however, JC will have to
prove that the judgment remains unpaid and that JD
acknowledged the debtor made a partial payment." 3
The judgment, then, remains viable even after the docketing
lien dies. During this post-lien period, executions can issue, so
long as the twenty-year period has not run."' And it is during
this period that a levying lien can be created." 5 Separately, an
action on the judgment can be brought after the docketing lien is
dead, but before the twenty-year period has lapsed." 6 In such an
action a new docketing lien arises, and separately, a new
judgment lasting at least twenty years also arises.1 1 7
In general, the action on a judgment can be brought only
after "ten years have elapsed since the first docketing of the
judgment."' 8  But earlier actions are possible. If JC has a
113 Federal judgments, in contrast, have no statute of limitations and are
perpetually valid. See United States v. Hannon, 728 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1984).
Other states have the concept of dormancy. Under this doctrine, a judgment no
longer implies a lien on local real estate if the judgment becomes dormant. In Ohio,
the real estate lien arises when a certificate of judgment is filed with the court of
common pleas where the real estate is located. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.02
(LexisNexis 2008). Dormancy occurs if no writ of execution or new certificate of
judgment is filed within five years of entry. See id. § 2329.07. Typically, actions on
the judgment can revive the judgments, but must be brought within a specified time
after dormancy begins. See id. § 2325.18 (limiting Ohio to revive a judgment within
ten years).
114 See Paola Vista Clothing, Ltd. v. V.R.P. Calzaturificio S.P.A., 148 A.D.2d 593,
595, 539 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (2d Dep't 1989). Prior to enactment of the CPLR, an
execution could issue five years after entry only with permission of the court. See
Levine v. Bornstein, 4 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 149 N.E.2d 883, 885, 173 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601
(1958).
111 See Quarant v. Ferrara, 111 Misc. 2d 1042, 1044, 445 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981).
116 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5014 (McKinney 2008).
117 See First Nat'l Bank of Long Island v. Brooks, No. 10130/03, 2003 WL
23009241, at *2 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County Sept. 22, 2003).
118 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5014(1). This point was overlooked in Acquisitions Plus, LLC v.
Krupski, 16 A.D.3d 827, 828, 792 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636 (3d Dep't 2005), where JC
obtained a judgment for conversion in May 1993. JD promptly filed for bankruptcy,
and JC obtained a judgment from the bankruptcy court that the conversion
judgment was nondischargeable. JC filed this judgment with the clerk of the
Supreme Court on July 8, 1994. The appellate division ruled that the anti-discharge
judgment, when filed with the state court, gave rise to a new docketing lien.
Everything about this holding is odd. First, a judicial ruling that a prior claim
against JD is not discharged may be a judgment obtained in an adversary
proceeding, FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(5), but it is hardly a money judgment. There
should have been no lien associated with it. See generally Alan M. Ahart, Enforcing
Nondischargeable Money Judgments: The Bankruptcy Courts' Dubious Jurisdiction,
74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 115 (2000) (bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction to issue
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default judgment in which JD never appeared and wheie JD was
not personally served with process, JC can commence an early
action on the judgment, presumably to improve the dubious
worth of default judgments, which fail if service of process was
defective. Also, an earlier action may be brought if the court "so
orders on motion with such notice to such other persons as the
court may direct." 19 This motion, however, is not the same as
bringing the action itself. The action on a judgment must be
commenced like any other action. A "motion" is therefore an
inappropriate procedure for generating a new judgment.120
Apparently, it is also possible to use the action on the
judgment to extend the old docketing lien. The extension
function requires commencement of the action prior to the ninth
and before the end of the tenth year after the judgment-roll is
filed. This possibility stems from a triad of sentences added to
CPLR 5014 in 1986:121
money judgments in conjunction with anti-discharge rulings). Second, if this
judgment gave rise to a lien, it must be viewed as an action on the earlier judgment,
since it makes reference to it and gives rise to a lien. Yet, actions on a judgment are
not permitted within ten years. Third, we are not told precisely when the discharge
judgment was filed, but it seems very possible that the judgment was filed with the
state clerk during the pendency of the automatic stay. Actions in violation of the
automatic stay are usually thought to be void or voidable. See City of Farmers
Branch v. Pointer (In re Pointer), 952 F.2d 82, 85-86 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing
when actions are considered voidable); Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County
Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540, 1545 (2d Cir. 1989)
(discussing when actions are considered void). This perhaps was another reason why
the bankruptcy judgment should not have given rise to a lien.
In Krupski, the supreme court had issued a CPLR 5240 protective order against
execution of any sort. 16 A.D. 3d at 828, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 636. This meant that, so
long as JC moved before the death of the discharge judgment lien, it could extend
the life of the lien past the usual ten years. See supra text accompanying notes 70-
99. The Supreme Court, however, had issued the section 5240 protection order on
June 29, 2004. The dubious discharge lien was scheduled to die on July 8, 2004.
Therefore, JC had less than two weeks to make its CPLR 5203(b) motion.
119 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5014(3).
120 See Curia v. Brooks, Weinger, Robbins & Leeds, Inc., 182 Misc. 2d 36, 38-39,
696 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778-79 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1999). The Curia court
rejects, as contrary to the statute, a suggestion by Professor Siegel that local JCs
should have access to the easy procedure of article 54, pertaining to the recognition
of foreign judgments. See id. at 40, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
121 Ch. 123, § 1, 1986 N.Y. Laws 235 (McKinney). In response to this
amendment, the New York Office of Court Administration remarked, "Since this
measure is not likely to have a significant impact on court administration, the
Office ... takes no position on the measure." Memorandum of Office of Court
Administration, reprinted in Ch. 123, 1986 N.Y. Laws 3379 (McKinney). It then
made the excellent suggestion that the docketing lien be made coterminous with the
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An action may be commenced under subdivision one of this
section during the year prior to the expiration of ten years since
the first docketing of the judgment. The judgment in such
action shall be designated a renewal judgment and shall be so
docketed by the clerk. The lien of a renewal judgment shall take
effect upon the expiration of ten years from the first docketing of
the original judgment.'2 2
Courts have read the emphasized language to extend the old lien,
not to create a new lien. Presumably, the period of extension is
ten years after the judgment roll is filed in the new action. Such
a reading makes sense. If it were read as creating a new lien,
then any transferee of JD during the life of the old lien would
obtain a complete promotion at the end of the first docketing lien.
Where JD has sold equity outright to X subject to JC's lien, for
example, JC's renewal lien would have nothing to which it could
attach, and X would have obtained a windfall. There would be
little to recommend such a result. Analogously, article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") has an express "continuous
perfection" principle. In its current version, the principle is
expressed as follows:
A security interest ... is perfected continuously if it is originally
perfected by one method under this article and is later perfected
by another method under this article, without an intermediate
period when it was unperfected."'
In contrast, CPLR 5014 does not invoke the word "continuous."
Nevertheless, courts have sensibly found continuity to be the
theme of the renewal judgment.
Thus, in Matis v. Delasho,12 4 a docketing lien existed prior to
JD's bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy JD was discharged. A
discharge "voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the
extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal
liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under
section 727. ' ' 25 The prepetition judgment of JC was therefore
voided, but the docketing lien was not.126 And JC could extend
life of the judgment itself, eliminating an excuse for confusion in the period after the
docketing lien yields the ghost.
122 Ch. 123, § 1, 1986 N.Y. Laws 235 (McKinney) (emphasis added).
123 U.C.C. § 9-308(c) (2005).
124 191 Misc. 2d 338, 741 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 2002).
125 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
126 Mathis, 191 Misc. 2d at 339, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 850; see also Brooklyn Jenapo
Fed. Credit Union v. Shain (In re Shain), 47 B.R. 309, 313 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985);
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this lien by bringing an action on the judgment prior to Lhe lapse
of the docketing lien. 12v Had JC waited until after the docketing
lien was dead, the discharge would have prevented any "new"
lien from arising.12  Discharge cannot, however, prevent
extending the life of the old lien.
In In re Buchardt,129 the extending nature of the action on
the judgment was cleverly used to dodge the effect of Bankruptcy
Code section 522(f)(1). 130 This section permits the avoidance of
judicial liens to the extent they impair exemptions. 13' The main
effect of section 522(f)(1) is to prevent judicial liens from enjoying
appreciation value from the real estate after bankruptcy, to the
extent of the exemption. For instance, New York's real estate
exemption is limited in value to $50,000.132 Suppose JD's
homestead is over-encumbered with mortgages. In bankruptcy,
JD can use section 522(f)(1) to ensure that, after bankruptcy, if
the homestead appreciates in value to $50,000 or more over the
mortgages, JD will be the recipient of the appreciation value.
Section 522(f)(1) was a new idea introduced to bankruptcy
law in 1978.133 The provision had no effect on liens in existence
prior to 1978."3 In Buchardt, JC had a judgment docketed on
September 16, 1977."3 In July 1987, JC brought a timely action
on the judgment.'36 The extending effect of the action meant that
JD could not bring a section 522(f) avoidance action against the
lien, as the lien antedated, by grace of the extension, the
enactment of section 552(f). 37
Carman v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 78 N.Y.2d 1066, 1067, 581 N.E.2d 1345,
1347, 576 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (1991). According to section 150(4)(b) of the New York
Debtor and Creditor Law, a debtor with a discharge is entitled only to have a
qualified discharge marked on the docket, indicating that the judgment creditor may
have a surviving lien on the property. N.Y. DEBT. & CREDIT. LAW § 150(4)(b)
(McKinney 2008)
127 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5014 (McKinney 2008).
128 See Gratton v. Dido Realty Co., 139 Misc. 2d 724, 726, 528 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1988).
129 114 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990).
130 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
131 Id.
132 See infra note 464 and accompanying text.
133 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 522(f)(1), 92 Stat.
2549, 2589 (1978).
l United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81 (1982).
'3 In re Buchardt, 114 B.R. 362, 363 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990).
136 Id.
17 Id. at 365. The question may arise: Isn't the homestead exemption self-
executing? Why does a bankrupt debtor need section 522(f)(1) to protect the
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Buchardt contained a hidden issue. Although JC
commenced the section 5014 action before its old lien died, the
court did not actually rule in favor of JC until two days after the
death of the lien. 138 Nevertheless, the Buchardt court ruled that
JC had a continuous lien back to 1977.139
What if, after the old lien had died and before the actual
extension had been granted, JD grants a mortgage to A? The
docket will not reflect the fact that JC is in the process of
extending the lien. Is A entitled to priority over JC?
The court in Gletzer v. Harris140 read section 5014 as
requiring not only commencement, but completion of the action
before the death of the old lien. In Gletzer, JC's docketing lien
was due to expire on October 24, 2001.141 Therefore, on October
22, 2001, JC commenced his section 5014 action. 142 The supreme
court did not get around to granting JD summary judgment until
June 26, 2007.143 Meanwhile, in 2003, JD granted mortgages to
A and B.'" According to the appellate panel, JC had to
commence and prevail before the original docketing lien died, in
order to prevail against "gap" transferees:
Here, [A and B] demonstrated that they properly recorded
mortgages establishing liens against [JD's] condominium unit
at a time when the official records indicated that the only extant
lien had expired by October 23, 2001. Once the county docket
book reflected only [JC's] expired lien, other creditors were fully
entitled to rely upon that fact and make mortgage loans on the
assumption that their mortgage liens would have priority. They
had no obligation to take into account the possibility that [JC]
might, in the future, successfully obtain a new lien against
[JD's] property. 145
exemption? While the homestead is usually self-executing, there is one circumstance
where it is not, rendering section 522(f(1) crucial to the debtor's exemption.
138 Buchardt, 114 B.R. at 363. In contrast, JC, in Matis v. Delasho, obtained
relief six days before the original docketing lien died. 191 Misc. 2d 338, 339, 741
N.Y.S.2d 849, 849 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 2002).
139 Buchardt, 114 B.R. at 365.
140 51 A.D.3d 196, 200, 854 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (1st Dep't 2008).
141 Id. at 202, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
142 Id. at 198, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 199, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
1321
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Gletzer court also hinted that if A and B had knowledge of
JC's renewal action, JC might have prevailed.'46 So a fuller
version of the Gletzer rule might be as follows: After docketing,
JC has a lien on local real property until ten years after the
judgment roll is filed.'47 If JC files an action on the judgment in
the one-year period prior to the lapse of the docketing lien, JC
obtains an equitable lien on JD's property, if the court has not
granted the new judgment. The source of this equitable lien is
the final sentence in section 5014, which provides: "The lien of a
renewal judgment shall take effect upon the expiration of ten
years from the first docketing of the original judgment."14  Once
the court grants the new judgment, the equitable lien becomes a
judicial lien. This vision coheres with Buchardt, which found
continuity of a lien even though a gap existed between the old
lien and the docketing of the new judgment. 149 It also prevents
transferees who were subject to JC's original lien from enjoying a
promotion in priority just because of judicial delay in granting
the new judgment. It protects A and B if and only if they are
bona fide purchasers for value. 50 It does not protect a JC 2 who
dockets in the equitable gap; JCs are typically subordinated to
prior equitable liens,' 5 ' though New York has some unfortunate
case law to the contrary.'52 And finally, JC can protect himself in
141 Id. at 203, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
14 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2008).
148 Id. 5014.
141 In re Buchardt, 114 B.R. 362, 364-65 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990).
... See Reif v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 268 N.Y. 269, 276, 197 N.E. 278,
280 (1935) (citing Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N.Y. 61, 74, 84 N.E. 585, 589 (1908)).
151 Eisenberg v. Mercer Hicks Corp., 199 Misc. 52, 54, 101 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950), affd mem., 278 A.D.2d 806, 104 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't
1951).
162 In City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., JD assigned to SP its
contingent right to a refund from the state comptroller if JD chose to cancel its
liquor license. 2 N.Y.2d 429, 431, 141 N.E.2d 575, 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (1957).
JD did cancel its license, so that the comptroller had a fixed obligation to pay. Id. at
432, 141 N.E.2d at 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 68. JC then obtained a lien on the
comptroller's obligation. Id. The Court of Appeals held that JC was the victor. Id. at
432, 141 N.E.2d at 576, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 68. SP had only an equitable lien on after-
acquired property, which could not take priority over JC's "legal" judicial lien. Id. at
432-33, 141 N.E.2d at 576, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 69. One would have thought that the
equitable lien, arising when the comptroller's obligation to pay became vested, would
have been completely good against a subsequent judicial lien. See id. at 434-35, 141
N.E.2d at 577, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (Froessel, J., dissenting). The whole point of the
equitable lien is to foreclose subsequent creditors. Nevertheless, JC prevailed, justly
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the gap during which the equitable lien exists by filing a notice of
pendency.153 This solution puts some extra procedural burden on
JC, but the notice of pendency makes sure that gap transferees
cannot claim to take free of JC's renewal judgment.
III. THE SALE
A. The Requirement of a Lien
A lien is a power of sale-a power that is the key to the
entire process of liquidating real property in aid of money
judgment satisfaction.' According to CPLR 5236(a): "[T]he
interest of the judgment debtor in real property which has been
levied upon under an execution delivered to the sheriff or which
was subject to the lien of the judgment at the time of such
delivery shall be sold by the sheriff pursuant to the
execution .... Here are set forth two conditions precedent to
the sheriffs sale. First, JC must have delivered an execution to
the sheriff. With regard to the execution, it is a rule that the
sheriff will do nothing with regard to a money judgment unless
an execution shall have been delivered to her. 56  But the
execution itself does not create a lien on real property. Only
docketing or levying does so.
Second, there must have been a levy or a "lien of the
judgment" at the time the execution was served. We must
presume that "lien of the judgment" means a docketing lien.'57
engendering the scorn of the great Grant Gilmore. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 7.12, 12.9 (1999).
153 According to CPLR 6501,
[a] notice of pendency may be filed in any action in a court of the state or of
the United States in which the judgment demanded would affect the title
to . . . real property. The pendency. . . is constructive notice, from the time
of filing of the notice only, to a purchaser from, or incumbrancer against,
any defendant named in a notice of pendency indexed in a block index
against a block in which property affected is situated or any defendant
against whose name a notice of pendency is indexed.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6501 (McKinney 2008).
154 See supra Part II.A.1.
15, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(a).
'rl See Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Conner, 103 N.Y. 502, 510, 9 N.E. 238,
239 (1886).
I'l Section 5236(a) arguably implies that if, after docketing, the judgment debtor
has sold the equity in the property, the sheriff should not sell. The sheriff, however,
can be compelled to sell in spite of this implication. See Jones v. Knowlton, 199
A.D.2d 871, 872, 606 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (3d Dep't 1993).
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Under CPLR 5203(a), only levying and local docketing witt '
county clerk give rise to liens. Entry of judgment does not.
B. Procedural Details
The CPLR much regulates the sale. First, the sale must be
scheduled between the 56th and 63rd day after publication of
notice of the sale.'58 The sheriff, however, may postpone it.' 59
The sale must be by auction, and "at such time and place within
the county where the real property is situated.., as in [the
sheriffs] judgment will bring the highest price."16° Neither the
sheriff nor his deputy may buy at the auction. 16 1 The sheriff may
sell such combination of parcels as will bring the highest price. 62
Notice of the sale must be served on JD'61 and posted in
three public places where the land is located. 6 4 Notice must also
be published once every two weeks in a newspaper published in
the county (or an adjoining county, if none). 65 Significantly, the
sheriff must mail notice to all parties holding an interest the real
property to be sold.'66
What are the consequences of procedural mistakes? The
CPLR states that purchasers without notice are not affected by
the sheriffs failure to give notice. 67 This, of course, implies that
purchasers with notice are affected. These matters are
considered later, in connection with the questionable
constitutionality of CPLR 5236(c). 68
158 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(a).
159 Id. The public is invited to request from the sheriff notice of any
postponement. Id. 5236(d). The request, and the sheriffs response, must be made by
personal service on the sheriff or by certified or registered mail. Id. A postponing
sheriff must show up at the scheduled time and place of sale and announce the
postponement. Id.
160 Id. 5236(a). If real property traverses a county line, the sale may be held in
either county. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
11 Id. 5236(c); see also id. 308.
11 Id. 5236(c).
165 Id.
1 Id. ("A list containing the name and address of the judgment debtor and of
every judgment creditor whose judgment was a lien on the real property to be
sold... shall be furnished [sic] the sheriff by the judgment creditor, and each person
on the list shall be served by the sheriff with a copy of the notice .....
167 Id.
168 See infra text accompanying notes 244-272.
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C. Sale of Mortgaged Premises
In New York, the sheriff may not execute on JD's real
property if JC also holds a mortgage on the same land to which
her judicial lien attaches. For example, suppose JD granted a
mortgage on Blackacre to A and then defaults. Instead of
foreclosing on the mortgage, A elects to obtain a money judgment
for the mortgage debt. According to CPLR 5236(b), the sheriff
may not sell Blackacre. 169 Of course, it remains open, after the
money judgment, for A separately to enforce its mortgage, 17 0 or to
execute on other real or personal property of the debtor.
The reason for this restriction is that, under New York
mortgage law, D has the right to redeem Blackacre by tendering
to A the amount of the mortgage debt. This "equity of
redemption" exists until the foreclosure sale is accomplished.' 7'
But, rather shockingly, the CPLR provides no right of
redemption. In general, if JC has a docketing lien on JD's
property, and if JD tenders the amount of the judgment to JC,
JC ostensibly does not have to take it and can proceed
maliciously to sell JD's real property. There is no accounting for
why this should be so. Fortunately, it is also part of New York
law that the courts can do whatever they want, with respect
enforcement of judgments. According to CPLR 5240, "[t]he court
may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any
interested person, and upon such notice as it may require, make
an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or
modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." Presumably,
courts will use this power to force JC1 to take the tender or lose
the right of sale.'72
169 For this reason, section 5230(a)'s last sentence requires: "Where the
judgment.. . was recovered for all or part of a mortgage debt, the execution shall
also describe the mortgaged property, specify the book and page where the mortgage
is recorded, and direct that no part of the mortgaged property be levied upon or sold
thereunder." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(a).
170 Goddard v. Johnson, 96 Misc. 2d 230, 231, 408 N.Y.S.2d 923, 923 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. Kings County 1978). If the creditor has already started a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding, the mortgagee may not seek a money judgment without permission from
the foreclosing court. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1301(3) (McKinney 2008). If
the mortgagee first obtains a judgment, she may not start a foreclosure sale until
the sheriff returns an execution unsatisfied. Id. § 1301(1).
171 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1341.
172 See Rondack Const. Servs., Inc. v. Kaatsbaan Int'l Dance Ctr., Inc., 54 A.D.3d
924, 926, 864 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-29 (2d Dep't 2008); Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl &
Vaccaro v. Kane, 33 A.D.3d 785, 787, 822 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633-34 (2d Dep't 2006)
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The Court of Appeals seemed to say otherwise in Guardian
Loan Co. v. Early,173 which held that CPLR 5240 could not be
used to overturn sales solely on the basis of inadequate bids at
the auction. 17 4 In the course of so ruling, the court said:
Indeed, to permit CPLR 5240 to be used to set aside already
completed execution sales would be tantamount to a judicial
resurrection of the concept of equity of redemption a remedy
purposefully deleted from article 52 by the Legislature and one
which we have no right to invoke. However unfortunate the
judgment debtor's plight may be, CPLR 5240 relates to the use
of an enforcement device; it has no application after the
threatened use of an enforcement procedure is a fait accompli. 175
This passage should not be read to bar use of section 5240 to
compel JC to take cash in lieu of proceeding with the execution
sale. Rather, the Early court is referring to pre-CPLR law which
permitted judgment debtors to redeem property after the sale.176
What must not be revived is a post-sale redemption period that
would have the effect of depressing the bids at execution sales.
Pre-sale redemption would have no such effect and is clearly a
good (even compelling) idea.
Be that as it may, where A holds a mortgage and a money
judgment, A may not cause the sheriff to hold an execution sale,
because that would deprive JD of the "right of redemption" under
mortgage law. 77 If, however, redemption were part of the CPLR
scheme, as it should be, then the restriction against selling
mortgaged property could be repealed. In fact, where JC also has
a mortgage on property as to which she has docketed locally, the
sheriff could be viewed as foreclosing the mortgage itself. The
CPLR could take guidance from article 9 of the UCC. According
to section 9-601(e) of the UCC:
(granting redemption right under section 5240), appeal denied, 8 N.Y. 858, 863
N.E.2d 109, 831 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2007). If JD satisfies the judgment and pays JC,, JD
will still owe the sheriff a poundage fee. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8012(b)(2). This will be
calculated as a percentage of the value of JD's interest in the real property. No
deduction in value is permitted if JD's property is entitled to the New York
homestead exemption. See Dean v. Dean, 174 Misc. 2d 171, 173, 662 N.Y.S.2d 1014,
1016 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1997).
173 47 N.Y.2d 515, 521, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 1244, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (1979).
174 See infra text accompanying notes 228-246.
178 47 N.Y.2d at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (emphasis added).
176 New York Civil Practice Act, ch. 925, §§ 724-28, 1920 N.Y. Laws 254-55
(repealed 1963).
177 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1341.
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If a secured party has reduced its claim to judgment, the lien of
any levy that may be made upon the collateral by virtue of an
execution based upon the judgment relates back to the earliest
of:
(1) the date of perfection of the security interest.., in the
collateral; [or]
(2) the date of filing a financing statement covering the
collateral .... 17
As this is the law of New York for personal property, there is
absolutely no reason why it should not also be the law for real
property. In fact, since courts can do whatever they want under
CPLR 5240, it is open for them to achieve this result without the
need for any legislative intervention.
D. What's for Sale?
1. First in Time Is First in Right
One thing the CPLR omits to explain is what a buyer gets
when real property is sold pursuant to section 5236. As the
entire debt enforcement regime turns on the answer to this
question, the omission is rather negligent. All we learn from the
CPLR is that the "sheriff shall execute and deliver to the
purchaser.., a deed which shall convey the right, title and
interest sold."1 79 But what interest is that?
To answer the question, we must refer back to the
nonstatutory formula for liens developed earlier 180 : The sheriff
may sell whatever JD could have sold at the time JC's lien was
created.1 81 Liens are created by docketing or levy. So the inquiry
becomes, 'What did the debtor have at the time of lien creation?"
That, at least, is what the sheriff can sell.
1 2
178 U.C.C. § 9-601(e) (2005).
179 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(f) (McKinney 2008). The sheriff must also prove
publication, service of notice and posting of notice. Id.
180 See supra Part II.A.
181 See May v. Finnerty, 104 Misc. 2d 450, 452, 428 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1980) ("A purchaser, after he obtains the Sheriffs deed is in the
same position as he would have been if the deed had been executed by the judgment
debtor at the time the judgment was docketed. .. ."). I have altered the foregoing
description to make clear that when JC causes the sheriff to sell, JC's lien
disappears as well as any interest that comes into being after JC's judgment was
docketed.
182 Courts have difficulty articulating this principle. In Guardian Loan Co. v.
Early, the court said, "the purchaser at a Sheriffs sale now takes immediate title to
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The CPLR conforms with this model, but only in part. in
Insulation Plus, Inc. v. Higgins,8 3 we had the following scenario:
ti: JC1 dockets against JD.
t2: Pursuant to JC,'s execution, the sheriff sells JD's real
property. The buyer is JC1 for the princely sum of one dollar.18
4
The sheriff does not, however, write out a deed to JC1.
t3 : JC 2 dockets.
In Insulation Plus, JC, successfully obtained a declaration that
JC 2 was foreclosed."8 5 This is because JC 1 could sell whatever the
debtor had at ti, when JC 1's lien was created. 8 6 The Insulation
Plus court articulated the principle of "first in time is first in
right" as follows:
Once the deed was recorded, title was deemed to have passed at
the time plaintiffs judgment was docketed. "[Tihe purchaser at
a Sheriffs sale ... takes immediate title to the property and is
placed in the same position as he would have been if the deed
had been executed by the judgment debtor himself ..."1"
To give another example, in Department of Housing
Preservation & Development v. Ferranti,' the following
chronology unfolded:
t1 : JC dockets against JD.
t2 : JD sells the equity to B.
t3 : B grants a mortgage to C.
t4 : After B defaults, C arranges a foreclosure sale, where C is
the buyer.
the property and is placed in the same position as he would have been if the deed
had been executed by the judgment debtor himself." 47 N.Y.2d 515, 518, 392 N.E.2d
1240, 1242, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58-59 (1979). This does not work if the debtor has
conveyed away the property by the time of the execution sale. The court should have
said that the purchaser takes title as if the deed had been executed by the judgment
debtor at the time of lien creation.
1- 214 A.D.2d 1001, 626 N.Y.S.2d 609 (4th Dep't 1995).
184 How could JC, win the auction for one dollar? One strong possibility is that
JD had previously granted a mortgage to A, and the mortgage was under water-
that is, the unencumbered property was worth less than the amount of A's claim.
185 Higgins, 214 A.D.2d at 1002, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
's Id., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11 (emphasizing that JC 2 succumbed to CPLR
5203(a)(3) in that JC1 was a purchaser who took free and clear of JC2). This is true,
but JC 1 wins just from the preamble to section 5203(a) without any reference to this
exception.
187 Id., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 611 (emphasis added) (citing Guardian, 47 N.Y.2d at
518, 392 N.E.2d at 1242, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58).
188 212 A.D.2d 438, 622 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1995).
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t 5 : JC serves an execution on the sheriff, and the sheriff sells to
X.
At t5, JC had the power to sell whatever JD had at t-fee simple
absolute. JD's transfer at t2 could not affect JC's power. Nor
could B's transfer at t3. Notice that at t5, JD had no interest at
all in the real property. C owned the equity by virtue of buying
at t4 . Yet the sheriff still had the power to sell the real property.
At t3, C (as buyer) bought whatever B had at t3 (when C's
mortgage was created). At t3, B had an estate encumbered by
JC's lien. Accordingly, C was forecloseable by JC at t5 .
2. Second in Time Is First in Right
The CPLR follows the rule of "first in time is first in right,"
but it also has some rules of "second in time is first in right."
These are legislated as exceptions to the basic "first in time"
notion.
a. Judicial Liens Second in Time
According to CPLR 5203(a), liens arise upon local docketing
or levy, subject to an important exception."8 9  These liens,
however, are no good against "a transfer to a purchaser for value
at a judicial sale, which shall include an execution sale."' 90 The
Fifth Scenario illustrates how this rule of "second in time" works.
Fifth Scenario
ti: JC, dockets.
t2: JC2 dockets.
t3: JC2 serves an execution, but JC1 never does.
t4: At the execution sale, based on JC 2's execution, X is the
buyer.
Under CPLR 5203(a)(3), JC 2 has the power to foreclose JC,, even
though JC 2 is second in time. Oddly, section 5203(a) never refers
to JC 2. Rather, it refers to X. So until X comes into the picture
at t4, JC1 is not yet expressly subordinated to JC 2. Section
5203(a)(3), however, implies that X takes free of JC,'s judicial
lien. And this in turn implies that JC 2 has power to sell more
189 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a).
190 Id. 5203(a)(3). This provision is a change from the prior law, which followed
the classic "first-in-time" foreclosure regime. See, e.g., Bennett v. Fish, 2 Misc. 2d
1051, 1053, 157 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1956) (buyer at
execution sale junior to senior judicial liens).
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than what D had at the time JC 2's lien was created. JC 2 is
second in time but first in right in terms of the power to sell.
b. Purchase Money Mortgages
Another important rule of "second in time is first in right"
entails purchase money mortgages. According to CPLR
5203(a)(2), JC's lien is no good against "a transfer in satisfaction
of a mortgage given to secure the payment of the purchase price
of the judgment debtor's interest in the property."191  The
following scenario illustrates the rule:
Sixth Scenario
ti: JC dockets a judgment, but JD owns no real estate.
t2: JD acquires real estate from V. V delivers a deed to JD and
JD pays V with proceeds supplied by C, a mortgage lender.
t3 : Minutes after JD acquires title from V, JD delivers a
mortgage deed to A. A records this deed.
t4: JC serves an execution on the sheriff, who holds a sale,
where Y is the buyer.
t5 : A declares a default by JD and arranges a foreclosure sale,
where X is the buyer.
In this scenario, JC obtained no lien at ti for the simple reason
that JD had no real estate. Only at t2 did JD obtain real estate.
At this time JC's lien came into existence.1 92
At t3, A obtained a lien and therefore was second in time.
But A's mortgage lien was "given to secure the payment of the
purchase price of [JD]'s interest in the property" within the
meaning of CPLR 5203(a)(2). 93 Notice that section 5203(a)(2)
never mentions A directly. Rather, it awkwardly protects "a
transfer in satisfaction" of A's mortgage.1 94
X was the buyer at t5 , when A foreclosed. Did X receive "a
transfer in satisfaction" of a purchase money mortgage? Not
exactly. What satisfied A's mortgage was X's payment of the
purchase price, to which A had priority. The exception does not
expressly work for the benefit of X. The exception functions
linguistically if JD were to make a conveyance to A in lieu of
foreclosure. In that case, JD's conveyance satisfies the mortgage
191 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a)(2).
192 On the after-acquired property aspect of docketing liens, see infra text
accompanying notes 373-380.
193 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a)(2).
194 See id. 5203(a)(3).
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debt. Or, if A outbid X at t5, A could bid in the purchase money
mortgage and take back JD's equity interest. In such a case, A
takes a transfer in satisfaction of her mortgage. The statute,
however, doesn't seem to describe X at all. Nevertheless, it
seems pretty clear that the idea is to give a superpriority to
purchase money mortgages. 195 And to achieve this, X must be
able to buy free and clear of JC. No court has said otherwise (so
far). As is often the case, the language of the CPLR is awkward.
Courts must read past the draftsmanship to discern the basic
logic of debtor-creditor relations. They are encouraged to do so
by section 5240, which invites courts to do whatever they want to
correct the piteous draftsmanship of the CPLR.
At t3 , A recorded her purchase money mortgage. Suppose A
never recorded. Does X still buy free of JC at t5 ? If we can agree
that X, however awkwardly, is described in section 5203(a)(2), it
makes no difference whether A records or not. Recordation is for
the benefit of subsequent purchasers.196 JC is neither subsequent
nor a purchaser'97 and therefore is doubly not the beneficiary of
the recording act. So X's rights are the same, whether or not A
records. 198
In the Sixth Scenario, A was second in time but first in right
(by means of X falling within the terms of section 5203(a)(2)). In
the Seventh Scenario, A is a purchase money lender but not
second in time:
Seventh Scenario
ti: JC dockets a judgment, but JD owns no real estate.
t2: In anticipation of acquiring land from V, JD delivers a
mortgage deed to A.
t3 : Minutes after JD delivers the mortgage deed to A, JD
acquires real estate from V. V delivers a deed to JD and JD
pays V with proceeds supplied by A, a mortgage lender.
t4 : JC serves an execution on the sheriff, who holds a sale,
where Y is the buyer.
191 See United States v. Miller, 400 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (so
assuming).
196 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2008) (second sentence).
' See infra text accompanying notes 276-282.
198 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 7.2(b) (1997) ("A
purchase money mortgage, whether or not recorded, has priority over any mortgage,
lien, or other claim that attaches to the real estate but is created by or arises against
the purchaser-mortgagor prior to the purchaser-mortgagor's acquisition of title to
the real estate." (emphasis added)).
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t5 : A declares a default by JD and arranges a foreclosure sale,
where X is the buyer.
In the Seventh Scenario, JC has no lien at ti and A has no
purchase money mortgage at t2 . So far JD has no real estate, so
neither JC nor A can have liens on JD's property. At t3 , JD
obtains real estate from V. At this precise moment, JC's lien
attaches to JD's after-acquired property. And, at the same
moment, A's mortgage lien attaches to JD's property.
Chronologically, the liens attach simultaneously.
According to the preamble to section 5203(a), no transferee
after docketing is valid against JC. Here, A has a transfer after
docketing. Is A therefore junior to JC? By no means. Section
5203(a)(2) describes X, or so we shall assume. If we read past the
bad draftsmanship of section 5203(a)(2), X takes free and clear of
JC and will pay a price that accords with this status. A is the
beneficiary of X's status. This prospective benefit justifies the
conclusion that A's purchase money mortgage is senior to JC's
lien, whether A is second in time or chronologically equal to JC.
To be distinguished is the case in which JD is not the
borrower of the purchase money. Recall the facts of Department
of Housing Preservation & Development v. Ferranti99:
ti: JC dockets against JD, who owned fee simple absolute.
t2 : JD sells the equity to B.
t3: B grants a mortgage to C.
t4 : After B defaults, C arranges a foreclosure sale, where C is
the buyer.
t5 : JC serves an execution on the sheriff, and the sheriff sells to
X.
In Ferranti, C was a purchase money lender, but CPLR
5203(a)(2) cannot help C here. The statutory reason for this is
that C did not finance "the purchase price of the judgment
debtor's interest in the property."20 0  Rather, C financed B's
interest in the property. B was not the judgment debtor. The
policy answer for this is that, if C won in the above case, it would
be an easy matter for JD to defeat JC in all cases by selling to a
buyer with a purchase money lender. If this were the rule,
judicial liens would be quite worthless.
Purchase money superpriority reflects the fact that the
lender is the founder of the feast. Without the purchase money
199 212 A.D.2d 438, 622 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1995).
200 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
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loan, JD would never have acquired the property. In Ferranti,
however, C never advanced funds to JD and C was not the
founder of the feast. For that reason, C did not deserve priority.
E. Who Owns the Proceeds?
A sale pursuant to a judicial lien is all about generating cash
proceeds to pay judgments. Who owns these proceeds?
Classically, only foreclosed parties have sold something to
the buyer. Only these parties have a claim to proceeds. The
foreclosed parties would include the debtor, the enforcing lien
creditor and any transferee that is junior to the enforcing lien.
The rule of distribution is first in time is first in right with the
proviso that the owner of the debtor equity-the residual
owner-is always in last place.2°'
The CPLR completely violates the classic model. According
to CPLR 5236(g):
After deduction for and payment of fees, expenses and any taxes
levied on the sale, transfer or delivery, the sheriff making a sale
of real property pursuant to an execution shall, unless the court
otherwise directs,
1. distribute the proceeds to the judgment creditors who
have delivered executions against the judgment debtor to
the sheriff before the sale, which executions have not been
returned, in the order in which their judgments have
priority, and
2. pay over any excess to the judgment debtor.20 2
Under this statute, only JCs who have served executions on the
sheriff and also JD have any claim to proceeds. 3  No other
junior party has an express entitlement to proceeds. So, if JD
has conveyed a junior mortgage to B or if JD sells the equity to X,
the sheriff sells free of B or X, but JD gets the surplus.2 4
Meanwhile, senior JCs who do not serve an execution by the time
201 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
202 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(g).
203 The appearance of a senior JC at the execution sale to announce the senior
lien therefore does nothing to improve JC's rights. See id. 5236(e) ("A judgment
creditor duly notified ... who fails to deliver an execution to the sheriff prior to the
sale shall have ... no further interest in the proceeds of the sale."); Meadow Brook
Nat'l Bank v. Goodkin, 53 Misc. 2d 1099, 1100, 280 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966), affd, 28 A.D.2d 648, 282 N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1967).
204 See Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Sibthorp, 116 A.D.2d 451, 452, 496 N.Y.S.2d
439, 440 (1st Dep't 1986). But see Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F. Supp. 2d 508, 527
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, No. 05-1954-cv, 2006 WL 2456810 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2006).
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of the sale have no right to be paid according to their prority 205
This is so even though the senior JC loses the lien.
Section 5236(g), however, does have a wild card in it: The
priority rules apply "unless the court otherwise directs."2 6 Along
with section 5240, which invites courts to do whatever they
want,0 7 section 5236(g) itself invites courts to circumvent its own
drafting flaws. One court used this license to permit a junior
mortgagee to participate in the foreclosure proceeds.0 8 Another
court permitted a transferee from the debtor to participate in the
surplus, even though the transferee had no money judgment and
had served no execution on the sheriff.2 9 CPLR 5239 aids in this
enterprise. According to section 5239:
Prior to the application of property. .. to the satisfaction of
a judgment, any interested person may commence a special
proceeding against the judgment creditor or other person with
whom a dispute exists to determine rights in the
205 The statute requires the sheriff to distribute proceeds to JCs "in the order in
which their judgments have priority." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(g). But judgments as such
don't have priority. See H.R. & C. Co. v. Smith, 242 N.Y. 267, 269, 151 N.E. 448, 449
(1926) ("[EIxcept as provided by statute, a mere judgment is never a lien against the
real estate of the judgment debtor."). Courts, however, understand this phrase to
mean that priority is according to the rule of first in time is first in right with regard
to docketing or levying. Nat'l Instalment Corp. v. Sacks, 56 Misc. 2d 346, 347, 288
N.Y.S.2d 667, 668-69 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968). Priority is to be determined at
the time of the sale, not the time of the distribution of the proceeds. In Federal Land
Bank v. United States, 21 A.D.2d 936, 937, 250 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1000 (3d Dep't 1964),
A's foreclosure sale was during the life of JC,'s lien. By the time of the distribution,
JC,'s lien had expired. Id. Nevertheless, JC, was permitted to participate in the
distribution. Id.
206 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(g).
211 Judge Edward Greenfield once warned:
This broad discretionary power gives the court a certain degree of leeway in
applying the procedures set forth in Article 52, but surely it does not
empower the court to ignore those procedures or issue an order contrary to
the statute. It is one thing to modify or limit a provision. It is another thing
entirely to ignore one provision and create a wholly new one in its place.
Section 5240 [of the CPLR] permits a certain amount of tinkering on the
structure by the judicial handyman, but it does not permit the construction
of an entirely new wing using jurisprudential architecture.
Kaplan v. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co., 46 Misc. 2d 574, 578, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
208 Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Liggett, 115 A.D.2d 378, 379-81, 496 N.Y.S.2d 14,
15-16 (1st Dep't 1985) (junior foreclosed mortgagee permitted to participate in
distribution according to priority); see also Siegel, supra note 6, at 143-44 (approving
of such a use of section 5239).
219 Barbaro v. Maher, 56 Misc. 2d 650, 652, 289 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1968).
1334 [Vol. 82:1291
2008] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART ONE
property .... The court may... direct the disposition of the
property .... 210
Meanwhile, section 5236(g) holds that, where JC 1 and JC 2
docket judgments in sequence and JC 1 serves an execution on the
sheriff, JC 2 has a right to proceeds only if JC 2 serves an
execution on the sheriff "before the sale." Nevertheless, it is still
true that a sheriff holds the cash surplus for JD. This is JD's
personal property, which can be reached by JC 2's writ of
execution. In Preston Farms, Inc. v. Nacri,2" JC 2 served an
execution after the sale but before the sheriff distributed the
proceeds. The court ruled that JC 2 had no right to the surplus
under CPLR 5236(g),212 but JC 2 could still garnish JD's personal
property, which the sheriff happened to control.213 Therefore, JC 2
was able to reach the surplus after all. 214 The result would have
been otherwise if the sheriff had already disbursed the funds to
JD by the time JC 2's execution had been delivered to the
sheriff.215
Where JC 2 serves an execution but JC 1 does not, in spite of
due notification pursuant to CPLR 5236(c), can JC 1 maintain
that JC 2 takes proceeds in trust for JC,? According to 5203(a)(1),
no transfer is good against JC 1 after she dockets, except
a transfer or the payment of the proceeds of a judicial sale,
which shall include an execution sale, in satisfaction either of a
judgment previously so docketed or of a judgment where a notice
of levy pursuant to an execution thereon was previously sofiled .... 216
This exception seems to say that, if there were an earlier JC than
JC1 and if, subsequent to JC,'s docketing, that earlier JC
receives proceeds of an execution sale, the transfer of cash to the
earlier JC is free and clear of JC,'s lien. In other words, CPLR
210 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239.
211 42 A.D.2d 668, 345 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
212 Id. at 669, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
213 Id. at 670, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
214 Id.
215 Accord May v. Finnerty, 104 Misc. 2d 450, 451-52, 428 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571-72
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980). Suppose JC 2 had bid in its judgment in lieu of
paying cash. This would never be allowed if JC 1 had served its execution prior to the
sale; a junior lien creditor can never bid in where a senior creditor has not been paid.
Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 888 F.2d 90, 93 (11th Cir. 1989). But where JC 1
loses seniority by failing to serve the execution, the bid in is proper, and the sheriff
holds no surplus that JC 1 can execute upon. In such a case, JC 1 loses out.
216 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a)(1) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
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5203(a)(1) is a personal property rule, not a real property rule.
The negative pregnant of (a)(1) is that, where JC 2 receives
proceeds, the judgment is not good against JC 1 . According to this
implication, JC 2 therefore takes proceeds in trust for JC1 .
Professor David Siegel argues against this negative pregnant:
In my judgment, such a proceeding [by JC 1 against JC 2] should
not be permitted if [JC1] has been duly notified under CPLR
5236(c) and has not issued an execution to the sheriff in
response to the notice. The 5236(c) procedure, combined with
the directions to the sheriff contained in 5236(e), seem to afford
every opportunity to [JC,] to protect his rights even where he
may have been remiss in failing to issue an execution before
[JC2] did so.... If he has been duly notified and has not issued
such an execution, ought the law to do anything further for
him? 217
No court has permitted JC1 to retrieve proceeds from JC 2, where
JC, received due notice. But the action has been allowed where
JC1 was never notified of the sale. In such a case, JC1 has a
claim that her due process rights have been violated. The
consequences of such a claim I will discuss in the context of
whether the CPLR's sales procedure is constitutional.21
F. Bidding In
The CPLR sets no minimum amount a buyer at an auction
must bid to constitute a valid sale. In contrast, New York
mortgage law holds open the possibility of setting aside a
foreclosure sale when the price bid is too low. In Polish National
Alliance v. White Eagle Hall Co.,29 the court suggested that any
bid that is ten percent or less of the fair market value per se
shocks the judicial conscience, justifying a set-aside of the sale.22 °
Anything above fifty percent leaves the conscience unscarred.22 '
It is also true of mortgage law that, when the mortgage
lender seeks a deficiency judgment, the amount of it is unrelated
to the nominal bid of the mortgage lender or third party. Rather,
the deficiency is calculated by subtracting the fair market value
217 Siegel, supra note 6, at 129.
211 See infra text accompanying notes 245-274.
219 98 A.D.2d 400, 470 N.Y.S.2d 642 (2d Dep't 1983).
220 See id. at 408, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
221 See id.
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of the premises from the mortgage debt.222 In effect, mortgage
law expects the mortgage lender to bid in the mortgage debt up
to the fair value of the premises. The deficiency will be judged as
if the lender had fulfilled this duty.
In Wandschneider v. Bekeny,223 the court borrowed from
mortgage law to supplement the CPLR under the promiscuous
authority of section 5240, which provides: "The court may at
any time.., make an order denying, limiting, conditioning,
regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforcement
procedure."224 In Wandschneider, JC bought $27,000 worth of
JD's equity for a bid of $500.225 The court ordered JC's judgment
reduced by $27,000, not $500.226 The court also refused to cancel
the sale itself or interfere with JC's title.227
Wandschneider may have been overruled in Guardian Loan
Co. v. Early,228 where JC began an execution sale and X, a third
party, was the buyer.229 X paid $1,268 for property worth
perhaps $48,000.230 JD moved to set the sale aside for having
generated so low a price. This relief was granted by the lower
courts but the New York Court of Appeals reversed. Part of its
rationale was policy based:
After the sale has been consummated, the interests of persons
other than the judgment debtor and creditor are implicated.
Title to property has been transferred, often to a stranger to the
222 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney 2008).
223 75 Misc. 2d 32, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
224 Id. at 35, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 928 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2008)).
225 Id. at 34, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
226 Id. at 38, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 931. An odd feature of Wandschneider is that JC's
judgment was entered in federal court. JC had docketed with the clerk in
Westchester County in order to generate a lien on JD's real property. So what the
Wandschneider court was doing was instructing the federal court as to the size of
JC's judgment following the auction by the sheriff. The court specifically found it
had the power to do so. Id. at 38-39, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 931-32. This seems to me quite
right. Suppose state law provided for strict foreclosure of judicial liens, so that JC
became the owner of the fee simple without an auction. Such a procedure would have
required a valuation of the property, and this would have been binding on the
federal court; federal legislation demands that federal judgments be enforceable by
state sheriffs, and this must be according to state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
Wandschneider is not far from a rule of strict foreclosure-whenever JC wins the
auction. And so the state court's valuation is binding on the federal court.
227 Accord In re Bachner, 82 Misc. 2d 107, 108-09, 368 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750-51
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (third party paid forty-one percent).
228 47 N.Y.2d 515, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1979).
229 Id. at 517, 392 N.E.2d at 1241, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
230 Id. at 518, 392 N.E.2d at 1242, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
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judgment who relies on the regularity of the sale and proceeds
accordingly. To permit these sales to be set aside merely
because a beneficial price has not been obtained especially in
view of the "at any time" provision of CPLR 5240, would
discourage participation by third parties at judicial sales, for
the title acquired at the sale would never be free from the
spectre of judicial invalidation.2 31
This policy justification is based primarily on the presence of a
third party. Yet at another moment, the Early court seems to be
making a rule about the use of the CPLR 5240 wildcard.
But while CPLR 5240 grants the courts broad discretionary
power to alter the use of the procedures set forth in article 52, it
has no application after a Sheriffs sale has been carried out and
the deed delivered to the purchaser, at which time the use of the
enforcement procedure will have been completed ....
So is Wandschneider overruled? Some courts have assumed
not.233  And it is possible to reconcile the two cases.
Wandschneider speaks to the amount of JC's judgment in light of
the auction. It does not disturb the rights of the buyer at the
execution sale. Early prohibits the use of CPLR 5240 to
compromise the title that the buyer obtains by virtue of the
sheriff's deed. An open question is whether a court is prepared to
knock down JC's judgment by the fair market value of the
premises when a third party-not JC-wins the auction. No
court has so held,234 although this is the rule for mortgage
231 Id. at 520, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60.
232 Id. at 519-20, 392 N.E.2d at 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (emphasis added).
233 For cases following Wandschneider, see Trepel v. Dippold, No. 04 Civ. 8310
(DLC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78050 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2006); Yellow Creek Hunting
Club, Inc. v. Todd Supply, Inc., 145 A.D.2d 679, 535 N.Y.S.2d 222 (3d Dep't 1988).
234 In Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. Wagner, 34 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1994), JD
fraudulently conveyed land to X, in order to hinder JC. X then sold the land on
credit to Y, so that X held a purchase money mortgage on the property. Id. at 77.
Since Y was a good faith purchaser, Y took much of the title free and clear of JC's
right. See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278 (McKinney 2008). When the dust settled,
only X's purchase money mortgage could properly be viewed as the fraudulent
conveyance. Wagner, 34 F.3d at 79-81.
Later, JC won a judgment against JD. Part of the relief obtained was the award of
X's mortgage to JC, with power of JC to foreclose the mortgage against Y. In effect,
JC's fraudulent conveyance theory awarded JC a judicial lien on X's mortgage, with
the proviso that JC did not have to sell X's mortgage at an execution sale; rather, JC
was empowered to collect the mortgage debt. And this was done by selling Ys real
property in a foreclosure sale. Id.; see also Bank of Tokyo Trust Co. v. Urban Food
Malls Ltd., 229 A.D.2d 14, 24, 650 N.Y.S.2d 654, 661-62 (1st Dep't 1996) (Article 9
secured party could proceed directly to collection by means of mortgage foreclosure).
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foreclosures.235 Such a holding would make sense for judicial
liens as well.
At least one court has proclaimed Wandschneider overruled,
or at least limited, by Early. In Mikulec v. United States,236 JC
had docketed against JD. JD's mother (X) bought JC's lien just
before a scheduled execution sale.237  The judgment in question
was for $121,008.44.23 Then X bid in $50 of her judgment and
won the auction. 239  Among the foreclosed parties was a junior
federal tax lien.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has, by federal law, a
redemption right after an execution sale.2 40  According to
28 U.S.C. § 2410(d):
At the sale, JC won the auction, bidding less than the fair market value of the
premises. Wagner, 34 F.3d at 77. JD then claimed that section 1371(2) of the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL") required that JC's judgment
against JD be reduced by the amount of the fair market value of the premises. Id. at
78. The district court agreed and knocked down JC's judgment by the fair market
value of the premises. Id. at 79.
The court of appeals wisely reversed. If section 1371(2) of the RPAPL applied to the
case, it applied to protect Y against X. An entirely different question was whether
JC's low bid should affect the size of JC's judgment against JD. As JD no longer
owned the land when JC (via X's mortgage) sold Ys property, JD was in no position
to claim the protections of section of 1371(2) the RPAPL. Id.
Was the procedure of permitting JC to enforce X's mortgage consistent with New
York law? Neither New York's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
nor the CPLR give any advice for pursuing fraudulent conveyances of real estate.
CPLR 5225 authorizes actions against third parties, but only with regard
to personal property. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225 (McKinney 2008). One possible
interpretation of the case is that X's right against Y was personal property. Article 9
so characterizes X's mortgage rights. U.C.C. § 9-308(e) (2005). Accordingly, CPLR
5225 applies: JC is a judgment creditor whose "rights to the property are superior to
those of the transferee." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225.
If this follows, then JC was proceeding against Y by turnover order. It was simply
collecting a payment intangible from Y (by means of selling Ys real property).
Accordingly, the judgment of JC should be reduced by the amount actually collected,
not by the fair market value of Y's real property.
235 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney 2008).
236 705 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983).
237 Id. at 600.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 26 U.S.C. § 7425(d)(1) (2000). The statute states:
(1) Right to redeem.-In the case of a sale of real property to which
subsection (b) applies to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, the
Secretary may redeem such property within the period of 120 days from the
date of such sale or the period allowable for redemption under local law,
whichever is longer. Id.
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In any case in which the United States redeems real
property... the amount to be paid for such property shall be
the sum of-
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale
(which, in the case of a purchaser who is the holder of the
lien being foreclosed, shall include the amount of the
obligation secured by such lien to the extent satisfied by
reason of such sale) .... 241
X claimed that the redemption price was $121,008.44, because,
under Wandschneider, her judgment was knocked down by the
fair market value of the property (which apparently exceeded the
amount of the judgment). The IRS claimed the redemption price
was $50 plus interest.242
The Mikulec court agreed with the IRS, on the ground that
Wandschneider had been limited by the Early decision: "We
conclude, therefore, that under Guardian Loan [section] 5240
cannot be used to invalidate sales or to adjust rights following a
transfer of title regardless of the identity of the purchaser."243
The Mikulec court nevertheless went on to hold that
Wandschneider was correctly decided. The holding was limited
to the case in which JD moved to knock down the judgment
according to the fair market value of the property bought by JC.
This motion, however, had to be made before the sheriffs deed
was delivered to JC. Furthermore, this motion would not be
made under section 5240, but under general principles of
equity. 24  But where a judgment debtor does not make this
241 28 U.S.C. § 2410(d)(1).
242 Mikulec, 705 F.2d at 600.
243 Id. at 602.
24 The Early court does hold open the possibility that a sale could be overturned
on the equities, for which it almost entirely cites mortgage cases. The only judicial
lien case cited was Colonial Steel Corp. v. Piquin Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 273, 344 N.Y.S.2d
505 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1973), where a marshal held an execution sale of
personal property without very much notice and at a price that was only about ten
percent of the fair market value. In asserting this equitable power, the Early court
also warned that inadequacy of price alone was not sufficient to justify the overturn
of a sale. Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 521, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 1244,
419 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (1979).
It should be emphasized that the Early court's analysis of equity entirely dealt with
the power to overturn the sale, not the power of the court to declare what the
outstanding judgment was, following a bid-in. The Mikulec court follows a law
review comment that states "that if the facts in Wandschneider were before the
Court of Appeals today, the use of equity, but not CPLR 5240, would be consistent
with the Guardian Loan decision." 705 F.2d at 602 (quoting Robert W. Corcoran, Jr.,
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motion, JC's judgment is reduced only by the amount actually
bid. In Mikulec, JD had not moved to knock down JC's judgment
(now owned by X). Accordingly, the redemption price for the IRS
was only $50.
Mikulec, a case in which X sought declaratory relief as to the
redemption price the IRS had to pay, must be viewed as an "Erie
guess" as to the nature of state law. So it is illuminating to
review the subsequent case of Yellow Creek Hunting Club, Inc. v.
Todd Supply, Inc.,245 where JC obtained a judicial lien on JD's
land. JD subsequently sold some of the encumbered land to X.
JC then obtained an execution sale on what land JD still
retained and bid in a low amount. JC then sought an execution
sale of X's land. X responded by seeking Wandschneider-style
relief against JC-a declaration that JC had been paid in full in
the first execution sale. On the reasoning of Mikulec, this motion
should have been denied. The sheriffs deed had already been
issued to JC and the setoff was being sought by a third
party, not by JD. Nevertheless, the Yellow Creek court granted
Wandschneider relief and held that JC's judgment had been
entirely satisfied. This is good evidence that Mikulec is a bad
Erie guess.246
Putting Mikulec together with Yellow Creek, the law would
appear to be this: Where JD or some other party in interest
except JC seeks an adjustment of JC's judgment, the court may
grant it by reducing JC's judgment by the fair market value of
the property JC received by bidding in. But in federal
redemption cases, JC is estopped from claiming that the amount
paid for real property exceeds the amount JC purported to bid.
Meanwhile, CPLR 5240 cannot be used to overturn the sale, at
least where a third party has won the auction and has received
the deed. A reversal of the sale is possible, however, where the
sheriff has not yet issued a deed. An unanswered question is
whether a court will knock down JC's judgment when a third
party bids less than the fair market value at an auction sale.
The analogy to mortgage law points to a positive answer.
The Survey of New York Practice, Article 52-Enforcement of Money Judgments, 54
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 416, 420 n.176 (1980)).
245 145 A.D.2d 679, 535 N.Y.S.2d 222 (3d Dep't 1988).
246 Also relevant is Hoffman v. Seniuk, where the court upheld setting aside the
entire sale, so long as this could be done before the sheriffs deed was actually
delivered. 88 A.D.2d 954, 954, 451 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192 (2d Dep't 1982). It is not clear
from the Hoffman opinion whether the winner of the auction was also JC or not.
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G. Constitutional Difficulties
According to the Fifth Scenario:
ti: JC, dockets.
t2 : JC 2 dockets.
t3 : JC 2 serves an execution, but JC1 never does.
t: At the execution sale, based on JC 2's execution, X is the
buyer.
Relative to this scenario, CPLR 5236(e) provides: "A judgment
creditor duly notified pursuant to subdivisions (c) or (d) who fails
to deliver an execution to the sheriff prior to the sale shall have
no further lien on the property. .. ." This sentence says that, in
the above example, if JC is properly notified, JC 1 has no lien
after the sheriff sells under JC 2's execution. This instantly raises
the question: What if JC1 was not properly notified? Failure to
notify JC1 raises the issue of whether JC 1's due process rights to
notice and a hearing have been violated.
The CPLR delegates to JC the task of accumulating the list
of names and addresses of JD and any person with an interest in
the land to be sold (as of forty-five days before the sale).247 The
sheriff must then send notice of the sale to everyone on the list by
certified or registered mail thirty days before the sale.248 This
gives JCs on the list thirty days to serve an execution on the
sheriff, in order to perfect their right to a distribution of the sales
proceeds.
This procedure entails constitutional difficulties, where a
party in interest foreclosable by JC is left off the list by JC. The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that, where JC 2 is junior to
JC, and JC 2 commences the sale by serving an execution, JC 2 has
every incentive to leave JC 1 off the list, because JC 2's priority
improves if JC1 serves no execution on the sheriff.
In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. McKee,249 JC 2 was
left off the list by JC 1. JC 2 claimed that the buyer took subject to
JC 2's lien. The court rejected this claim and held that the buyer
took free of JC 2's lien by virtue of CPLR 5236(c), which provides:
"An omission to give any notice required by this or the following
subdivision.., does not affect the title of a purchaser without
247 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(c) (McKinney 2008).
248 Id.
249 61 Misc. 2d 693, 696, 305 N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
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notice of the omission or offense."25 ° In consolation, the McKee
court proffered some suggestions to JC 2 . First, it suggested that
the sale could be overturned, if a right has been prejudiced.25 '
But how could this be, in light of the court's reliance on the last
sentence of 5236(c)? Surely overturning the sale is possible only
if the buyer has knowledge of the defect.252
Second, the court more plausibly remarked: "If he holds a
judgment senior to that of the levying creditor, he can maintain
an action against the latter to recover the proceeds of sale to the
extent of his judgment .... In other words, if JC1 is senior
and JC 2 leaves JC 1 off the list required by section 5236(c), JC 2
may have the power to foreclose JC's lien, but a court of equity
will view this power as used strictly for the benefit of JC. On
this view, the proceeds received by JC 2 are held in constructive
trust for JC. If JC can trace these proceeds into the estate of
JC 2, JC1 can enforce the trust and require the turnover of the
proceeds. If the money cannot be traced, then JC 2 has committed
250 The court also held that a lis pendens filed in connection with the foreclosure
of senior mortgages would not put the buyer on notice, even though the lis pendens
referred to JC 2 as a party. Only actual notice would deprive the buyer of the
protection of CPLR 5236(c)'s last sentence. Id. at 695, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
251 Id. at 696, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 592; accord May v. Finnerty, 104 Misc. 2d 450,
452, 428 N.Y.S.2d 570, 572 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
252 Courts are divided whether section 5236(c)'s last sentence applies when the
buyer is JC. In Gersten-Hillman Agency Inc. v. Lichtenstein & Friedman Realty
Corp., 182 A.D.2d 1041, 1043, 583 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (3d Dep't 1992), the court set
aside a sale to JC even though JC had no knowledge of the procedural mistake of
the sheriff. It implied that the last sentence of section 5236(c) does not apply when
the buyer is the judgment creditor. See id. at 1042, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 57. It also
suggested that CPLR 2003, which permits judicial sales to be overturned for failure
to give notice, simply overrides CPLR 5236(c). See id., 583 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
In Todd Supply, Inc. v. Hodgkiss, 133 A.D.2d 1006, 1006, 521 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (3d
Dep't 1987), the sheriff served JD by registered mail only. This satisfies section
5236(c), but the court, inexplicably, ruled that the sheriff must comply with CPLR
308, which requires affixing notice to JD's residence, in addition to mail. Id. at 1006,
521 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58. JC purchased at the sale, not knowing of the defect. Id. at
1006, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 157. Later, JC grew disappointed with his purchase and
therefore tried to have the sale overturned because JD received improper notice. Id.
at 1006, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The court pointed out that JC is entitled and indeed
required to rely on the last sentence of section 5236(c) for good title. Id. at 1007, 521
N.Y.S.2d at 158.
253 McKee, 61 Misc. 2d at 696, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 592; see also Siegel, supra note 6,
at 130 (supporting JCi's suit against JC 2). Of course, JC 1 never levied but only
docketed and served an execution.
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the tort of conversion, and JC 1 may have a money judgment
against JC 2.254
The United States Supreme Court has addressed due process
rights of foreclosed junior lien creditors in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams.255 In this case, a municipal taxing authority
had power to foreclose any property claimant to land. It
commenced a foreclosure proceeding, sending notice to the fee
owner. No notice was sent to a mortgagee, however. The
Supreme Court held that, since it knew the name of the junior
mortgagee (though not the address), the tax lienor had a duty to
send a letter to the mortgagee. The tax lienor could not rely on
the fee owner to notify his mortgagee: "Notice to the property
owner, who is not in privity with his creditor and who has failed
to take steps necessary to preserve his own property interest,
also cannot be expected to lead to actual notice to the
mortgagee. 256 Nor could the theoretical ability of the mortgagee
to monitor the property excuse the tax lienor's due process
duty.257
Just as notice to the mortgagor could not reasonably imply
notice to the mortgagee, so, under the CPLR, delegation of the
notice function to JCi or JC 2 does not suffice to assure that all
the other judgment creditors (or other property claimants) will be
notified. It can hardly be doubted that the CPLR is
unconstitutional for delegating an important part of the notice
2,4 Similar analysis solves the following dilemma:
Eighth Scenario
ti: JC1 dockets.
t2: JD grants a mortgage to B.
t3 : JC 2 dockets.
t4 : JC 2 delivers an execution to the sheriff who schedules a foreclosure sale.
JC1 never does, because JCi never received notice of the sale.
t 5 : At JC 2's execution sale, X buys.
Even though JC 2 started the sale, JC, is foreclosed. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a)(3).
This means that the sheriff had power to sell whatever JCi had (even if JC 2's
execution started the sales process). Accordingly, B's mortgage is foreclosed. But
proceeds are held by JC 2 in constructive trust, first for JCi, then for B.
Expropriating JC,'s lien is also the exprioriation of B's junior mortgage. The law
should presume that JC 2 does this for the benefit of JC, and B.
255 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
21 Id. at 799. The use of the word privity is odd, because the owner of the fee
and the mortgagee had in fact signed a mortgage agreement and were in privity of
contract. Presumably, the court meant to say that the mortgagor was not the agent
of the mortgagee and was simply not worthy of trust by the tax lienor to send the
notice.
257 See id.
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function to a private party whose interests may well align
against notifying senior forecloseable parties.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has so ruled with
regard to a judicial lien procedure quite similar to that of the
CPLR.258 In New Brunswick Savings Bank v. Markouski,25 9 the
following chronology unfolded:
t]: H and W, tenants by the entirety, jointly convey a mortgage
to A, which A has recorded.
t2 : JC1 dockets a judgment against H. By virtue of docketing,
JC, has a lien on H's share. We are not told the size of JC,'s
judgment.
t 3: JC 2 dockets against H.
t 4: JC 1 commences an execution sale by serving an execution on
the sheriff. As required by New Jersey law, JC 1 compiles a list
of property owners, but leaves JC 2 off the list.2 60 As a result the
sheriff sends no notice to JC 2.
t5 : At the execution sale, X buys for $7,000.
t 6: A forecloses and sells to Y. A surplus results.
As to this surplus, W of course received her share. H did not, as
H was foreclosed at t5. X had bought H's share, but JC 2 claimed
priority to it. The court ruled that, because of the notice defect at
t4, JC 2's lien was not extinguished; therefore JC 2 had some sort of
right to the proceeds.
What remedy is appropriate? In Markouski, the court
emphasized that X, as a bona fide purchaser, was entitled to
some protection, but not to the total surplus which, but for the
due process error, X would have owned outright. The court noted
that, according to a concession by JC 2, at a minimum, X should
258 For example, in New Jersey, junior JCs can foreclose senior JCs, just as in
New York. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-39 (West 2008).
259 587 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 1991).
260 As in New York, JC 2 is delegated the job of notifying third parties affected by
the sale:
The party who obtained the order or writ shall, at least 10 days prior to the
date set for sale, serve a notice of sale by registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested, upon (1) every party who has appeared in the action
giving rise to the order or writ and (2) the owner of record of the property
as of the date of commencement of the action whether or not appearing in
the action ....
N.J. CT. R. ANN. 4:65-2. Under this provision JC 1 is obligated to notify "owners" of
an execution sale. Apparently, judgment creditors are not considered owners for this
purpose. In any case, JC, commenced an execution sale but did not send notice to
JC 2.
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get back the $7,000 it bid at JC,'s execution sale.b1 it remanded
for further refinements.
The situation at hand is close to the phenomenon of the
omitted necessary party in mortgage foreclosures. To illustrate
the law of the omitted party, consider the following scenario:
Ninth Scenario
ti: D grants a mortgage to A.
t2 : D grants a mortgage to B.
t3 : A starts a foreclosure proceeding and forgets to make B a
party.
t4 : At the foreclosure sale, X is the buyer.
If proper procedure had been followed, X should have
purchased a fee simple absolute estate. This fee simple is made
up of D's equity, A's mortgage, and B's mortgage. All of these
interests should have been foreclosed. B, however, was not
foreclosed, because she received no notice. But the sale is
otherwise effective to convey to X the interest of A and D. This
means that X has bought A's senior mortgage, as well as D's
equity. Because X is subrogated to A's mortgage, it is open for X
to foreclose again. In addition, in New York26 2 as well as in New
Jersey,263 A is entitled to strict foreclosure against B. B is invited
to redeem by a deadline or be forever foreclosed.
In Markouski, however, reforeclosure or strict foreclosure
were not appropriate remedies, because A had already foreclosed
upon both X and JC 2. Their rights could only be vindicated by a
share of the cash surplus generated in the foreclosure sale.
Using the above analysis of X's title, X should be deemed
subrogated to JC,'s judgment. We know in Markouski that X
261 Markouski, 587 A.2d at 1278 ("We note Heritage's concession in its briefs
filed below that Equity is entitled to be reimbursed for at least the $7,000 it paid at
the initial sale.").
262 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1523(2) (McKinney 2008). The statute states:
If it shall appear to the court... that the defect in the foreclosure
proceedings was not due to fraud or wilful neglect of the plaintiff and that
the defendant or the person under whom he claims was not actually
prejudiced thereby, the judgment may fix a time for redemption of the
property and provide that a failure to redeem within such time shall
thereafter preclude the defendant from redeeming the property or claiming
any right, title or interest therein.
Id.
263 See generally Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Pessin, 570 A.2d 481 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (allowing assignees of a second mortgage who had not been named
in a foreclosure action to pay off a senior mortgage).
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paid $7,000 and that JC 2 conceded X should receive this amount,
but properly this should only be so where JC 1's judgment exactly
equals $7,000. X should be entitled to the full amount of JC1's
judgment, since that is what X validly bought at the imperfect
execution sale. On the other hand, if JC 1's judgment is less than
$7,000, X should receive JC 1's judgment only. Thereafter, JC 2
has priority. If JC 2 is fully paid, X can obtain the surplus, as X
bought -'s equity at t5 .
If the Markouski facts were to be transposed to New York,
however, CPLR 5236(c) poses an obstacle to the remedy
described. According to CPLR 5236(c), "[a]n omission to give any
notice ... does not affect the title of a purchaser without notice of
the omission or offense. '264 Therefore, where X has no knowledge
of the omission, X's title must be viewed as sacrosanct. The only
possible remedy is for the sheriff to pay JC 2 for the loss, in
exchange for which the state would be subrogated to JC 2's
judgment.265
Where X does have notice of the defect, revival of JC 2's lien is
appropriate. It should be possible for a court to craft a
reforeclosure and even a strict foreclosure procedure. Although
the CPLR has abolished redemption in judicial lien cases, 2 66 this
was aimed at getting rid of post-sale redemption, which
notoriously has a bad effect on bidding at all sales.2 67 It should
not be viewed as preventing pre-foreclosure redemption. Nor
should abolition of post-sale redemption prevent a strict
foreclosure remedy (tied to a post-sale right of JC 2 to redeem)
under the broad equity power conferred by CPLR 5240.268
Where JC 2 serves the execution and omits JC1 from the list,
and where JC 2 bids in, it should be the case that JC1 has an
equitable lien on JC 2's land. According to the logic of equity
liens, JC 2 has purchased debtor equity from JD. Equity should
264 Another seemingly relevant idea is N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(e): "A judgment
creditor duly notified ... who fails to deliver an execution to the sheriff prior to the
sale shall have no further lien on the property. . . ." Of course, JC 2 has not been
notified, so the statute does not apply, but its negative pregnant should be rejected.
That is, even though JC 2 was not notified, it does not follow that JC 2 therefore has a
lien. This negative pregnant would contradict the direct command of N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5236(c).
265 See Siegel, supra note 6, at 135-36.
266 See supra text accompanying notes 159-162.
261 See Siegel, supra note 6, at 122-23.
268 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2008).
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consider that this acquisition by JC2 was for the benefit of JC1.26 9
In a second foreclosure sale commenced by JCi, JC 2 could have
the surplus after JC1 is fully paid. The reason an equitable lien
(not a docketing lien) is appropriate is that if we said JC, obtains
a revival of the judicial lien, then bona fide purchasers from JC 2
would be subject to JC1's lien. If, on the other hand, JC1 has a
mere equitable lien, JC 2's bona fide purchasers would take free
and clear of JC1. Any other result would distress subsequent
title searchers.
We have said that where the buyer at a foreclosure sale has
no notice of defective notification, the buyer's title cannot be
compromised. 270  Another rule applies where the constitutional
defect is in the judgment itself, whereunder the land was sold.
Salient here is the possibility that JD was never served with
process, resulting in a default judgment. Under such
circumstances, JD is entitled to relief from the judgment.2 1' It is
also the case that where JC has served an execution on the
sheriff and the sheriff has sold to X, X's title must be negated.272
According to CPLR 5237:
The purchaser of property sold by a sheriff pursuant to
execution or order may recover the purchase money from the
judgment creditors who received the proceeds if the property is
recovered from such purchaser in consequence of an irregularity
in the sale or a vacatur, reversal or setting aside of the
judgment upon which the execution or order was based. If a
judgment for the purchase money is so recovered against a
judgment creditor in consequence of an irregularity in the sale,
such judgment creditor may enforce his judgment as if no levy
or sale had been made, and, for that purpose, he may move
without notice for an order restoring any lien or priority or
amending any docket entry affected by the sale. 273
269 Such an attitude is called estoppel by deed. Typically, this doctrine holds that
where a person purports to convey something she does not have and then later
acquires the very thing supposedly conveyed, the acquisition is deemed for the
benefit of the wronged transferee who had earlier received nothing. Mickles v.
Townsend, 18 N.Y. 575, 582-83 (1859).
270 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5236(c).
271 See id. 5015(a)(4).
272 See McCracken v. Flanagan, 141 N.Y. 174, 176-78, 36 N.E. 10, 10-11 (1894).
273 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5237.
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Where the sale is reversed, poundage is not reimbursed by the
sheriff; rather, JC must bear this expense. 4
When the defect is no service of process prior to the default
judgment, it must actually be true that no service of process
occurred. In Roosevelt Hardware v. Green,275 JC and JD
consensually agreed that the default judgment would be vacated
for failure to serve process. The court held this insufficient to
reverse X's title. It remanded for a hearing on whether
historically there really was no service of process. X could not
lose title solely because JC and JD stipulated between
themselves that service of process was defective.
IV. THE RECORDING ACT
A. Judgment Creditors Are Not Purchasers
JC can foreclose any grantee of the debtor whose interest
arises after the judgment is locally docketed or levied." 6
Conversely, JC cannot foreclose a transferee whose interest
arises prior to these points in time, with the exception that prior
judicial liens can be foreclosed by subsequent JCs. 277
Pre-lien grantees of a JD may suffer consequences, however,
if they do not record their conveyances. According to New York's
recording statute:
Every... conveyance not.., recorded is void as against any
person who subsequently purchases or acquires by exchange or
contracts to purchase or acquire by exchange, the same real
property or any portion thereof, or acquires by assignment the
rent to accrue therefrom as provided in section two hundred
ninety-four-a of the real property law, in good faith and for a
valuable consideration, from the same vendor or assignor, his
distributees or devisees, and whose conveyance, contract or
assignment is first duly recorded, and is void as against the lien
upon the same real property or any portion thereof arising from
payments made upon the execution of or pursuant to the terms
of a contract with the same vendor, his distributees or devisees,
274 Roosevelt Hardware v. Green, 72 A.D.2d 261, 266, 424 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 (2d
Dep't 1980).
275 72 A.D.2d 261, 424 N.Y.S.2d 276.
278 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a).
277 Id. 5203(a)(2).
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if such contract is made in good faith and is first duly
recorded.278
Significant for our purposes is that an unrecorded conveyance is
void as against purchasers and other voluntary property
claimants. A purchase connotes a voluntary conveyance . 9  A
judicial lien, however, is not a purchase. Unrecorded
conveyances are perfectly good against subsequent lien
creditors.28 ° So in Suffolk County Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Geiger,8 l JD conveyed an unrecorded mortgage to A, and JC
docketed a judgment. Although the procedure is unclear, JC
apparently sought a declaration that its judicial lien was senior
to the prior unrecorded mortgage of A. The court ruled for A:
"[Ilt is well settled that the protection of the recording act can be
relied upon only by subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, not
by judgment creditors ....22
Similarly, in Rivas v. McDonnell,283 JC, under the same
circumstances, held an execution sale. One day before the
auction, A, throwing off his slough, and moving with fresh
legerity, recorded his mortgage. At the auction, X was the buyer.
The court properly held that, even if X was a bona fide purchaser,
X's title was still subject to A's mortgage. JC had no standing
under the recording act and so X could not claim "shelter" under
the status of this lien.
Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,
bankruptcy trustees were considered to be lien creditors on the
278 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2008).
179 Id. § 290(2) ("The term 'purchaser' includes every person to whom any estate
or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consideration, and every
assignee of a mortgage, lease or other conditional estate.").
280 See, e.g., FDIC v. Malin, 802 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Certain Lands, 41 F. Supp. 636, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Sullivan v. Corn Exch. Bank,
154 A.D. 292, 295-97, 139 N.Y.S. 97, 100-01 (2d Dep't 1912). The same is generally
true for equitable interests in real property. See, e.g., Lafayette Trust Co. v. Beggs,
213 N.Y. 280, 287-88, 107 N.E. 644, 646 (1915); Blum v. Krampner, 28 N.Y.S.2d 62,
64 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1940), affd, 261 A.D. 989 (2d Dep't 1941) (granting A an
injunction to prevent sheriffs sale).
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Stern, 5 Misc. 2d 423, 139 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1955), JD may or may not have conveyed an unrecorded mortgage to A. JC
then docketed a judgment. A subsequently recorded. The court, suspecting that JD
and A were lying about the mortgage, ruled that it would presume the mortgage
deed was delivered on the day of recordation. That is to say, the court found that JC
was first in time and A's unrecorded mortgage was second in time.
281 57 Misc. 2d 184, 291 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968).
282 Id. at 186, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
28- 308 A.D.2d 572, 764 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 2003).
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day of bankruptcy.21 4 On the basis of the foregoing, unrecorded
mortgages in New York were perfectly valid in bankruptcy. 215
The Bankruptcy Code now makes the trustee a bona fide
purchaser of real estate who has recorded.2 6 As a result,
bankruptcy spells doom for the unrecorded mortgage in New
York.
B. Good Faith Buyers at Execution Sales
Suppose, however, an execution sale is added to the mix:
Tenth Scenario
ti: JD grants A a mortgage. A never records.
t2 : JC dockets a judgment.
t3 : JC serves an execution on the sheriff who schedules an
execution sale.
t4: At the execution sale, X is the buyer. X is a bona fide
purchaser who records the sheriffs deed.
In the Tenth Scenario, JC is no purchaser, but X is. Properly, X
should take free and clear of A. The sheriff can convey anything
that JD could have conveyed. In effect, the sheriffs deed must be
treated as JD's deed. And since JD has power to convey free of
A, so does the sheriff.28 7
The law in New York, however, is contradictory on this
point. Arguably, the governing authority is Maroney v. Boyle,2"'
which involved the following:
t1 : A has an equitable lien on O's property.
28 9
t 2: 0 conveys to JD, but JD has knowledge of A.
t3: JC dockets against JD.
t 4: JC commences an execution sale, where C is the buyer. C is a
bona fide purchaser.
In Maroney, C took free and clear of A. The court, quoting its
earlier opinion in Hetzel v. Barber,29 ° held:
284 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 41, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
285 See Heiman v. Parnass, 40 F.2d 558, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1930).
28 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2000).
287 See Grid Realty Corp. v. Fazzino, 55 A.D.2d 635, 636, 390 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170-
71 (2d Dep't 1976), affd, 42 N.Y.2d 1048, 369 N.E.2d 768, 399 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1977);
Beman v. Douglas, 1 A.D. 169, 171, 37 N.Y.S. 859, 861 (3d Dep't 1896).
288 141 N.Y. 462, 36 N.E. 511 (1894).
289 This arose because A had tendered purchase money to 0 and presumably
expected to receive the grant of a mortgage lien at a future time, which never
materialized.
290 69 N.Y. 1 (1877).
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A sheriffs deed, given in pursuance of a judgment and a sale
upon execution, is treated as if given by the judgment debtor
himself. It conveys precisely what he could have conveyed when
the judgment was docketed.... The grantee in such cases
holds, not under the sheriff, but under the debtor, and the deed,
when recorded, is protected by, and has the benefit of, the
[RIecording [A] ct.291
Hetzel was a case in which JD conveyed to A in an unrecorded
deed.292 JC docketed, and, in the ensuing execution sale, X was
the buyer. X recorded the certificate of sale from the sheriff. X
was held to have taken title free of A's unrecorded conveyance.293
291 Maroney, 141 N.Y. at 469, 36 N.E. at 512-13 (quoting Hetzel, 69 N.Y. at 9-
10).
292 Hetzel, 69 N.Y. at 8.
293 Id. at 15-16. The text gives a very simplified account of the case. In Hetzel, T
owned "the Dennis place." Id. at 2. In a will, she conveyed one-third to JD, her
husband, and two-thirds to her two daughters. Id. at 3. By the will, JD had power to
sell the daughters' two-thirds and invest the proceeds, which they were to receive
upon attaining the age of 25. Id. JD then leased the premises to Y. Id. at 4.
Subsequently, JD deeded his one-third to A, who did not record (A's first deed). Id.
JD did not purport to use his power over the daughters' share. Id. JC then docketed
a judgment. Id. at 8. At an execution sale, X was the buyer. Id. X had no knowledge
and recorded the sheriffs certificate of sale. Id. at 8-9. By this action X took free and
clear of A, for one-third of the Dennis place. Id. X sold his interest to Y. Id. at 10. Y
obtained the sheriffs deed and recorded it. Id.
Meanwhile, the daughters sold their two-thirds to Y. Id. Subsequently, JD conveyed
the whole of the Dennis place to A (A's second deed). Id. at 11. That is, JD purported
to use his power of sale over the daughters' former two-thirds and also purported to
use the power to sell his own one-third, even though A had this by an earlier
unrecorded deed. A finally recorded all the deeds he had. Id. He then sued to evict Y.
Y prevailed as to one-third because X was a bona fide purchaser who recorded first
and who therefore took free of A (for one-third). Id. at 10. As to the remaining two-
thirds, although JD had power over the daughters' share, they were not precluded
from "taking back" the real property from their father and selling it free and clear of
JD's power. Id. at 13. JD's subsequent deed to A was therefore too late.
An interesting feature of the case is that A's second deed was recorded before Y
recorded the sheriffs deed. The court still decided for Y. The court did not rely on the
fact that the certificate of sale was filed before A's second deed was filed. This might
have made X a bona fide purchaser who recorded first (even though X had not yet
received a deed). Rather, the court ruled that since the first deed gave A JD's
personal one-third, the second deed was ineffective to give A anything. Therefore,
even though A recorded the second deed first, it was meaningless as to the one-third.
Rather, Y recorded the sheriffs deed before A had filed the first deed. What this
suggests is that if A loses a deed and then tries to record a replacement deed, A has
not actually recorded and may fail as to a subsequent purchaser. Perhaps filing the
replacement deed puts everyone on inquiry notice that A may have some rights,
although this is a close question. See Harper v. Paradise, 210 S.E.2d 710, 714 (Ga.
1974) ("[A] deed in the chain of title, discovered by the investigator, is constructive
notice of all other deeds which were referred to in the deed discovered . . . ." (quoting
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Hetzel was a proper recording act case. Maroney, however, was
not. Rather, Maroney entailed whether a fiduciary (0) could sell
free of A's equitable interest. Nevertheless, both cases agree that
the sheriff inherits, as it were, O's power to sell free of earlier
unrecorded or equitable interests.294
Muddying the waters is Clute v. Emmerich295 :
t1: JD conveys a mortgage to A, who records.
t2 : JC dockets against JD.
t3 : JD sells his equity to B. B pays off A's mortgage claim. A
files the required "satisfaction piece," which notifies the world
that A has been paid.
t4 : JC serves an execution on the sheriff, who schedules an
execution sale.
t5 : At the execution sale, X is the buyer. X had no knowledge of
B.
At t3, B was subrogated to A's mortgage. That is to say, the law
deems that A has conveyed the mortgage to B. X, however,
claimed to take free of B's mortgage. Subrogation claims are
equitable in nature. They are no good against bona fide
purchasers for value, where a mortgage satisfaction is on record.
The Clute court, however, held that since JC was no purchaser, Y
was not either:
The judgment rendered is criticised as in direct violation of the
[R]ecording [A]cts. That [X] bought the property at a sale on
execution, when [A's] mortgage was discharged of record; that
she became such purchaser in good faith and for value, as the
trial court expressly found; and that a practical revival of the
satisfied mortgage sweeps away the protection of the record,
and works gross injustice to one who has trusted to it,- [sic] is
the substantial argument made. But we do not see that the
[RIecording [A]cts affect the question. Whatever of good faith
attended [X's] purchase at the execution sale, she could gain by
it no better or stronger right than the creditor would have got if
Talmadge Bros. & Co. v. Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 31 S.E. 618 (1898))). In
Harper, however, the recorded replacement directly referred to the earlier deed,
whereas this is not clear from the opinion in Hetzel.
294 Granted that 0 had power over A, but how did JD have a like power, when
JD was a bad faith purchaser from 0? Although the court does not explain, it must
be the case that when 0 conveyed to JD, 0 conveyed O's power over A. JD then
conveyed this power to the sheriff. The sheriff then used the power to kill off A's
equitable lien. Maroney proves that the power of 0 to convey free and clear to bona
fide purchasers is itself a conveyable property interest.
295 99 N.Y. 342, 2 N.E. 6 (1885).
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he had been the purchaser. She took only what the judgment
could give, and bought at the peril of disappointment as to the
existence or scope of its lien. The maxim of caveat emptor
applied to her purchase, and she has no ground of complaint if
she is given an interest in the land precisely commensurate
with the actual lien of the judgment under which she bought.
The record told her that such lien was only upon Hall's equity of
redemption, and was subject, when obtained, to [A's] mortgage.
The judgment creditor had no equitable right to anything more.
If more came by an enlargement of the lien, that was simply the
creditor's good fortune; if it did not so come, the good fortune
vanished, but no right of the creditor was invaded. [X's]
purchase, therefore, gave her, outside of her legal right, no
equity to have the property freed from the incumbrance to
which the judgment itself was subject. Her struggle is to retain
the benefit of an accidental and unintended extension of the
judgment lien, to which she was in no way equitably entitled, at
the expense of others acting in ignorance and through
mistake.296
B's subrogation rights were therefore preserved against X, a bona
fide purchaser at an execution sale.
What, then, is the law of New York on JC 1's ability to
expropriate D's ability to convey free of earlier unrecorded
conveyances? Hetzel (1877) is the only member of our trio
supporting JC's power that is truly a recording act case. Clute
(1885) is a case about an equitable lien. Maroney (1894) was also
a case about an equitable lien. It overrules Clute, so that Hetzel
is the governing authority for the recording act and Maroney the
governing authority for a sheriffs power to sell free of purely
equitable property interests.2 9 v
The rule should not change where JC bids in her judgment
at the execution sale. JC becomes a purchaser at this point.
Nevertheless, one case seems to hold otherwise. In Domestic &
Foreign Discount Corp. v. Beuerlein,2 98 D made an unrecorded
conveyance of a cotenancy to his mother. JC docketed and, just
days before its docketing lien died, JC served an execution on the
' Id. at 349-50, 2 N.E. at 6-7 (citation omitted).
297 Accord Grid Realty Corp. v. Fazzino, 55 A.D.2d 635, 390 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d
Dep't 1976) (sheriff could sell free of claim that D's absolute title was actually a
mortgage); Beman v. Douglas, 1 A.D. 169, 37 N.Y.S. 859 (3d Dep't 1896) (buyer at
execution sale took free of equitable interest arising from real estate sales contract).
298 54 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1944).
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sheriff.299 The sheriff held the execution sale, where JC was the
buyer. °° Claiming to be a cotenant, JC moved for a partition
sale. The court, however, ruled that JC had no status under the
recording act and therefore denied JC's motion.3 0 1 Although the
court never quite addressed JC's bona fides, °2 if JC was without
knowledge of the unrecorded conveyance, JC, as a purchaser at
the execution sale, should have prevailed. JC's docketing lien
against D was not voluntary, but the sheriff sold to JC as a
buyer. The seller was not a purchaser, but the buyer was.
V. FUTURE ADVANCES UNDER SENIOR MORTGAGES
In New York, a mortgage may secure advances made to the
debtor after the mortgage deed is delivered.30 3 But mortgagees, if
they have notice of the existence of these transferees, may not
make advances to the prejudice of junior transferees of a
debtor. 4
In the language of a UCC debate about the nature of the
security interests, New York follows the unitary view of
mortgages.3 0 5  That is to say, once a mortgage is created, its
priority comprehends whatever amount the agreement provides
for, including discretionary advances. But New York also follows
a doctrine of equitable subordination: If a lender knowingly
"squeezes out" an intervening party by making an optional future
299 Id. at 549.
300 Although JC never extended the lien and apparently the sheriff never levied,
the court upheld the propriety of the execution sale. This accords with the view that
if the execution is served on the sheriff while the execution sale is alive, the sale can
proceed. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
301 Id. at 550.
302 JC did, however, claim that the unrecorded conveyance was also a fraudulent
conveyance. The court ruled that the statute of limitations had run on fraudulent
conveyance avoidance, and it refused to toll the statute until JC had discovered the
existence of the conveyance. Id. So JC was claiming no knowledge of the conveyance
at some point of the process.
303 State Bank v. Fioravanti, 51 N.Y.2d 638, 641, 417 N.E.2d 60, 61, 435
N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (1980).
304 Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43, 51 (1881) (advanced senior lien over
intervening docketing lien, where senior lender had no knowledge of the docketing
lien).
305 The alternative view is that every new advance creates a new lien-the
multiple theory. David Gray Carlson & Paul M. Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 347
n.255 (1984).
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advance, the lender is equitably subordinated to the intervening
party, to the extent of the offending advance. °s
A leading case for this proposition is Ackerman v.
Hunsicker, °7 where JD granted A a mortgage with a future
advance clause in it. JC obtained a docketing lien.3°" Thereafter,
A guaranteed JD's note to a lender.3 0 9 The court held that A's
guaranty was a discretionary advance as to which A had
seniority generally, and JC had no cause to demand the equitable
subordination of A's post-lien advance. 10  Although JC's
docketing was "constructive notice" to future parties, it provided
no notice to prior parties.3 11
A similar case is Wallach v. Brosnahan (In re Brosnahan),312
where D granted A a mortgage which A never recorded.
Thereafter, JC docketed a judgment. Judge Carl Bucki held
that, in general, A had priority as to discretionary future
advances, but it also held open the possibility that A could be
equitably subordinated (as a matter of New York law) if A
advanced with knowledge of the harmful effect on JC. 3
The Brosnahan case is complicated by the fact that D had
filed for bankruptcy. As a result, the bankruptcy trustee could
avoid A's unrecorded mortgage31 4 and preserve it for the benefit
of the bankruptcy estate.1 So it was the bankruptcy trustee
who was asserting A's seniority under New York law. This leads
to a paradoxical situation. If A had made good faith advances to
D without knowledge of JC,31 6 the trustee benefited because his
priority over JC (derivative from A) was vindicated. If the
advances were in bad faith, then the trustee was harmed,
because JC's priority was preserved. It is not ordinarily the case
306 See Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Assocs., 188 A.D.2d 234, 236, 594
N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (3d Dep't 1993), affd, 195 A.D.2d 677, 599 N.Y.S.2d 340;
Skaneateles Savs. Bank v. Herold, 50 A.D.2d 85, 88, 376 N.Y.S.2d 286, 289 (4th
Dep't 1975), affd, 40 N.Y.2d 999, 359 N.E.2d 701, 391 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1976).
307 85 N.Y. 43.
31 Id. at 45-46.
30' Id. at 45.
310 Id. at 48.
311 Id. at 52.
312 312 B.R. 220 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004).
M Accord Thomas v. Kelsey, 30 Barb. 268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859).
314 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2000).
315 Id. § 551.
316 In Brosnahan, A was the adult child of D; they were unlikely to be have been
good faith advancers. 312 B.R. at 222.
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that a bankruptcy trustee fears bad faith advances to a bankrupt
just prior to a bankruptcy proceeding.
In 1985, the New York Legislature enacted section 281(2) of
the Real Property Law, in order to strengthen the position of
senior mortgagees making discretionary future advances:
Any credit line mortgage may, and when so expressed
therein, shall secure not only the original indebtedness
but also the indebtedness created by future advances
thereunder.., whether such advances are obligatory or are to
be made at the option of the lender or otherwise, to the same
extent and with the same priority of lien as if such future
advances had been made at the time such credit line mortgage
was recorded.., although there may have been no advances
made at the time of the execution and acknowledgment of such
credit line mortgage, and although there may be no
indebtedness outstanding at the time any advance is made. 317
This provision, however, requires the credit line mortgage318 to be
recorded. Because the mortgage in Brosnahan was not recorded,
section 281(2) did not apply to aid the bankruptcy trustee. 9
What if A had recorded and the statute applied? Does it
authorize bad faith advances to D in derogation of JC's rights?
The Brosnahan court suggested so: "Compliance with this
statute is like hitting a home run in baseball. It assures a
score ".... 320 But as George Brett learned in the famous "pine
tar incident ,"321 a home run does not assure a score. If A
knowingly gives an advance to an insolvent D in order to squeeze
317 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 281(2) (McKinney 2008).
318 A credit line mortgage is defined as
any mortgage or deed of trust, other than a mortgage or deed of
trust... made pursuant to a building loan contract as defined in
subdivision thirteen of section two of the lien law, which states that it
secures indebtedness under a note, credit agreement or other financing
agreement that reflects the fact that the parties reasonably contemplate
entering into a series of advances, payments and readvances, and that
limits the aggregate amount at any time outstanding to a maximum
amount specified in such mortgage or deed of trust.
Id. § 281(1)(a).
319 312 B.R. at 224.
320 Id.
321 See Christopher H. Clancy & Jonathan A. Weiss, A Pine Tar Gloss on Quasi-
Legal Images, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 411, 421 & nn.31-33 (1984); Joseph Lukinsky,
Law in Education: A Reminiscence with Some Footnotes to Robert Cover's Nomos and
Narrative, 96 YALE L.J. 1836, 1855-56 (1987) (the pine tar incident
"constituted ... the most widespread popular legal debate in American history"
(emphasis omitted)).
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the lien of JC, then JC has a fraudulent conveyance claim
against A.322 For example, suppose the equity in D's house is
worth $100 and JC's lien is for precisely $100. A, knowing of JC,
makes an advance of $100. Under the statute, A is senior, but A
has made JC into an unsecured creditor for $100. As an
unsecured creditor, JC should have no trouble showing that $100
worth of A's mortgage is an intentional fraudulent conveyance,323
and A cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser of this portion of
her mortgage. 24
VI. RENTS
A peculiar type of property is the right of a landland to
collect rent from her tenants. Even more peculiar is how New
York judicial liens attach to these rights.
Some basic principles concerning rents need to be rehearsed.
First, the obligation of a tenant to pay rent runs with the land,325
meaning, among other things, that whoever owns the reversion
has the right to collect the rent. 26 Let us call the forward-looking
obligation of a tenant to pay rent a "rent receivable." New York
law insists that the rent receivable is real property. 27 Indeed,
the reversionary interest of the landlord is nothing but the rent
receivable (during the duration of the lease) coupled with a right
of possession after the lease ends.
Yet, once the rent receivable is actually paid, the proceeds
are considered the landlord's personal property. It is said that
collection of the rent "severs" the dollars from the real
322 Brett's home run was initially ruled fraudulent but this was reversed on
appeal, and the home run was justly restored to Brett. Clancy & Weiss, supra note
321, at 438.
323 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (McKinney 2008) ("Every conveyance
made and every obligation incurred with actual intent... to hinder, delay, or
defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent . . ").
324 If, as in Brosnahan, JD is bankrupt, the trustee will have a serious
impediment getting this fraudulent conveyance away from JC. In New York, JC's
docketing lien supposedly attaches to whatever property JD fraudulently conveyed
to A. See infra text accompanying notes 385-412.
322 Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 367, 244 N.E.2d 259, 266, 296 N.Y.S.2d
783, 793 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
326 King v. Kaiser, 3 Misc. 523, 524, 23 N.Y.S. 21, 22 (N.Y.C. C.P. Gen. T. N.Y.
County 1893); Payn v. Beal, 4 Denio 405, 409-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (citing Lord
Coke).
327 See ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 674, 350 N.E.2d
899, 901, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1976); see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Brown &
E. Ridge Partners, 243 A.D.2d 81, 83-84, 672 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207-08 (4th Dep't 1998).
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property.2 8  Collecting rent is like harvesting crops. While
attached to the earth, rent receivables and crops are part of the
earth itself. But when rent is collected and the crops harvested,
the dollars and crops are unencumbered personal property.
3 29
A lien on the reversionary interest in real property
encumbers the rent receivables. Yet, so long as the landlord
owns the reversion, the landlord may collect the rent and harvest
the crops free and clear of the lien. Thus, where a landlord
collects rents and leaves the senior lien unpaid, the landlord does
not convert to her own use the property of the lienholder.
"Conversion"-wrongful interference with the tangible personal
property of another 330-cannot exist here, because, once the rents
are collected, they are the landlord's personal property as to
which no real estate lien attaches.33'
Eventually, a lien creditor, whether a consensual mortgagee
or a JC, will sell the reversion to a buyer in a foreclosure sale.
After the sale, the buyer owns the reversion and therefore now
has the right to collect the rent receivables.
New York law, however, permits mortgagees to dispossess
the defaulting mortgagor even before the foreclosure sale. If the
mortgage agreement so provides, a mortgagee may obtain the
appointment of a receiver in an ex parte hearing.3 2 This is a
change from common law, which required the showing of waste
or a showing that the property was insufficiently valuable to
reimburse the mortgagee for the loan upon foreclosure.33
The effect of appointing a receiver is that the owner of the
reversion is dispossessed. The landlord loses the right to collect
rent receivables, which now belong to the receiver. If the
32 Wyckoff v. Scofield, 98 N.Y. 475, 479 (1885) ("When these moneys came to
the possession of the defendant's agent it operated as an effectual severance of the
rents from the mortgaged property. .. ").
329 See David Gray Carlson & Paul M. Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I-Creditor Representatives, Bank
Receivers, Fixtures, Crops and Accessions, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 849-57 (1984).
330 Roemer & Featherstonhaugh P.C. v. Featherstonhaugh, 267 A.D.2d 697, 697,
699 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (3d Dep't 1999).
I" But see Citation Mortgage, Ltd. v. Ormond Beach Assocs. (In re Ormond
Beach Assocs.), 184 F.3d 143, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1999) (Florida law).
332 See Friedman v. Gerax Realty Assocs., 100 Misc. 2d 820, 821, 420 N.Y.S.2d
247, 248 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1979).
3" Dart v. W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 438 P.2d 407, 409-10 (Ariz. 1968) (Arizona
law). A more recent Arizona statute brings it into line with the New York reform.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-702(B) (2008).
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landlord nevertheless insists on collecting, the receiver may treat
the money collected as held in trust for the receiver. Now, if the
landlord pockets the rents, she commits the tort of conversion, for
which she will have personal liability (even if the underlying
mortgage is non-recourse). 34
Although the law of rents is usually expressed in the context
of consensual mortgages, it should apply straightforwardly to the
enforcement of a judicial lien on a reversionary interest. Since
the rent receivable is real property, a docketing or levying lien
attaches to it. 335 The landlord, however, continues to have the
right to harvest the rents free and clear of the judicial lien. 36
The CPLR gives JC a right to a receiver. Any such receiver "may
be authorized to administer, collect, improve, lease or repair or
sell any real... property"337 of the debtor. When the receiver
appears, the landlord's ability to collect rent free and clear of the
judicial lien should come to an end.3
Suppose, however, we have the following:
Eleventh Scenario
ti: JD leases the premises to T.
t2 : JD grants a mortgage to A, who records.
t3 : JC dockets against JD.
t4 : JC obtains a receiver to take possession of JD's reversionary
interest.
t5 : A obtains a receiver for the same purpose.
In the Eleventh Scenario, JC (through her receiver) has the right
to collect from T starting at t4 and ending at t5 . At t5 , A (through
the receiver) has an even better right of possession. So A's
receiver dispossesses JC's receiver, just as JC dispossessed JD.
Whatever JC's receiver has collected from T prior to t5 , JC's
"I Citation Mortgage, Ltd. v. Ormond Beach Assocs. Ltd. P'ship (In re Ormond
Beach Assocs. Ltd. P'ship), 184 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (nonrecourse Florida
mortgage).
"' See Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 244 N.E.2d 259, 261, 296
N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (1968).
336 S & H Bldg. Materials Corp. v. European-Am. Bank & Trust Co., 104 Misc.
2d 249, 253, 428 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980) ("[P]rior to the
appointment of a receiver ... the owner would have been entitled to collect the
rents . . ").
33' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a) (McKinney 2008).
3" Fehr v. First Americana Corp., 31 A.D.2d 967, 968, 299 N.Y.S.2d 214, 216-17
(2d Dep't 1969), appeal dismissed, 25 N.Y.2d 890, 251 N.E.2d 147, 304 N.Y.S.2d 8
(1969).
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receiver may keep.3 9 Those rents have been severed from the
underlying real estate. But A's receiver may collect rents going
forward from t5. 4°
This was the holding of S & H Building Materials Corp. v.
European-American Bank & Trust Co., 341 with the proviso that
the sheriff had levied T by serving T with the execution; no
receiver was appointed. The S&H court found the sheriffs levy
unproblematic, but as a statutory matter, service of the execution
on T is a levy only if there is an "interest of the judgment
debtor... in personal property" of the debtor. 42  The rent
receivable is real property.343  Oddly, once the dollars are
collected by the sheriff, the dollars are personal property as to
which A's senior mortgage lien does not attach. 44 Nevertheless,
339 An "assignment of rents" in which A purports to own collections without the
intervention of a receiver is not permitted in New York. See id., 31 A.D.2d at 968,
299 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
340 In Fehr, A was the senior mortgagee and B was the junior mortgagee. JC,
docketed against D, followed by JC2. JC 2 was the first to obtain a receiver. JC2's
receivership was "extended" to A-that is, instead of obtaining a new receiver, JC 2's
receiver was given a new boss in A. The receiver then sold the premises, which
satisfied A's mortgage. The court ruled that JC 2 was senior to B as to rents actually
collected. The dissent, however, thought that whatever the receiver held should be
viewed as surplus from the sale itself, as to which B would have been senior. Indeed,
had the receiver given the rents to A, such that A was paid, surplus proceeds would
have existed, and B would have been entitled to them over JC and JC 2. The
majority in Fehr, however, thought that the rent collections were not to be viewed as
surplus funds at all. Once collected, the funds were personal property to which B
had no right. See id., 299 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
Also to be noted is the fact that JC, had a judicial lien senior to that of JC 2. Yet JC 2
was the first to obtain a receiver and so won priority over JC1. Presumably, JC,
could take back the premises from JC 2 by separately obtaining a receivership.
341 104 Misc. 2d 249, 428 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
342 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (emphasis added).
343 In Community Bank, National Ass'n v. Lyons (In re Lyons), 177 B.R. 767, 771
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1994), a debtor and his non-debtor wife had rental income. The
wife acquiesced to the debtor's expropriation of the rent. Meanwhile, JC had a
judgment against the wife and claimed the right to garnish the tenants paying rent.
The court ruled that rents were inherently not garnishable because they were real
property.
311 In Kissling v. Maidman, A foreclosed on JD's real property and had a deficit.
A's receiver had some collected rents on hand. 103 Misc. 2d 44, 45, 425 N.Y.S.2d 469,
470 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County. 1980). Two JCs who docketed before the receiver was
appointed claimed priority to the funds. Id. The easy answer is that the receiver was
a court officer in the employ of A, and the rents he held were A's funds. Confusingly,
CPLR 5234(a) states that, "the proceeds of personal property... acquired by a
receiver or a sheriff... shall be distributed to the judgment creditor and any excess
shall be paid over to the judgment debtor." The Kissling court hinted that a JC who
had served an execution on the sheriff would have been senior, but this hint should
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at the moment of the levy, the uncollected rent receivable is not
personal property.3
45
In Glassman v. Hyder,346 a sheriff, pursuant to a pre-
judgment order of attachment, levied Ts obligation to pay rent
for occupation of a New Mexico building. This was done by
serving T (present and doing business in New York) with an
order of attachment in New York. Judge Charles Breitel
acknowledged that rent receivables are real property and, if
located in New York, he endorsed the idea of a receivership as an
outgrowth of a lien on the reversionary interest. But T was
renting a New Mexico building. The rent receivable, therefore,
could only be reached by encumbering the reversionary interest
with a judicial lien in New Mexico.34 Obviously, the plaintiff did
not want to travel to New Mexico; he wanted to bring a quasi in
rem proceeding in New York.
Judge Breitel did not quite rule that rents were real estate
and therefore not leviable. Rather, he ruled that rent receivables
were debts owed by T to D. Confusingly, the CPLR distinguishes
between personal property348 and debts,349 as if they are separate
things. But, in New York, only debts certain to become due can
be levied. A rent receivable is not certain to become due. Rather,
it is a contingent obligation; T owes rent only if Ts quiet use and
enjoyment of the premises continues. Therefore, the rent was an
unleviable contingent debt.
be rejected. CPLR 5234(a)'s unstated premise is that JCs claiming a distribution
from a receiver must have obtained the appointment of the receiver pursuant to
CPLR 5228. If someone else's receiver has funds, a JC for whom the receiver was not
appointed can only levy on the surplus after the receiver's client has been paid.
3" A levy of a rent receivable by execution is not valid, but what if, as in S&H
Building Materials, a tenant actually pays the sheriff. In such a case, CPLR 5209
applies:
A person who, pursuant to an execution ... pays ... a sheriff or receiver,
money. .. in which a judgment debtor has or will have an interest.., is
discharged from his obligation to the judgment debtor to the extent of the
payment ....
Although the execution creates no lien on the rent receivable, the tenant is invited to
pay anyway and, if he does, his rent obligation is deemed satisfied.
346 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968).
31' Glassman therefore overrules Ivor B. Clark Co. v. Hogan, 296 F. Supp. 398
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified on other grounds, 296 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
decided two months earlier, where a New York JC obtained a turnover order (and
hence a personal property judicial lien) on rent receivables located in Georgia).
348 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b).
341 Id. 5201(a).
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Later, the court in ABKCO Industries, Inc. v. Apple Films,
Inc.,"' amplified the meaning of Glassman. The ABKCO court
implied that the rent receivable in Glassman was both a debt
under section 5201(a) and property under section 5201(b). As a
debt, it could not be levied, because it was not certain to become
due. As property, the rent receivable was usufructuary to New
Mexico land and so was not located in New York. This remark
implies that rent receivables located in New York are real
property (as well as debts). Yet paper levies under section
5232(a) or section 6214(a) operate only if the debtor has personal
property or debts certain to become due. The lesson here is that
rent receivables in New York are not properly leviable. Nor can
they be reached by turnover orders, which are also geared to
personal property only.3 51
As if this were not peculiar enough, we must add a strange
and no doubt absurd distinction. Real property law distinguishes
between the forward-looking obligation of the covenant running
with the land from the liability for breach of the covenant. The
future obligation is purely real property-the rent receivable.
But the breach of a past obligation is a chose in action352-
personal property of the debtor that can be levied, because it has
already become due. For example, in Glassman, T had to pay
rent a month in advance. T was served with the order of
attachment on December 21, 1965. At the time of the levy, T was
entirely paid up on back rent. No more rent was due until
January 1, 1966. 3  Therefore, at the time of the levy, the rent
receivable was real property, or it was contingent debt, per the
Glassman majority. 54
350 39 N.Y.2d 670, 350 N.E.2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1976).
351 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b); Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F. Supp. 2d 508, 525-26
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Oil City Petroleum Co. v. Fabac Realty Corp., 70 A.D.2d 859, 418
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1st Dep't 1979), affd, 50 N.Y.2d 853, 407 N.E.2d 1334, 430 N.Y.S.2d 38
(1980).
352 Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N.Y. 212, 218, 26 N.E. 611, 612 (1891); see Duvall v.
Craig, 15 U.S. 45, 62 (1817).
353 Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 358, 244 N.E.2d 259, 260, 296 N.Y.S.2d
783, 785 (1968). Eventually, the court dissolved the order of attachment and the
sheriff returned these funds to D in New Mexico. Id., 244 N.E.2d at 260, 296
N.Y.S.2d at 785.
31 Judge Keating, in dissent, thought this contingency so remote that January
rent should have been deemed a debt certain to become due. Id. at 367, 244 N.E.2d
at 265, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (Keating, J., dissenting).
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Suppose, however, the sheriff levied on January 2 at a time
when T had not yet paid the rent. As of January 1, T owed rent
certainly and it was due. So, on the reasoning of Glassman, the
rent receivable had become a chose in action. This chose in
action was both D's personal property and a debt that has
certainly become due. As such, it was fully leviable under the
first sentence of CPLR 6214.
A levy by service of an order of attachment upon a person other
than the defendant is effective only if, at the time of service,
such person owes a debt to the defendant or such person is in
the possession or custody of property in which such person
knows or has reason to believe the defendant has an
interest .. .
Since rent on January 3 was certainly due, the levy was valid.
And given that this first sentence of section 6214(a) is met, the
second sentence now takes effect:
[A111 debts of such a person.., then due and thereafter coming
due to the defendant, shall be subject to the levy.356
This means that T would have had an ongoing duty to pay rent to
the sheriff as rent accrued after January 2 (our hypothetical date
of levy). For instance, rent in February, March, etc., was payable
to the sheriff (not the landlord) until the maximum amount
named in the order of attachment was fully secured.
This was the conclusion of the court in Tenzer, Greenblatt,
Fallon & Kaplan v. Abbruzzese 57 Because some back rent was
due and owing at the time of the levy, all rent in the future was
levied. The judgment creditor in Tenzer therefore received years
of rent that accrued after the initial valid levy.3
355 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b); see also id. 5232(a) ("A levy by service of the execution
is effective only if, at the time of service, the person served owes a debt to the
judgment debtor....").
" Id. 6214(b); see also id. 5232(a) ("[AIll debts of such a person ... then due or
thereafter coming due to the judgment debtor ... shall be subject to the levy.").
... 57 Misc. 2d 783, 293 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968).
11 In contrast, where a rent receivable has ripened into a chose in action and
where a receiver displaces the mortgagee before the mortgagee has actually
collected, the mortgagee's receiver succeeds both to the rent receivable and to the
chose in action. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fulton Dev. Corp., 265 N.Y. 348, 353, 193
N.E. 169, 172 (1934). Fulton therefore contradicts the premise that an obligation
arising from a running covenant but which is past due is personal property.
Otherwise, the mortgage lien on real property could not attach to the landlord's
chose in action.
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But can this conclusion be vindicated in light of the fifth
sentence of section 6214? That sentence provides:
Until such payment... or until the expiration of ninety days
after the service of the order of attachment upon him, or of such
further time as is provided by any subsequent order of the court
served upon him, whichever event first occurs, the garnishee is
forbidden to ... pay over or otherwise dispose of any such debt,
to any person other than the sheriff, except upon direction of the
sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court.35 9
Suppose T, in Glasser was garnished on January 2 and T paid
the sheriff on January 3. The second sentence says that, when
February rent becomes due, T must pay it to the sheriff. But the
inscrutable fifth sentence states that, after January 3, T is no
longer forbidden to pay the debt to D. How these sentences are
supposed to interact is a mystery. The court in Tenzer, however,
assumed that the levy survives past January 3 to pick up the
rent obligation in February, March and beyond. 6 °
The sheriffs levy of debt certainly due picks up contingent
debt that becomes vested during the life of the levy. But it is
otherwise if JC attempts to obtain a turnover order against T.
Turnover orders are competent to create a lien on debts361 or on
personal property. 62 Therefore, a turnover can effectively bind T
to pay rent past due, but future debt is unencumbered by any
given turnover order. 63
There is one last possibility for obtaining the rents directly
through execution. Perhaps rent is income within the meaning of
CPLR 5231. Section 5231 governs income executions. 64 This is
the means by which creditors garnish wages. But section 5231 is
359 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b); see also id. 5232(a) ("At the expiration of ninety days
after a levy is made by service of the execution, or of such further time as the court,
upon motion ... has provided, the levy shall be void except as to... debts ... paid to
the sheriff.. . or as to which a proceeding under sections 5225 or 5227 has been
brought.").
360 It should be noted that the fifth sentence has the familiar wild card, "except
upon direction of the sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court." Id. 6214(b). So
perhaps the sheriff or the court could extend the injunctive effect of the levy past the
point at which T pays. But another interpretation of this discretion is that the
sheriff or court may shorten the injunctive effect but may not lengthen it.
361 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5227.
362 Id. 5225.
363 Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F. Supp. 2d 508, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
36 An income execution must set forth the amount of income to be received and
how much of it must be paid over to the sheriff, plus various other items not
required in an ordinary execution. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(a).
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not limited to wages; it applies "[w]here a judgment debtor is
receiving or will receive money from any source. "365 Because
section 5231 involves wages, it is encrusted with all sorts of
restrictions. In particular, the sheriff must first serve JD with
the income execution, to give JD the opportunity to avoid
garnishment by paying the sheriff directly.366 If JD does not pay,
the sheriff then garnishes the employer. Furthermore, the levy
extends only to ten percent of income.3 67 In New York, ninety
percent of wages are exempt from execution. 6 s The income
execution must be served on the sheriff of the county where JD
resides, or, if a non-resident, where JD is employed.369
Can wage garnishments levy the rent T owes her landlord?
This possibility was considered and not entirely rejected in
Glassman. Judge Breitel doubted whether income could be
levied under a pre-judgment order of attachment, since CPLR
6202 makes only debt or property "as provided in section 5201"
subject to attachment.3 71 "Income" was conceived to be a third
thing that could be levied by an income execution pursuant to
CPLR 5231, Judge Breitel also noted that income executions
must in any case be delivered to the debtor. 71 Because this had
not been done, the plaintiff could not rely on a levy of income in
Glassman.372
To summarize, JC can clearly get rent on New York real
property by docketing a judgment in the county where the rent
receivable is located and by obtaining the appointment of a
receiver who "dispossesses" JD and takes over the right to collect
rents. Whether rent can be levied pursuant to an ordinary
execution, however, is subject to the caprice of whether, at the
time of the levy, T owes back rent (a chose in action) or future
rent (not D's personal property). There is also the somewhat
loopy possibility that JC can obtain ten percent of the rents
pursuant to an income execution. These absurdities result from
the fact that only personal property and debts certain to become
365 Id. 5231(b).
366 Id. 5231(d).
367 Id. 5231(b).
368 Id. 5205(d)(2).
369 Id. 5231(b).
370 Id. 6202; Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 244 N.E.2d 259, 261, 296
N.Y.S.2d 783, 787-88 (1968).
371 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5231(d).
372 23 N.Y.2d at 360-61, 244 N.E.2d at 262, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
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due may be levied by service of the execution. As a result, rent
receivables are immune from levy under section 5232(a), though
choses in action are not.
VII. AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
Much of the above discussion presupposes that a debtor owns
real property at the time a judgment is docketed. It is very
possible that the debtor will acquire property aftdr judgments are
docketed. In such a case, all the liens attach to the after-
acquired property all at the same time. 3 None is prior in time to
any other. By New York case law, these liens are deemed to
share pro rata in the property. 4
The leading case for this proposition is Hulbert v. Hulbert.75
The facts of this case, however, are rather different from the
proposition for which the case is cited.
Hulbert presented the following facts376:
ti: JC 1 dockets, but JD has no real property.
t2 : JC 2 dockets.
t3 : JC 2 dockets a second, separate judgment.
t4 : JD inherits a one-third cotenancy in real property.
t5 : JC, delivers an execution to the sheriff. At the execution
sale, X is the buyer.
t6 : JD's cotenants move for and obtain a partition sale whereby
a fee simple estate is sold to Y.
In Hulbert, the court awarded JD's one-third share to X and JC 2
on a pro rata basis.3 7  Accordingly, the case stands for the fact
that when JC 1 and JC 2 compete for after-acquired real property
of JD, they share pro rata.378
A mystery in the case is the effect of the execution sale at t4
on JC 2. Did not X buy JD's inheritance free and clear of JC 2's
lien? Here was what the Hulbert court had to say on the matter:
373 Bankruptcy discharge interferes with this conclusion. If the discharge is
granted before the debtor obtains real property, the judgment is destroyed and can
create no after-acquired property lien on the debtor's acquisition. Bank of N.Y. v.
Nies, 96 A.D.2d 166, 172, 468 N.Y.S.2d 278, 282 (4th Dep't 1983).
174 Other states follow various other priority solutions. See generally David Gray
Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 CARDOzO
L. REV. 505 (1985).
375 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916).
.76 Id. at 432, 111 N.E. at 70.
177 Id. at 442, 111 N.E. at 74.
171 Id. at 441-42, 111 N.E. at 73-74.
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[T]he liens of the three judgments attached simultaneously to
the property of [JD] upon his acquisition of the interest derived
from his father. By virtue of the statute they were at that time
equal liens entitled to share pro rata in the proceeds of the
debtor's property. Such being the case, how can it be held that
the issuing of the execution and the advertising by the sheriff-
acts which would be an idle ceremony-should give a preference
to the creditor? Once a lien is acquired it is a right which
cannot be lost by the performance of an unnecessary act by
another creditor. With as much reason could it be held that as
between two mortgagees holding mortgages of equal rank the
one who showed the greatest diligence in commencing an action
of foreclosure should acquire a preference over the other. Under
the terms of the statute the judgments of [JC2] became liens on
the real property of [JD] of equal rank with the lien of the
judgment of [JC1]. The lien of these judgments of [JC2], having
attached, did not forfeit their position of equality and become
subordinate to a lien of equal rank, merely because its
owner did not do a useless thing.... The diligence of a junior
judgment creditor could not affect the lien of a senior judgment
creditor, and, if it could not affect the lien of a senior judgment
creditor, it cannot affect the lien of equal rank. The principle
that equity favors the diligent has no application where one
creditor displays his diligence in the doing of useless and
unnecessary things. The liens of the three judgments attached
when [JD] acquired the property. The issuing of an execution
upon one of the judgments could not affect the relative rank of
the liens as between themselves.
3 7 9
A careful reading of this passage reveals that the reason JC 2's
liens did not disappear in JC 1 's execution sale is that JC 1 had no
power to foreclose simultaneously created liens. For this reason,
the court refers to JCl's execution as "a useless thing."
3 0
So if X did not buy free and clear of JC 1 and JC 2, what did X
buy? In the sale, X bought JC 1 's lien and JD's equity.38  Because
JC,'s lien and JC 2's two liens together exceeded the value of JD's
one-third interest, JD's equity did not figure in the distribution of
the partition sale. 2  In effect, X had only JC 1 's docketing lien to
171 Id. at 441, 111 N.E. at 73 (emphasis added).
380 Id. at 440-41, 111 N.E. at 73.
311 See id.
382 Id. at 432-33, 111 N.E. at 70.
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assert against JC 2. The two liens of JC 2 were held to be equal in
time and pro rata in share.8 3
How would this case be decided under CPLR 5203(a)? X
would have taken the entire distribution from the partition sale.
To be sure, JC 1 and JC 2 were equal until the execution sale.
According to section 5203(a): "No transfer of an interest of the
judgment debtor in real property.., is effective against the
judgment creditor.., from the time of the docketing of the
judgment with the clerk of the county in which the property is
located ....,3 Under this provision, JC1 docketed first, and so
no transfer to JC 2 is good against him. The trouble is JC 2 has
the same argument. JC1 also was a transferee (at t3) after JC2
docketed, and so JCx's lien is no good against JC 2 . Neither side
can look to section 5203(a) for priority.
X, however, stands on different ground. The preamble to
section 5203(a) is subject to an exception by section 5203(a)(2),
which states that JC 2 loses as to "a transfer to a purchaser for
value at a judicial sale, which shall include an execution sale."
By virtue of this exception, JC 2 is foreclosable by JC1 (and vice
versa). In short, Hulbert's holding on foreclosability has been
overruled by enactment of the CPLR, although its holding on pro
rata sharing lives on.
VIII. JUDICIAL LIENS AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Suppose JD fraudulently conveys real property to X. JC
then dockets a judgment against JD. Does JC have a lien on X's
property? The proper answer should be no.38  CPLR 5203(a)
states that docketing creates a lien on "an interest of the
judgment debtor in real property."38 6 And, once she conveys it
away, JD has no interest in the property.387 To be sure, X holds
the property in trust for creditors of JD. But JD has no property
interest in what JD has conveyed to X.
That JD has no property left after a fraudulent conveyance
was recognized by the Court of Appeals in Bostwick v. Menck,8 s
383 Id. at 440, 111 N.E. at 73.
384 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2008).
38' See id. According to the statute, a docketing creates a lien only against JD,
not a transferee of JD's property.
386 Id. (emphasis added).
387 See infra note 424 and accompanying text.
388 40 N.Y. 383, 385 (1869) (a receiver in a fraudulent conveyance action
'acquires no right to the property by succession to the rights of the debtor, for the
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where JD conveyed some sort of property, personal or real, to
X. 38 9  JC then obtained the appointment of a receiver, who
brought a fraudulent conveyance action against X. The exact
issue in the case was whether the receiver should recover only
enough property to satisfy JC's $200 judgment or whether the
receiver could compel X to surrender all of the fraudulently
conveyed property worth $15,000. 390 The court ruled that X
would be excused if he turned over $200 in property. 9' In the
course of so ruling, the court said that the receiver
acquires no right to the property by succession to the rights of
the debtor, for the reason that the transfer is valid as against
the debtor, and cannot be set aside by him as the debtor's
successor .... [T]he fraudulent transferee of property acquires
a good title thereto as against the debtor, and all other persons
except the creditors of the transferror .... [Tihe right of the
receiver representing the creditors ... is no greater than that of
the creditors. What, then, are the legal and equitable rights of
a creditor as to property fraudulently transferred? Manifestly
only to treat as void and set aside such transfer, so far as shall
be necessary to satisfy his debt and costs. ... When his debt
and costs are paid, the transfer is valid as to him as to other
persons 392
From this principle it should follow that docketing against JD
cannot mean JC has a lien against X's property.3 93
By way of good example, Luhrs v. Hancock394 presented the
following set of facts:
ti: JD fraudulently conveys Arizona real property to X.
t2: JC dockets against JD.
t3: X conveys a mortgage to B. B is a bona fide purchaser.
t4: JC initiates an execution sale, where Y is the buyer.
t5 : B initiates a foreclosure sale where Z is the buyer.
t6: Y sues to eject Z.
reason that the transfer is valid against the debtor, and cannot be set aside by him
as the debtor's successor").
389 Id. at 384-85.
310 Id. at 383-84.
191 Id. at 385-86.
392 Id.; accord McDonald v. McDonald, 17 N.Y.S. 230, 232 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T.
3d Dep't 1891) (a JD "has no interest in the land which she fraudulently conveyed").
393 See Doster v. Manistee Nat'l Bank, 55 S.W. 137 (Ark. 1900). This ancient
opinion is conspicuously well reasoned and deserves to be followed in New York.
394 181 U.S. 567, 568-69 (1901).
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The Luhrs court held that Z had better title than Y. 395 Under
Arizona law, JC never had a lien on X's property. 6 Therefore, X
could validly mortgage to B, the bona fide mortgagee. And Z
could take good title under the shelter of B's status as a bona fide
purchaser.
Surprisingly, New York case law strongly indicates that JC
does have a lien against X's property, even before JC 1 moves to
set the fraudulent conveyance aside. This rule is entirely
contrary to the logic of fraudulent conveyance law, which holds
that, at the time of docketing, JD had already conveyed away the
property. Having no property, there is nothing to which JC's lien
could attach.
A leading authority in New York for its lamentable rule is
White's Bank of Buffalo v. Farthing297  In White's Bank, JD
conveyed to X before any judgments were docketed . JCsI-3 then
docketed in sequence. 99 JC 2 sought to execute on X's property
without making JC 1 a party.400 The court properly held that JC 1
was not a necessary party, a conclusion that would be correct if
JC1 had no lien on X's property.0 1 Inconsistently, however, the
White's Bank court remarked:
The several judgments became liens on lands fraudulently
conveyed by [JD] in the order of their docketing, and they could
have been sold on executions issued on the judgments. 402 [JC2],
however, elected to bring its action to remove the alleged
fraudulent obstruction created by the conveyances. If it
succeeds in establishing the fraud, it will be entitled to a
judgment setting aside the conveyances simply, in which case it
can proceed to enforce its judgment by a sale of the land on
execution, unembarrassed by the cloud created; or the court
may proceed further, and compel the fraudulent grantees to
"I Id. at 570.
396 Accord In re Estes, 3 F. 134, 141 (D. Or. 1880), affd, 5 F. 60 (C.C.D. Or.
1880).
397 101 N.Y. 344, 4 N.E. 734 (1886).
"I Id. at 346, 4 N.E. at 734.
399 Id. at 347, 4 N.E. at 734.
400 Id., 4 N.E. at 734-35.
401 Id. at 347-48, 4 N.E. at 734-35.
402 But see Nat'l Tradesmen's Bank v. Wetmore, 124 N.Y. 241, 249, 26 N.E. 548,
549 (2d Div. 1891) (requiring a judgment creditor to bring an equitable action to
avoid, with a showing that the legal remedy of execution was inadequate). Wetmore's
insistence upon an equitable proceeding is completely inconsistent with the premise
that JC has a lien on fraudulently conveyed land upon docketing against the JD.
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convey the lands to a receiver, to be sold to satisfy the plaintiffs
judgment.
The judgments in favor of the other banks will in no way be
affected, whichever form the judgment in this action may take.
If it simply sets aside the fraudulent conveyances, the land will
remain charged with the liens of the several judgments in the
order of their docketing, and the proceedings to enforce them
will be regulated by the statute. If it goes further, and appoints
a receiver, and directs a conveyance to him, a purchaser under
the receiver's sale will take title as of the time of the debtor's
conveyance to the receiver, subject, however, to the judgment in
favor of the banks other than [JC2]. The result of (JC2's] action
will not, therefore, affect the lien of the judgments in favor of
the other banks who seek to intervene in this action.
... According to the rule established in this state judgment
creditors holding distinct and several judgments may unite in
an action to set aside a conveyance by the common debtor, made
in fraud of their rights as creditors. This is a convenient rule,
but it is not a rule of obligation, but one conferring authority
only. It has never been held that all judgment creditors so
situated were necessary parties to such an action.... The
rights of the creditor not made a party will not be prejudiced by
the judgment in that action. A judgment creditor has no title to
the land of the judgment debtor, but a lien only, which may, by
subsequent proceedings, become the foundation of title; nor has
he any interest in the subject-matter of the action brought by
another judgment creditor, within the meaning of the section.
He may have an interest which will be subserved by having the
conveyance set aside. But he will not be concluded by a denial
of that relief in the action of the other creditor, and, whatever
the result of that action may be, his rights and remedies remain
as before.40
3
This long passage seems to be saying that, even though it was
the first to commence a supplementary proceeding against X, JC 2
had a lien junior to that of JC 1 and that JC, could not be
foreclosed in JC 2's action. °4 What the fraudulent conveyance
proceeding against X achieves, according to the White's Bank
court, is a declaration that JD once again owns the property, and
403 101 N.Y. at 346-48, 4 N.E. 734-35 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
404 The modern CPLR would at least make JC, foreclosable. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5203(a)(2) (McKinney 2008). But JCi would have priority to the proceeds of an
execution sale. Id. 5236(g).
[Vol. 82:12911372
2008] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART ONE
the docketing liens can now be enforced without the worry that
the conveyance to X might later be found unfraudulent.
40 5
In Chautauque County Bank v. Risley,40 6 however, JC 1 and
JC 2 both docketed against JD after JD fraudulently conveyed
land to X. JC, was the first to bring an equitable action against
X. The Chautauque County Bank court ruled that JC waived the
lien by proceeding in equity, thereby allowing JC 2's lien to gain
priority. 407 This egregious holding, still thought to be good law in
1929,408 makes it risky for JC1 to proceed in equity, in lieu of
simply serving an execution on the sheriff.
The regrettable New York position effectively denies to a
bona fide purchaser protection from fraudulent conveyance
liability. According to New York Debtor and Creditor Law
278(1):
Where a conveyance... is fraudulent as to a creditor, such
creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any
person except a purchaser for fair consideration without
knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase...
a. Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to
the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or
405 For a similar holding, see Hillyer v. LeRoy, 179 N.Y. 369, 375, 72 N.E. 237,
238 (1904), where JD conveyed to X and JC 1 docketed against JD thereafter. Two
years later, JD filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge. Discharges have the
effect of nullifying judgments in personam but leaving judicial liens intact. See
11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Thereafter, JC1 commenced an action
against X to set aside the fraudulent conveyance. X claimed that JC,'s judgment was
discharged, but the court ruled that JC1 had a lien on X's property from the time JC,
docketed against JD.
In Wilkinson v. Paddock, JD had granted a mortgage to A. JD then fraudulently
conveyed the equity to X. 11 N.Y.S. 442, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1890),
affd mem., 125 N.Y. 748, 27 N.E. 407 (1891). First JC, and then JC 2 docketed
judgments against JD. JC 2 successfully brought an action against X declaring X's
title to be based on fraudulent conveyance. A then foreclosed everybody and a
surplus resulted. JC, was held senior to JC2, even though JC, never sought to have
X's conveyance set aside.
In North Fork Bank v. Schmidt, the court was prepared to give JC, priority over
fraudulently conveyed assets, even though JC 2 was the first to commence a
proceeding against X to recover the fraudulent conveyance. The court remanded
because JC, had not proved that the conveyance was fraudulent as to it (while JC 2
had made such a showing). 265 A.D.2d 466, 468, 697 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (2d Dep't
1999).
406 19 N.Y. 369, 372 (1859).
407 Id. at 375.
408 Note, Priorities Among Judgment Creditors Pursuing Statutory and
Equitable Remedies in New York, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 508 (1929).
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b. Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution
upon the property conveyed.4 °9
If indeed JC has a judicial lien against X's property by docketing
against JD, then bona fide purchasers for value from X takes
subject to it. 410  There is no bona fide purchaser protection
against a docketing lien in New York. 411 And if X's purchaser
takes free of JC,'s fraudulent conveyance right, then perforce JC 1
has no lien.41 2
The New York rule also allows X to hide behind JC,'s
inactivity in avoiding liability to JC 2. "[T]he effect would be to
ignore that old and excellent maxim of equity, Vigilantibus non
dormientibus, aequitas subvenit, and to declare in favor of those
merely prior in time, although ever so unequal in diligence."413
Why should X escape liability to JC 2 just because JC,'s judgment
makes it bootless for JC 2 to proceed?
The New York position plays havoc with the statute of
limitations. The life of docketing lien approaches ten years. 4
The statute of limitations in New York for avoidance of a
fraudulent conveyance is but six years.41 If JC, really has a lien
on X's real estate, then X cannot cite the six-year statute of
limitations. Rather, JC's lien can be enforced for at least ten
49 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278(1) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
410 In Feuer v. Schaller, the court asserted that where JD conveys to X and JC1
dockets against JD, JC 1 has a lien against X. 115 Misc. 229, 230-31, 187 N.Y.S. 530,
531-32 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1921). But, prior to JC,'s docketing, X had conveyed
to Y, a bona fide purchaser. Therefore, JC,'s lien did not attach against Y's property.
Had Y purchased after JC,'s docketing presumably Ys property would have been
encumbered by JC,'s lien, in spite of Y's bona fide purchaser status.
411 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 271(1).
412 In Corbin v. Litke, 105 Misc. 2d 94, 431 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1990), the court assumed that the proper fraudulent conveyance remedy was
an injunction forcing X to convey the property back to JD, so that JC,'s lien could
attach. On its own merits, this is unfortunate. Where JC,'s judgment is for $100 and
the property is worth more than that, the conveyance back to JD means that JD gets
the surplus, which is not appropriate. Be that as it may, the remedy assumes that
JCi does not already have a lien on X's property.
413 Doster v. Manistee Nat'l Bank, 55 S.W. 137, 138 (Ark. 1900) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
414 See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
415 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1) (McKinney 2008); see also Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d
18, 20 (2d Cir. 1991). When the fraudulent transfer is an intentional fraud, then C1
has six years or two years after discovery, whichever lasts longer. Wall St. Assocs. v.
Brodsky, 257 A.D.2d 526, 530, 684 N.Y.S.2d 244, 248 (1st Dep't 1999).
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years from the judgment-roll 416 and even indefinitely, if JC takes
care to preserve the lien.417 This difficulty is illustrated by Smith
v. Reid,418 where JD fraudulently conveyed New York real
property to X. JC then docketed against JD but made no
effective move against X or Xs successors. 419  Thereafter, the
statute of limitations for fraudulent conveyance avoidance
lapsed.420 After the lapse, JC held an execution sale, where Y
was the buyer.421  Y was able to quiet title against Xs
successors.422  Properly, all that Y should have taken from the
execution sale was JC's right to have the fraudulent conveyance
set aside. But against this right X's successors should have had
the benefit of the six-year statute of limitations.423
The New York position is based on a metaphorical confusion
which states that, when JD makes a fraudulent conveyance, JD
makes no conveyance at all. The conveyance is said to be void.
In truth, the conveyance is void as to creditors but otherwise
valid.4 14 "Metaphors in law," Judge Cardozo once warned, "are to
be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
416 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 72, at
115 (2d ed. 1940).
417 This can be done by bringing an action on the judgment in the ninth year of
the life of the docketing lien. See supra text accompanying notes 120-121.
418 134 N.Y. 568, 31 N.E. 1082 (1892).
419 See id. at 568, 31 N.E. at 1083.
420 See id. at 577-78, 31 N.E. at 1085.
421 See id. at 570, 31 N.E. at 1083.
422 See id. at 578, 31 N.E. at 1086. In Smith, Y actually went into possession. Id.
at 577, 31 N.E. at 1085. Thereafter, X sold to Z, who had no knowledge of Y. See id.
at 570, 31 N.E. at 1083. The court held that Z was on inquiry notice of Ys rights and
therefore could not be a bona fide purchaser. Id. at 577, 31 N.E. at 1085. Yet, even if
Z was a bona fide purchaser, Y bought free and clear of X, on the court's own logic.
Therefore, X had nothing to convey to Z, and bona fide status was irrelevant.
422 The issue of statute of limitations was present in Domestic & Foreign
Discount Corp. v. Beuerlein. 54 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1944). In this
case, JD conveyed property to X in 1931. Id. at 549. JC docketed a judgment against
JD in 1932. Id. In the final days of the docketing lien, JC served an execution on the
sheriff. Id. The sheriff held the sale after the docketing lien was dead, which the
court held proper. See id. at 549-50. At the sale, JC was the buyer. Id. JC was
treated as if it was not a bona fide purchaser (which it probably was). Nevertheless,
if JC had a lien on X's property, JC should have successfully bought X's interest. The
court, however, held that the statute of limitations on fraudulent conveyance actions
against X had run. Id. at 550. Accordingly, the court must have believed that JC
never had a lien on X's property.
424 See David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and
Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 170-71 (2003).
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they end often by enslaving it." 425 In the realm of fraudulently
conveyed real property, New York courts are entirely enslaved by
the metaphor of voidness. As an astute Arkansas chancellor
wrote in Doster v. Manistee National Bank42 6 over a century ago:
"Nor do courts of law annul and set aside fraudulent
conveyances. Some process, after judgment at law is rendered, is
necessary in order to fix and secure a lien upon property that has
been fraudulently conveyed, and to uncover it for the judgment
creditor. ,4
27
New York Debtor and Creditor Law 278(1) does not say that
JD's conveyance to X is void. It says a creditor may have the
conveyance set aside to a certain extent-to the extent of JC's
judgment.4 21 Section 278(1) goes on to say that JC can disregard
the conveyance and levy.429 But surely this means levying
against X, not against JD. A levy against X does not require us
to believe that JC already has a lien on X's property. Indeed, in
New York JC's docketing lien against JD precludes levying under
section 5235 altogether.430 In any case, CPLR 5235, which
governs levy against real estate, authorizes a levy only "upon any
interest of the judgment debtor in real property."431 Where JD
has made a fraudulent conveyance, JD has no interest
remaining.4 32 And, until JC sues X, X is no judgment debtor.
The bad consequence of these holdings is on display in some
modern bankruptcy cases. In Mendelsohn v. Thaler (In re
Faraldi),431 JD made a fraudulent conveyance to X, JC docketed
against JD, and JD filed for bankruptcy. Because JD had made
a fraudulent conveyance, the trustee recovered X's property and
brought it into the bankruptcy estate.434  The court ruled,
however, that JC had a valid judicial lien on X's former property,
because that property never ceased being JD's property, and JC's
425 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
426 55 S.W. 137 (Ark. 1900).
421 Id. at 138.
428 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278(1)(a) (McKinney 2008).
429 Id. § 278(1)(b).
430 See supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
431 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5235 (emphasis added).
432 Of course, where JD conveys less than everything-a mortgage, for
example-JD validly retains the equity to which a docketing lien could attach.
3 286 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002).
14 See id. at 503.
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docketing against JD was a docketing against X.435 The result
can only be explained by the metaphorical confusion that insists
that a fraudulent conveyance is no conveyance.
Similarly, in Lawson v. Liberty National Bank & Trust
Co.,436 JD fraudulently conveyed property to X. JC docketed
against JD outside the preference period.437  Just before
bankruptcy, X conveyed the property back to JD.438 Properly
speaking, JC's lien arose when JD re-acquired the property.
Accordingly, JC's lien should have been condemned as a voidable
preference. The Lawson court, however, reversed the bankruptcy
court and found that JC's docketing lien arose prior to the
preference period. 39
A difficult bankruptcy case where these principles figure is
Wallach v. Brosnahan (In re Brosnahan),44 ° which we visited
earlier with respect to the priority of discretionary future
advances by a mortgagee against an intervening JC.' In
Brosnahan, JD conveyed a mortgage to A on the eve of JC's
docketing lien.442 JD then filed for bankruptcy. A sought to have
the automatic stay lifted, but the bankruptcy court denied the
motion because the trustee had a valid fraudulent conveyance
cause of action against A.443 That is to say, A had advanced funds
to JD knowing that JD was insolvent. The bankruptcy trustee is
in for surprise, on the above principles of New York law. If cases
like Faraldi are correct, then JC has a valid judgment lien on A's
mortgage. Anything the trustee recovers from A by virtue of his
45 See id. For a similar holding under Texas law, see Cullen Center Bank &
Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell). 102 F.3d 1411 (5th Cir. 1997). In this case JD made
a fraudulent conveyance to X, JC1 docketed against JD, and, less than ninety days
later, JD filed for bankruptcy. See id. at 1412-13. The court held that JC, had
received a voidable preference by docketing against JD within ninety days of
bankruptcy, but this could only be so if JC,'s docketing against JD established JC,'s
lien on the property of X. See id. at 1417-18. In other words, the court assumed JD,
not X, was the owner of the property all along.
46 18 B.R. 384 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 386.
438 Id. at 385.
11 See id. at 387-88. Had JC,'s docketing against JD been within the preference
period, it would have been hard to call the alleged lien a preference. The lien would
be a transfer from X to JC,, not a transfer from JD to JC1. Carlson, supra note 424,
at 176.
440 324 B.R. 199 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005).
4" See supra text accompanying notes 312-320.
442 Wallach, 324 B.R. at 202.
44 Id. at 202, 204-05.
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theory is encumbered by JC's valid lien. If JC has a docketing
lien against X's property, where JD conveys fee simple absolute
to X, then JC equally has a lien against A's mortgage, if that
mortgage is a fraudulent conveyance. Of course, the better view
is that JC has no docketing lien against property JD has already
conveyed to third parties prior to docketing.
But even if Faraldi and Lawson correctly ruled that
docketing against JD creates a lien on the property of X, these
liens should have been fully avoidable by the bankruptcy trustee.
In both cases, the trustee had an independent right to recover the
fraudulently conveyed property from X under sections 544(b)(1)
or 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. JC would have been a transferee
of a transferee and therefore just as liable as X for the fraudulent
conveyance, pursuant to section 550(a)(1). 4' As a transferee of a
transferee, JC might conceivably be eligible for the defense of
section 550(b)(1), but JC must show herself to be "without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided."45 Since JC
had initiated fraudulent conveyance litigation in both of these
cases, this defense surely would not apply.446
One possible idea for reconciling the New York position with
the text of section 278(1) of the Debtor and Creditor Law is to say
that docketing against JD gives JC an equitable lien against X's
property. 4 7 Such an idea would preserve X's power to convey the
property free of JC's rights to a bona fide purchaser, as section
278(1) directly bestows. The equitable lien would then be subject
to the six-year statute of limitations, not the near-ten year
duration demanded by CPLR 5203(a), which applies to docketing
liens, not equitable liens.44  But such a position generates its
own problems. Fraudulent conveyance law empowers both
judgment creditors and creditors whose debts are not yet mature
to set aside fraudulent conveyances."4 Why should JC, who has
docketed against JD, have an automatic priority over the
unmatured creditor who is the first to obtain relief against X?
New York's fraudulent conveyance law by no means justifies
such a conclusion. The priority of JC 1 over subsequently
4' See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2000).
"5 Id. § 550(b)(1).
4' See Carlson, supra note 424, at 178 (analyzing the section 550(a)(1) defense
in this context).
44' See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAw § 278(1) (McKinney 2008).
448 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5203(a) (McKinney 2008).
449 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 279.
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docketing creditors or over unmatured creditors who have
obtained judicial relief is based solely on the misconception that
JD's conveyance to X is void and that X's property is really JD's
property. This confusion insufficiently grounds JC 1's priority
over those creditors who first obtain relief against X.
It is also possible for the New York courts to reverse their
rule on docketing against fraudulently conveyed property. The
troubling precedents in New York date from the nineteenth
century. Since then, there have been some non-binding Erie
guesses as to the content of New York law, but no direct rulings
by the New York courts.45 ° It is therefore open for New York
courts to decide that the enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act ("UFCA")45' in 1925 effectively reverses these old
precedents.452 On this premise, where JD conveys to X prior to
any docketing, no JC has a lien.
450 Besides the above-cited bankruptcy cases, there is also In re Luftman, 245 F.
Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the assertion that JC, has a lien against X's
property upon docketing against D was unnecessary to the result. In Luftman, JD
conveyed property fraudulently to X. JC1 then docketed a judgment. JC 2
subsequently docketed. JC obtained a declaration from the Supreme Court of
Westchester County that X had received a fraudulent conveyance. Properly, this
judicial action is what made X's property susceptible to JC,'s lien for the first time.
Finally, JD filed for bankruptcy, where X's land was liquidated.
JC 2 claimed it was entitled to share the proceeds pro rata with JC1. According to
JC 2, the property was after-acquired property, insofar as the judgment creditors
were concerned. That is to say, when JD conveyed the property to X, JD successfully
alienated all interest in the land. So when JC, and JC2 docketed, D had no land.
This much was true.
JC2, however, transgressed the bounds of plausive manners by claiming that, when
JC, had judicial relief against X, the effect of this relief was to "void" the conveyance
so that JD was absolute owner of the property thereafter. This supposedly meant
that JC, and JC 2 both obtained after-acquired property liens simultaneously. Here
JC 2 tried to exploit the metaphorical confusion that fraudulent conveyance are void,
not just voidable at the behest of specific creditors. If JC2 was correct in this regard,
then fraudulent conveyance actions by one creditor are always collective actions for
all creditors (or at least for those with docketed judgments at the time of the
individual creditor action).
The Luftman court ruled for JC,, which was the right result, but it did so for a
regrettable reason. The real property was not after-acquired property, the court
reasoned. Rather, JD never conveyed to X at all. So JC,'s docketing lien attached to
X's property at the moment JC 1 docketed. So conceived, JC1 was first in time and
therefore first in right. Imagine, however, that JC 2 was the one to initiate the
fraudulent conveyance action. On the reasoning of the Luftman court, JC, is entitled
to benefit from the fruits of JC2's labor.
4," See Am. Sur. Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 6, 166 N.E. 783, 785 (1929).
452 One near-holding is North Fork Bank v. Schmidt, 265 A.D.2d 466, 697
N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1999), where JC1 was initially awarded priority to
fraudulently conveyed property by virtue of docketing against JD before JC2 did.
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This conclusion is justified by an examination of the UFCA's
remedial provisions. But, before we make that examination, it
should be noted that the CPLR gives no advice on how to proceed
when real property is fraudulently conveyed. In personal
property cases, JC might bring a turnover proceeding under
CPLR 5225(b), which is specifically geared to fraudulent
conveyances from JD to X:
Upon a special proceeding commenced by the judgment
creditor, against a person in possession [of ... personal
property... where it is shown that.. . the judgment creditor's
rights to the property are superior to those of the transferee, the
court shall require such person... to deliver ... personal
property... to a designated sheriff.
This statute is useless in a real property case,658 but sections 278
and 279 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law apply to real
and personal property alike. According to section 278, if a
creditor's claim has "matured[,] ... [h]ave the conveyance set
aside ... to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim,
or... [d]isregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution
upon the property conveyed." Certainly judgment creditors of JD
have "matured" claims (though creditors without judgments also
may qualify as mature creditors).4 4 This section indicates that
JC might "levy" against X's property. In New York, levy is
accomplished under CPLR 5235, but this section authorizes a
levy only "upon any interest of the judgment debtor in real
property." Ex hypothesi, JD has no interest in X's real property.
The court reversed on the ground that JC, could not show the conveyance was
fraudulent against him under Debtor and Creditor Law section 273-a. The court
remanded for a finding on whether JC, could show a fraudulent conveyance under a
different section of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law. It did not quite,
however, find that the first to docket against JD has priority to property previously
conveyed away.
4.. But see Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 533 F. Supp. 905, 922-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(entertaining fraudulent conveyance avoidance of real property under CPLR section
5225(b)). In the end, the Shaheen court declared that, if JC would serve an execution
on the sheriff, the sheriff could sell the transferee-wife's interest in the tenancy by
the entireties as if it were D's property. It also declared that the wife must forfeit her
survivorship right in the tenancy as a penalty for receiving a fraudulent conveyance
of her husband's cotenancy. Needless to say, this goes beyond fraudulent conveyance
law, which allows JC to place a judicial lien only on the property D conveyed to her.
See Marine Midland Bank v. Murkoff, 120 A.D.2d 122, 132, 508 N.Y.S.2d 17, 24 (2d
Dep't 1986) (disapproving of Shaheen).
4' Conner, 251 N.Y. at 7-8, 166 N.E. at 785.
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So as a practical matter, JC can only "[h]ave the conveyance set
aside ... to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim."
Meanwhile, creditors without judgments fall under Debtor
and Creditor Law 279, which provides:
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent
as to a creditor whose claim has not matured he may proceed in
a court of competent jurisdiction against any person against
whom he could have proceeded had his claim matured, and the
court may,
a. Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property.
b. Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property,
c. Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation, or
d. Make any order which the circumstances of the case may
require.455
Eliminated here is the option of proceeding directly to levy, as
the creditor has no judgment yet against X.
What these provisions imply is that (1) JD's judgment
creditors must "set aside" the conveyance; they may not levy; and
(2) JD's non-judgment creditors have rights against X no worse
or no better than JD's judgment creditors. Both types of
creditors must proceed against X in supplemental proceedings.
And the first party to commence the action establishes priority
for her claim (even if it is not yet reduced to judgment).456 This is
the implication of in custodia legis. In custodia legis is an extra-
statutory idea, as illustrated by Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen.5 7
In Clarkson, the debtor fraudulently conveyed certificated
securities to X. JC, commenced a turnover proceeding against X,
as authorized by CPLR 5225(b). X responded by claiming the
transfer was in good faith and for a fair consideration.
Regrettably, the CPLR is clear that commencement of the action
creates no judicial lien. Rather, a lien arises only when "a
judgment creditor has secured an order for delivery
455 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 279 (McKinney 2008)
456 Miller v. Sherry, 69 U.S. 237, 249 (1865) (Illinois law); Senter v. Williams, 32
S.W. 490, 491 (Ark. 1895) ("Though it is the favorite policy of a court of equity to
distribute assets equally among creditors pari passu, yet, whenever a judicial
preference has been established, by the superior legal diligence of any creditor, that
preference is always preserved, in the distribution of assets, by the court."); Shepler
v. Whalen, 119 P.3d 1084 (Colo. 2005); Davidson v. Burke, 32 N.E. 514 (Ill. 1892).
457 716 F.2d 126.
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of ... personal property."45 But, since section 5225(b) does not
apply to real property cases, its restrictive rule on lien
commencement can be ignored.
Before the District Court in Clarkson decided whether JC 1
was entitled to a turnover, the court required X to hand over the
equity shares to an officer of the court, while it pondered the
bona fides of X. Thereafter, JC 2 "levied" the shares.459  If the
matter were governed by the CPLR alone, JC 2 should have
prevailed, as JC 2 levied before JC 1 obtained a turnover order.46°
The court nevertheless held for JC1 ; the shares were in custodia
legis at the time of the levy. Therefore, the court officer held the
property in trust for JC 1 . The most JC 2 could have was the
surplus.
Clarkson is therefore no mere interpretation of the CPLR,
where turnover orders are limited to personal property. Rather,
it is an extra-statutory principle that can apply equally well as to
real property.4 61 It establishes that where JC 2 is the second to
docket against JD and where JC 2 brings X's property in custodia
legis, JC 2 has priority to the proceeds of the equitable proceeding,
even though senior judgments against JD are outstanding.
Clarkson emphasizes that the moment of in custodia legis is
when X actually delivered certificated shares to an officer of the
court. But this seems unnecessary to the decision. Once the
Clarkson court had jurisdiction over the person of X, the property
that X held was already in custodia legis.46 2 In the real estate
4m N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added); see also County
Nat'l Bank v. Inter-County Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 65 Misc. 2d 446, 317 N.Y.S.2d 790
(Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1970).
49 The Clarkson court does not discuss the form this levy took. Stock certificates
are property capable of delivery. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(c)(4). But, where the stock is in
the "lawful possession of [a] pledgee[]," id. 5232(b), the equity interest in stock can
be levied by service of the execution. Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 942 (2d Cir.
1972).
4o See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(c).
461 See, e.g., Memphis Sav. Bank v. Houchens, 115 F. 96, 112 (8th Cir. 1902)
(discussing the commencement of case to administer trust that rendered trust assets
free of subsequent levies).
462 See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) ("Where the action
is in rem the effect is to draw to the federal court the possession or control, actual or
potential, of the res, and the exercise ... impairs, and may defeat, the jurisdiction of
the federal court already attached. The converse of the rule is equally true, that
where the jurisdiction of the state court has first attached, the federal court is
precluded from exercizing its jurisdiction over the same res to defeat or impair the
state court's jurisdiction." (emphasis added)).
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context, what would be the equivalent? The answer would be
commencement of a supplementary proceeding under the
authority of sections 278 or 279 of the New York Debtor and
Creditor Law.463 To be sure, it is prudent for JC to file a notice of
pendency under New York law.46 Even after JC has established
priority by commencing an action against X, X still has the power
to convey a clear title to a bona fide purchaser for value.465 A
notice of pendency would serve to perfect JC's right to obtain X's
property, where X has received a fraudulent conveyance fromjD.466
IX. HOMESTEAD RIGHTS
New York provides a $50,000 exemption for a homestead.467
For married couples, the joint amount is $100,000.468 A
463 See Metcalf Bros. v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1902).
41 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6501. The notice of pendency statute, which dates back to
1848, repeals the notion that the world is on notice of JC's property claim when JC
commences the action against X. Today, the notice of pendency (not commencement)
is what puts the world on notice. Deerfield Bldg. Corp. v. Yorkstate Indus., Inc., 77
Misc. 2d 302, 304-05, 353 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334-35 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974).
465 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 278(1) (McKinney 2008).
466 See, e.g., Joslin v. Lopez, 309 A.D.2d 837, 839, 765 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (2d
Dep't 2003); Bennett v. Bennett, 62 A.D.2d 1154, 1154, 404 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (4th
Dep't 1978). In Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Liggett, 115 A.D.2d 378, 496 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1st Dep't 1985), JD conveyed real property to X. JC then joined X in a motion to set
aside the conveyance as fraudulent. A notice of pendency was filed. JC then obtained
a judgment against JD. An execution was served on the sheriff who then was able to
sell X's title in the property. The notice of pendency established the ability of the
sheriff to sell free of any transferee of X subsequent to the notice of pendency. In
Liggett, X had conveyed two mortgages after the notice of pendency. These
mortgages were property foreclosed in the execution sale. The result of the case is
entirely consistent with the premise that JC has no lien on X's real property by
virtue of docketing against JD, unless JC also commences a proceeding against X.
467 Historical and Statutory Notes to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(a) (McKinney 2008).
This amount, raised from $10,000, became effective on August 30, 2005. Id. The
$10,000 was a raise from an earlier $2,000 exemption. Notes of Decisions to N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5206(a) (McKinney 2008). The earlier raise was not retroactively effective.
Perry v. Zarcone, 77 A.D.2d 881, 881, 50 N.Y.S.2d 50, 50 (2d Dep't 1980). The new
raise, so far, has been retroactively applied, in spite of the takings clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In re Trudell, 381 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008);
CFCU Cmty. Credit Union v. Little (In re Little), No. 05-69113, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70638, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007); In re Brown, No. 06-30199, 2007
Bankr. LEXIS 2486, at *48-51 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007). The Second Circuit
gleefully side-stepped the issue when it found cause to dismiss an appeal. Weber v.
U.S. Tr., 484 F.3d 154, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2007).
466 In re Martiny, 378 B.R. 52, 53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Mfrs. &
Traders Trust Co. v. Borst, 128 Misc. 2d 691, 692, 490 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1984).
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homestead is defined as property "owned and occupied as a
principal residence." 469  The homestead has been stretched to
cover the home in which a debtor's estranged family lives, while
the debtor lives elsewhere.47 ° But where the ex-spouse is JC
against the non-resident JD, JD has not been permitted the
homestead exemption. Weekend getaways are not
homesteads.472
Typically, the home is real property,473 but it can also
be personal property-shares of a co-operative apartment
469 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(a). Where a debtor owns a farm as a homestead, and
where the residence is sold in a mortgage foreclosure sale but other farmland is left
unsold, the remaining farmland cannot be viewed as a homestead. In re Ellerstein,
105 B.R. 214, 217 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1989). In Ellerstein, the debtor listed the entire
farm as the homestead. The mortgagee then obtained a lifting of the automatic stay,
resulting in a sale of the residence. The trustee, however, never objected to the
exemption but was still able to claim the non-residential excess was not exempt.
This part of the opinion is probably overruled by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, which
held that a trustee must object to the exemption within the thirty day deadline of
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 4003. 503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992).
470 In re Pearlman, 54 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Warren, 38
B.R. 290, 293 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1984).
411 In re Thomas, 27 B.R. 367, 371 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Fontana v. Fontana,
89 A.D.2d 843, 843, 453 N.Y.S.2d 23, 23 (2d Dep't 1982). It has been suggested that
Fontana is explained by the fact that the non-resident debtor had no intent ever to
return to the unhappy marital home. Warren, 38 B.R. at 294.
472 In re Miller, 103 B.R. 65, 67-68 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (only one homestead
per customer); In re Galcia, 59 Misc. 2d 511, 514, 299 N.Y.S.2d 723, 726 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 1969) (in the context of a refund under New York Social Service Law).
473 There is conflicting authority on whether section 5206(a) applies to mere
equitable title (where JD is actually living on the property). In In re de Kleinman,
172 B.R. 764, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), JD had purchased a condo, but the condo
board nixed the deal. JD moved in anyway (or so the court assumed). Under the
sales contract, the seller agreed to hold title in trust for JD. The de Kleinman court
inexplicably ruled that JD was not entitled to the exemption because equitable
ownership was not good enough under section 5206(a). Citing Black's Law
Dictionary, JD did not "own" a residence. "In common legal parlance, 'ownership'
means having 'good legal title.'" Id. at 772 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105
(6th ed. 1990)). In In re Martinez, No. 08-71123-478, 2008 WL 3891224 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008), JD had inherited a cotenancy from her father. Apparently,
the house had been lost earlier in a tax foreclosure procedure but was successfully
redeemed by the administrator of the father's estate. Pursuant to the redemption,
Suffolk County deeded the property to the administrator. JD therefore had an
equitable interest in the property. The Martinez court found JD had the right to the
exemption. The Martinez court upheld the exemption and criticized the de Kleinman
court for relying on an out-of-date Black's Law Dictionary. See also In re Mastowski,
135 B.R. 1, 1 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1992) (vendor in a land sales contract allowed the
exemption, since the contract was treated as a mortgage under New York law).
[Vol. 82:12911384
2008] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART ONE
corporation or a mobile home.474  Our eternal home is not
overlooked. A burial plot, that small model of barren earth that
serves as paste and cover to our bones, is also exempt.475
The homestead exemption is good against judicial liens
only.476 It is certainly no good against mortgages,477 mechanics'
liens, 47 or criminal fines. 479  Nor will it prevent a constructive
trust theory from doing its work.480
Upscale JDs will own the equity in houses valued at more
than $50,000. In such cases, the CPLR provides a "special
proceeding"481 for JC to sell all of JD's interest in the property.
Where, however, the homestead has equity worth less than
$50,000 after all senior liens are considered, there can be no
sale. 4 2  Nevertheless, a court will not upset an execution sale
even if the winning bid is less than the homestead amount,
where a third party is the good faith bidder who is entitled to
5236(c) protection.4 3 The rule seems otherwise where JC bids in
and obtains the property.48 4
474 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(2), (4); see also Miller, 103 B.R. at 67 (noting that a boat
might be covered). These expansions were added in 1977. The expansions were not
good against debts incurred prior to August 22, 1977. Michaels v. Chem. Bank, 110
Misc. 2d 74, 76-77, 441 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640-41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (guaranty
not a debt for this purpose); Corbin v. Litke, 105 Misc. 2d 94, 98, 431 N.Y.S.2d 800,
802 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
475 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(f). This section exempts no more than a quarter acre. It
must already have been used to bury a corpse other than that of JD. It may contain
no structure other than vaults "or other places of deposit for the dead, or mortuary
monuments." Id.
476 See Robinson v. Wiley, 15 N.Y. 489, 492 (1857) ("The exemption constituted
an impediment or bar, to the right of the plaintiff to resort to the land to obtain
satisfaction of his judgment, but in no sense of the terms was a claim to, or
incumbrance on, the land.").
411 Citibank v. Cambel, 119 A.D.2d 720, 720, 501 N.Y.S.2d 133, 133 (2d Dep't
1986); Wyo. County Bank v. Kiley, 75 A.D.2d 477, 481, 430 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (4th
Dep't 1980).
478 Robert S. Moore, Inc. v. Whittaker, 142 Misc. 2d 708, 708, 538 N.Y.S.2d 415,
415 (Schoharie County Ct. 1989).
479 People v. McArdle, 55 N.Y.2d 639, 641, 430 N.E.2d 1309, 1310, 446 N.Y.S.2d
256, 257 (1981).
480 Wells Fargo Bank Int'l v. Binabdulaziz, 124 Misc. 2d 1072, 1073, 478
N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1984).
48, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(e) (McKinney 2008).
482 See Reda v. Voges, 192 A.D.2d 611, 611, 596 N.Y.S.2d 147, 147 (2d Dep't
1993).
4'3 Roosevelt Hardware v. Green, 72 A.D.2d 261, 265-66, 424 N.Y.S.2d 276,
278-79 (2d Dep't 1980).
4'4 See Sunset View Ass'n v. Olsen, No. 968/03, 2003 WL 22047895, at *2 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County Aug. 26, 2003).
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Section 5206(e) is well written, by CPLR standards. Unlike
section 5236(g), which unwisely omits distributions to any
property claimant except JCs and JDs, section 5206(e) sensibly
provides: "The court, if it directs such a sale, shall so marshal
the proceeds of the sale that the right and interest of each person
in the proceeds shall correspond as nearly as may be to his right
and interest in the property sold."4 5
This section also sensibly makes $50,000 of the proceeds
exempt property for the debtor. The cash is deemed exempt for
one year, after which it may be levied by JC as personal
property. If the cash is rolled over into a new homestead, the
exemption in the new homestead continues.48 6  No similar
provision exists for the proceeds of personal property exempt
under section 5205.
Proceeds of a judicial sale of the homestead are exempt, but
this is not so for proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale, where a
surplus is generated.4 7 In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Brown,48 8 JD granted a mortgage to A and lost a judgment to JC.
A then foreclosed and sold to X for a price large enough to
generate a $8,667 surplus.48 9 Before the surplus was distributed,
JD filed for bankruptcy.49 ° Since, at the time, New York provided
a $10,000 real estate exemption, JD claimed the entire surplus
was "real estate" and therefore awardable to JD.49 1 The court,
however, held that, once the homestead was sold by means other
than an execution sale, the proceeds were personal property.4 92
As New York has no exemption for cash, the amount was
awarded to JC.493
481 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206(e).
486 Id.
487 In such cases, the receiver conducting the mortgage foreclosure sale must
pay the money into the court, and third parties foreclosed by the mortgage have an
opportunity to make claims against the surplus according to their priority. N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1354(4), 1361 (McKinney 2008). If, after all real property
claimants are paid, there is still a surplus for the debtor, JCs may establish personal
property liens against the surplus. See E. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sabatine, 76
A.D.2d 899, 900, 429 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (2d Dep't 1980).
78 A.D.2d 119, 120, 434 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308 (4th Dep't 1980).
489 Id.
490 Id.
491 Id. at 121, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
492 Id. at 123, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
493 JD had the last laugh by amending her exemption schedule to switch from
the state-law exemption to the wildcard federal exemption of section 522(d)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which in those days permitted the exemption of any property
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In so ruling, the Brown court relied on Mojeski v.
Siegmann,494 where the issue was rather different. In Mojeski, A
foreclosed on a tenancy by the entirety. A surplus resulted. JD's
spouse claimed that the cash surplus was held by the entirety,
just as the land was. Since JD's judgment creditors were not
entitled to JD's share of the cash if JD was not the survivor, the
spouse reasoned that the creditors should receive no distribution
until dilatory time had determined JD to be the survivor. The
Mojeski court ruled that the surplus from a mortgage foreclosure
sale was personal property, and personal property could not be
held in tenancy by the entirety.495 Ergo, in Brown, the creditors
could have an immediate distribution of JD's share.
The Brown result is surprising. If JC had held an execution
sale before A foreclosed, JD's monetary exemption would have
been specifically authorized by CPLR 5206(e). Yet because A
foreclosed first, JD's right to the exemption was lost. It is
possible to argue against the Brown result. When A foreclosed, A
foreclosed JC and expropriated JC's full foreclosure power.
Therefore, within A's master foreclosure was JC's sub-foreclosure
of JD. Within that sub-foreclosure, JD had an exemption to
cash, which should be honored in A's foreclosure sale.
Happily for debtors, Brown does not apply if JD files for
bankruptcy with equity in her home and A has a mortgage senior
to a judicial lien held by JC. In such a case, a sale by the
bankruptcy trustee is subject to the rule that all parties with an
interest in the property must be adequately protected.4 96  This
rule should permit a bankruptcy court to protect JD's $50,000
exemption, in the context of a sale free and clear of liens.
Yet there is still this dilemma for JD. If the property is
completely encumbered by A's mortgage and JC's judicial lien,
worth up to $7,900. Furthermore, JD could use section 522(f) to avoid the judicial
lien because it impaired her exemption of the proceeds. Brown v. Dellinger (In re
Brown), 734 F.2d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 1984). Effective September 1, 1982, the New York
Legislature deprived its citizens of their right to elect federal exemptions in
bankruptcy. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 284 (McKinney 2008). JD's amendment to
her exemption schedule occurred in 1980. Therefore, JD's shrewd maneuver cannot
be repeated.
494 87 Misc. 2d 690, 386 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
495 A legislative exception to this rule has been added recently for shares of a
cooperative apartment. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-2.1(4) (McKinney
2008).
496 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000).
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the trustee cannot sell free and clear of all liens.497 In such a
case, the trustee abandons the property into the clutches of state
foreclosure law, where JD's exemption will be lost, thanks to
Brown. JD can generate some false hope from section 522(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which provides: "Unless the case is
dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable
during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that
arose ... before the commencement of the case ......
JD might be able to argue that, once the federal bankruptcy
court recognizes JD's New York exemption, it is no longer subject
to the disability exploited in the Brown case. That is to say, JD's
exemption is no longer limited to real property, but is a federally
valid exemption regardless of the status of real or personal
property under New York law.49 Alas, section 522(c) is subject to
an exception if JC owns "a debt secured by a lien that is-
(A)(i) not avoided under subsection (f) or (g) of this section or
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title; and
(ii) not void under section 506(d) of this title ... .499 Where JC's
lien is not avoidable, section 522(c) can be of no help.
JD, however, can defeat Brown by using section 522(f)(1) to
avoid JC's lien, thereby preserving a surplus in A's foreclosure
sale following the abandonment. According to section 522(f)(1):
"[Tihe debtor may avoid the fixing of a [judicial] lien on an
interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption .... 00
"Impairment" is a defined term. According to section
522(f)(2)(A):
[A] lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent
that the sum of-
(i) the lien;
(ii) all other liens on the property; and
47 Id. § 363(f)(3).
498 In In re Bedell, 173 B.R. 463 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994), D filed for chapter 13
protection. During the case, A successfully moved to lift the automatic stay. Having
lost the house, D then converted her case to chapter 7 liquidation. In the subsequent
foreclosure sale, a substantial surplus was generated; no JC had a junior lien on the
property, though. The chapter 7 trustee protested that, on the strength of the Brown
case, D had forfeited her exemption. The bankruptcy court, however, ruled that, by
claiming the exemption in chapter 13, the federal exemption survived the foreclosure
sale. D therefore received the $10,000 exemption in effect at that time.
499 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
500 Id. § 522(f)(1).
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(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim
if there were no liens on the property;
exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property
would have in the absence of any liens.50
1
To see how section 522(f)(1) saves JD from the ill aspects of
Brown, assume JD's house is worth $150,000 in its
unencumbered state. A's senior mortgage is for $100,000. JC's
judgment is $1 million. Under Brown, if A forecloses, all of the
$50,000 surplus will be taken by JC. But under sections 522(f)(1)
and (2)(A), we are to take the sum of $1 million plus $100,000
plus $50,000, and we are to subtract the value of the house "in
the absence of any liens" ($150,000). The result is $1 million
worth of avoidance. JC's judicial lien is therefore entirely
avoided.0 2 In A's subsequent foreclosure sale, JC has no lien at
all,50 3 and the surplus belongs entirely to A.5°4 To reach this goal,
JD needs a discharge in bankruptcy. A discharge "voids any
judgment at any time obtained."05 Without a discharge, JD can
avoid JC's lien, but JC's judgment continues to live. JC could
therefore have the sheriff garnish the surplus, which is personal
property. Under these circumstances, JD still loses the
homestead if A forecloses.
We are not quite done with Brown. We must still account for
the United States Supreme Court's highly cubist opinion in
Farrey v. Sanderfoot.0 6  In Farrey, a husband and wife were
cotenants of their house when they divorced. According to the
divorce decree, the husband kept the house but owed the wife
cash to balance out the equal division of the marital estate. This
50 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A).
502 Section 522(f)(2) is not self-executing, however. Moseley v. Milner, 131 Misc.
2d 126, 128, 499 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1986). Where a debtor
exempts a homestead and is still subject to a senior mortgage which might be
foreclosed, the debtor is vulnerable to the Brown holding.
503 Notice that if the surplus exceeds $50,000, JD gets it all-an odd side effect
of section 522(f)(1), which is designed only to preserve JD's $50,000 exemption.
504 One case holds that JC, is entitled to the benefit of Brown and therefore JD
cannot use section 522(f)(1) to avoid JC,'s lien. Zuaro v. Gertz (In re Gertz), 29 B.R.
37, 38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). But the very judge who decided Zuaro overruled
himself in Henry v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In re Henry), 38 B.R. 971, 974 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1984).
505 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1).
506 500 U.S. 291 (1991); see also Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 314 (1991)
(remanding case to determine whether judicial lien was simultaneously created with
the exempt property, making it unavoidable).
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amount was proclaimed to be a judicial lien on the house. The
husband then filed for bankruptcy. Claiming the house as
exempt property, he ungallantly sought to destroy his ex-wife's
judicial lien under section 522(f)(1).
Knowing that ungallantry must be defeated, the Supreme
Court refused to avoid the judicial lien. According to Justice
Byron White, the purpose of section 522(f)(1) was to relieve
debtors who were required to file homestead declarations in the
real estate records but who had not done so before judicial liens
attached.50 In bankruptcy, the judicial liens could be avoided,
even if the property only became exempt later, thereby
preventing the consequences of a lost race to the courthouse.08
Given the purpose of race avoidance, it supposedly followed
that section 522(f) does not apply in any circumstance in which
the parties would not engage in a race to the courthouse. One
such instance is when the debtor owns no property at all at the
time a judgment is rendered against him. In such a case,
creditors would hardly invest in racing to the courthouse. Here,
Congress could not have intended for section 522(f) to apply.
This imagined policy led to a curious definition of what it meant
to "fix" a lien. According to Justice White:
507 Only some states require this. Prior to 1977, New York did also, but no
longer does. In re Lightstone, 253 F. 456, 456 (W.D.N.Y. 1918); Robinson v. Wiley, 15
N.Y. 489, 490 (1857); see also Corbin v. Litke, 105 Misc. 2d 94, 431 N.Y.S.2d 800
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
508 This at least appears to be the race that Justice White deplored. See Farrey,
500 U.S. at 298 (describing section 522(f)(1)'s "purpose of preventing a creditor from
beating the debtor to the courthouse"). Elsewhere, he also deplores a race between
creditors to get judicial liens, a province of voidable preference law. Id. (describing
section 522(f)(1)'s role in replacing section 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act).
Justice White, then, conceives of creditors rushing to the courthouse to get liens in
anticipation of bankruptcy. Id. at 300-0 1. This might justify voidable preference law,
but it cannot suffice to justify section 522(f). See C. Robert Morris, Bankruptcy
Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV.
265, 288-89 (1992) (criticizing Justice White's invocation of voidable preference
concepts). As far as the debtor's exemptions are concerned, the race cannot be
conceived as beginning with unsecured creditors wishing for the first time to obtain
liens. Creditors cannot have judicial liens on demand. They must win judgments,
which require notice to the debtor, not to mention trials, motions and the like. The
debtor can easily beat creditors to the courthouse to preserve their homestead if
what we have is creditors starting off from an unsecured position hoping to get quick
judicial liens.
Contrary to Justice White's theory, if Congress had in mind the abolition of a race, it
must be a race in which JD has just lost a judgment and has not filed a homestead
declaration. It is not JC who will be rushing to the courthouse but only JD.
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Section 522(f)(1) does not state that any fixing of a lien may be
avoided; instead, it permits avoidance of the "fixing of a lien on
an interest of the debtor." If the fixing took place before the
debtor acquired that interest, the "fixing" by definition was not
on the debtor's interest. Nor could the statute apply given its
purpose of preventing a creditor from beating the debtor to the
courthouse, since the debtor at no point possessed the interest
without the judicial lien. There would be no fixing to avoid
since the lien was already there. To permit lien avoidance in
these circumstances, in fact, would be to allow judicial
lienholders to be defrauded through the conveyance of an
encumbered interest to a prospective debtor. For these reasons,
it is settled that a debtor cannot use [section] 522(f)(1) to avoid
a lien on an interest acquired after the lien attached. °9
Thus, section 522(f) can apply only when the debtor owns
property first and then, subsequently, a lien fixes to this
property. Where the lien attaches simultaneously with the
debtor's obtainment of after-acquired property, section 522(f)
cannot have any effect on the lien.510
Justice White refers to liens affixed before the debtor ever
acquires the property. This view is nothing more than a classic
commercial law blunder: A lien might exist before the debtor has
acquired property. This is the very error that the court in
Hulbert v. Hulbert51 sought to dispel when it found that
509 Farrey, 500 U.S. at 298-99 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
510 Ironically, not even this reasoning requires victory for the ex-wife. According
to Justice White, the husband and wife were cotenants. The divorce decree wiped out
their property interests. Later, for the first time, the ex-husband received a new
property interest-fee simple absolute as encumbered by mortgages and the ex-
wife's judicial lien. So conceived, the husband's equity in the property was created
coevally with the judicial lien. See id. at 292.
It is quite possible to characterize the events differently. According to Justice
Anthony Kennedy's concurring opinion, it is possible that the divorce decree did not
terminate the husband's interest at all. Rather, it preserved and continued the
husband's cotenancy and added the wife's cotenancy to it. In addition, the wife
received a judicial lien on the entirety. Id. at 302 (Kennedy, J., concurring). On this
view, the husband's interest in the property did antedate the wife's judicial lien, at
least in part.
Justice White sought to defeat this reasoning by reading the divorce decree as
encumbering-not the husband's preexisting cotenancy-but only the cotenancy the
husband gained in the divorce decree. Since the judicial lien did not antedate the
husband's acquisition of the cotenancy, the judicial lien could not be avoided. Id. at
300-01 (majority opinion). This reasoning functions so long as the wife's claim
against her former cotenancy was less than the value of the cotenancy. It was
unfortunate for the ex-wife if she was undersecured on this reasoning.
511 216 N.Y. 430, 441, 111 N.E. 70, 73 (1916).
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docketing creates no lien until the debtor actually owns property.
For this reason, the Hulbert case proclaimed that competing
judgments docketed before debtor acquisition create coeval liens.
Putting the holding in Farrey together with the effect of
bankruptcy on the Brown holding, if JD owned property before
JC docketed, JD can use section 522(f)(1) avoidance to reverse
the result in Brown. But, absurdly, if JD acquired the property
after JC docketed, Farrey prevents the avoidance of JC's lien.
The Second Circuit so ruled in Marine Midland Bank v. Scarpino
(In re Scarpino).5 12  In after-acquired property cases, Brown
continues to reign and JD forfeits the exemption in the surplus
from the mortgage foreclosure sale.51 3
X. TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY
Whatever may be true of judicial liens on New York real
estate, the influence of CPLR 5240 must never be neglected.
According to the provision of section 5240:
The court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of
any interested person, and upon such notice as it may require,
make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating,
extending or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure.
This provision allows the courts to change the rules whenever
they want. The provision basically proves the Hegelian point
that no law is law. We have seen that New York courts have
used CPLR 5240 to charge JC with the fair market value of real
property, where the creditor was the buyer at the execution
sale. 14 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has prohibited the
512 113 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit can hardly be blamed for
following what Farrey clearly requires. The bankruptcy court tried to claim that
Hulbert did not hold that lien creation was simultaneous with JD's acquisition.
Rather, Hulbert coheres with the idea that JD acquired property and, thereafter, at
some future time, the judicial liens of JC 1 and JC2 attached to JD's property. In re
Scarpino, 196 B.R. 16, 18-19 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 113 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.
1997). In other words, the lower court fought metaphysics with metaphysics. The
Second Circuit properly observed that there was no time at which JD could have
conveyed free of these judicial liens. Therefore, in Hulbert, JD's acquisition and lien
creation were simultaneous, thus sinking JD's right to use section 522(f)(1) to avoid
after-acquired property liens.
"I Similarly where JD conveys to his wife after JC 1 dockets against JD, and
where the wife files for bankruptcy, Farrey prevents the wife from using 522(f)(1) to
limit JC,. See In re LaBorde, 231 B.R. 162, 167 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999).
514 See, e.g., Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc. 2d 32, 37, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925,
930-31 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
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use of section 5240 in order to rescind an execution sale solely
because the price bid by a third party buyer was too low.515
Courts have also used CPLR 5240 to limit execution upon a
tenancy by the entirety,5 16 making it a kind of exempt property.
In these cases, H and W own a house as tenants by the entirety.
In New York, creditors of the individual spouses can obtain a lien
on the tenancy of the debtor spouse. 7  At an execution sale,
where H is the judgment debtor and X is the buyer, X obtains a
cotenancy with W,518 subject to W's right to X's share if W
survives H.519 Neither X nor W can force his or her cotenant into
a partition sale. 2 °
In these cases, H typically has conveyed his encumbered
cotenancy to W and has moved out. Typically, the creditor has
documented no other attempts to collect from H.5 21  On W's
motion, the court restrains JC from executing on Is cotenancy
"until the house becomes vacant, is sold, or the wife predeceases
the husband, or at such other time as the respondent may be able
515 Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 521, 392 N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 419
N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (1979); see also supra text accompanying notes 228-232.
516 See, e.g., Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec. Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 363, 365, 341
N.Y.S.2d 533, 535 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973); Hammond v. Econo-Car of the N.
Shore, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 546, 548, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1972) ("Perhaps the only value of the immediate execution upon the husband's
interest here is to put pressure on the wife, either to sell the house, or to pay off an
obligation that is not hers."); Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791,
792, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
"I Where JC has a claim against both spouses, then both halves can be put up
for sale. Where there are also individual creditors of one spouse, difficult allocation
issues can arise. See Sasario v. Calo, 63 Misc. 2d 534, 537, 313 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252-53
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1970). Where the joint creditor is senior, it should be
possible for the individual creditor to receive the benefit of marshalling of assets, in
order to maximize the joint return to both creditors. For example, where the shares
are worth $100 and a joint JC claims $50 and a junior individual JC of H claims $50,
W's share should entirely go to the joint JC, and H's share should go to H's
individual JC. See 1 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND
CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING: CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY § 1.07, at 42-43 (2d ed.
2000).
518 See Lover v. Fennell, 14 Misc. 2d 874, 879, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1021-22 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1958).
519 See Hammond, 71 Misc. 2d at 547, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95. When the couple
divorces, however, survivorship ends, and JC (or the buyer at the execution sale) has
an interest in a tenancy in common. Hohenrath v. Wallach, 37 A.D.2d 248, 249, 323
N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (2d Dep't 1971).
521 See Hammond, 71 Misc. 2d at 547, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 494. X also has no right
to evict JD, if JD is there as guest of his spouse. See Berlin v. Herbert, 48 Misc. 2d
393, 395, 265 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
5121 See, e.g., Gilchrist, 66 Misc. 2d at 793, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
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to show a sufficient change of circumstances which would
warrant further relief."5 22
Does CPLR 5240 imply that a New York tenancy by the
entirety is exempt property? According to Bankruptcy Code
522(b)(3)(B), a bankrupt debtor may exempt "any interest in
property in which the debtor had, immediately before the
commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the
entirety... to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the
entirety.., is exempt from process under applicable
nonbankruptcy law."523 Without CPLR 5240, clearly a New York
tenancy by the entirety is not exempt, but does it become so in
light of New York case law discussed above? In Community
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Persky (In re Persky),524 the Second
Circuit answered with a resounding no. CPLR 5240 is a
discretionary provision that a court may choose to use, not a
standing rule of exemption. 25 Once the tenancy by the entirety
is in the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy trustee has the
power to impose a partition sale over the opposition of a non-
debtor spouse. 526 Bankruptcy Code 363(h)(3), however, requires,
as condition to such a sale, "the benefit to the estate of a sale of
such property free of the interest of co-owners outweighs the
detriment, if any, to such [non-debtor] co-owners." 27
522 Seyfarth v. Bi-County Elec. Corp., 73 Misc. 2d 363, 366, 341 N.Y.S.2d 533,
536 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973). Relief must be sought, however, before the
sheriff sells and distributes the proceeds. Registrato v. Corso, 70 Misc. 2d 494, 495,
333 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1972).
522 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
514 893 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989).
125 Id. at 18 ("The fact that in individual cases execution against a particular
type of property interest may be limited or conditioned by the remedial provisions of
CPLR 5240 to prevent disadvantage to certain persons does not as a matter of
substantive law transform that particular type of property interest into one
generally exempt from the enforcement process.").
526 Id. at 16.
521 Id. at 17 (court must consider non-economic emotional harm to non-debtor
spouse). One court hints that the debtor and her non-debtor spouse are entitled to a
moving allowance from the proceeds of a tenancy by the entireties. See In re Morris,
115 B.R. 752, 756 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("As a practical matter this section is
usually invoked to sell primary residences when there is enough equity in the
property to satisfy secured creditors, pay the non-debtor spouse for his or her
interest in the property, pay the debtor's household exemption, and make a
meaningful contribution to the unsecured creditors, with enough left over for the
debtor and non-debtor spouse to secure alternative living quarters."). In Morris, JC,
having a lien on W's share of a tenancy by the entireties, tried to petition W into an
involuntary bankruptcy, so that section 363(h) could be used to sell the entire
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In an even more radical extension of section 5240, the court
in Holmes v. W.T. Grant, Inc.,528 prohibited an execution sale of a
house where H and W were both judgment debtors. The grounds
for the restraint were simply that loss of the home was too
disruptive to the family.529 The restraint was conditioned on
payment of $20 per month on the $500 debt.53 ° In effect, the
court imposed a chapter 13 wage plan on JD in exchange for
preventing an execution sale of their home.531
Tenancies by the entirety cause an interpretive difficulty
when an individual JD files for bankruptcy with her spouse and
JD wishes to avoid part of JC's judicial lien (where the spouse is
not a party to the judgment against JD). Shall we say that JD
owns fifty percent of the property, or shall we say that JD's
percentage ownership is calculated by the sum of the value of her
life estate plus the value of her survivorship rights?
Under state law, the matter is irrelevant. JC can only sell
JD's cotenancy. In such a sale, JD simply obtains a senior right
to $50,000. The matter has bite, however, for section 522(f)(1)
avoidances. To take a simple example, suppose JD and her
spouse own a house by the entirety worth $200,000 and JC has a
judgment against only JD for $90,000. According to section
residence, rather than a cotenancy share. Id. at 755. But only unsecured creditors
may join in an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(1) (West 2008). JC's
purpose therefore confessed a belief that JC was entirely a secured creditor, because
only if JC were paid in full could a section 363(h) sale proceed to liquidate equity for
the benefit of unsecured creditors. Morris, 115 B.R. at 756. The court, however,
compared apples and oranges. At state law, where partition sales are not permitted,
JC likely would get a mediocre price, implying an unsecured deficit claim after the
cotenancy was valued. If the petition succeeded, then JC, undersecured at state law,
would become fully secured thanks to the power of section 363(h).
528 71 Misc. 2d 486, 336 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
529 Id. at 488, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
530 Id.
513 A less intrusive use of CPLR 5240 is BNY Financial Corp. v. Moran, where
the court enjoined the sale of a reversionary interest in a non-residence held by the
entireties for a short time until H and W could find a buyer willing to pay enough to
satisfy the senior mortgages and JC's lien. 154 Misc. 2d 435, 437, 584 N.Y.S.2d 261,
263 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992), See also Kantor v. Mesibov, No. 2814-06, 2007 WL
415981, at *4-5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Feb. 6, 2007) (noting that the tenancy by
the entirety had to be valued according to debtor's life expectancy; no sale unless the
creditors could show a reasonably substantial amount would be realized after
exemption and sheriffs fee); FDIC v. Lapadula, 137 Misc. 2d 559, 561-62, 521
N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1987) (staying the execution sale for six
months for the debtor to obtain alternate housing, but requiring that the debtor to
pay the JC $750 per month).
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522(f)(2)(A), we are to take the sum of the targeted lien ($90,000),
other unavoidable liens (0), and the exemption ($50,000). From
this ($140,000) we are to subtract the value of JD's real property
interest. The result is the amount of avoidance to which JD is
entitled.
Suppose we say that JD is a fifty percent owner of the
residence. Then JD can use her avoidance power to reduce JC's
lien to $50,000. JD's avoidance right is defined as $140,000 less
$100,000 ($40,000), and $90,000 less $40,000 ($50,000). Suppose
now the house increases in value to $240,000. If JD and her
spouse sell at market value and "redeem" JC's lien by paying JC
$50,000,532 JD and her spouse jointly obtain $190,000.
Suppose, on the other hand, JD has a very low life
expectancy because she is seriously ill. Suppose, on the basis of
this, that the value of JD's fifty percent life interest and JD's
survivorship right is worth but $10,000. In such a case, JC's lien
can be reduced from $90,000 to zero, because JD's avoidance
right is now $130,000, which exceeds the amount of JC's lien. In
the market sale, JD and her spouse keep all the proceeds.
In In re Levinson,533 Judge Dorothy Eisenberg refused to
consider life expectancies in calculating section 522(f)(1)
avoidance.534 Rather, she relied on the fact that JD and his
spouse had equal rights to the property. For example, where the
property is sold, each spouse is entitled to fifty percent of the
proceeds--even if one spouse paid the entire purchase price.535 It
is undoubtedly the case that the spouses have equal rights, but,
even so, the statute refers to the value of the debtor's real
property.536 Where that property is subject to survivorship of a
non-debtor, undoubtedly the marketplace would view life
expectancy as highly significant. Therefore, although the
Levinson holding has the virtue of being easy to apply, it does not
comport with a market-based definition of "value." The abstract
"2 The CPLR does not strictly allow this, so our example assumes that either
JC consents to be redeemed or JD obtains relief from the court under the wild card
of CPLR 5240. See supra text accompanying note 172.
372 B.R. 582 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 590. This accords with the result reached in Popky v. United States,
which involved a federal tax lien that attached to a single spouse's tenancy by the
entireties in Pennsylvania. 419 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2005).
" See Secrist v. Secrist, 284 A.D. 331, 334, 132 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415 (4th Dep't
1954), affd, 308 N.Y. 750, 125 N.E.2d 107 (1955).
536 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (2000).
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legal proposition of equality has nothing to do with how the
market values the interest of a spouse not likely to be the
survivor.-
3 7
XI. TAX LIENS V. JUDICIAL LIENS
A. Local Property Tax
If JD is not paying judgments, he may also not be paying
property taxes either. Therefore, the judicial lien may encounter
a competing tax lien for local property taxes.
In New York, a municipality is permitted to tax real
property. If the tax is not paid, the municipality is prepared to
sell fee simple absolute if someone doesn't come forth to pay up.
As a result, it is said that the property tax lien is a superpriority
tax.
Property taxes are very dangerous to mortgages, 538  so
mortgage lenders are organized to pay the taxes and add the
amount paid to the principal amount of the mortgage loan.539 For
this reason, judgment creditors do not always face a senior
property tax lien. Instead, they encounter an expanded senior
mortgage lien. But should there be a property tax outstanding, it
will be senior to any judicial lien. 4 °
When a mortgage foreclosure sale occurs in New York, the
property tax lien is also foreclosed, and the senior property tax
has the highest priority to the sales proceeds. 541 Accordingly, the
537 For a case using life expectancies in valuing a tenancy by the entireties, see
Pletz v. United States (In re Pletz), 221 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000).
'8 See Berlin Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. City of New York (In re New York-In
Rem Foreclosure Action No. 39, Borough of Queens), 171 A.D.2d 792, 793, 567
N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (2d Dep't 1991).
"' See In re Trabal, 254 B.R. 99, 104 (D.N.J. 2000) ("Where taxes on property
are the responsibility of the mortgagor, but paid by the mortgagee for the benefit of
the mortgaged property... the mortgagee is entitled to be reimbursed and can add
any uncollected monies to the mortgage debt."); Grant S. Nelson, The Foreclosure
Purchase by the Equity of Redemption Holder or Other Junior Interests: When
Should Principles of Fairness and Morality Trump Normal Priority Rules?, 72 Mo.
L. REV. 1259, 1265-66 (2007).
540 Dime Sav. Bank v. Beecher, 23 A.D.2d 297, 300, 260 N.Y.S.2d 500, 503 (2d
Dep't 1965), affd sub nom. Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Williams, 18 N.Y.2d 763, 221
N.E.2d 561, 274 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1966).
541 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1354(2) (McKinney 2008) makes "all taxes,
assessments, and water rates which are liens" expenses of the sale. N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 1354(1) makes expenses of the sale the highest priority, higher than
that of the foreclosing mortgagee.
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buyer at the mortgage foreclosure sale will pay the full value of
the estate, knowing that the property tax lien will disappear
after the tax is paid from the proceeds of the sale.
With judicial liens there is no such priority. Under CPLR
5236(g), only judgment creditors, who have served executions
before the execution sale, have the right to proceeds. Therefore,
buyers at such sales are advised to deduct the amount of the tax
lien from the maximum bid, as the title they take will be subject
to such liens.
B. Federal Tax Liens
No doubt America's biggest creditor is the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"). In collecting taxes, the IRS need not rely on
money judgments. Rather, federal legislation gives them a tax
lien that arises as soon as a tax is assessed.142
Unlike local property taxes, the IRS lien has no
superpriority. It is junior to any prior lien, but case law has
insisted that the prior lien must be "choate" in order to be
senior.543 Choateness implies certainty as to the amount of lien,
the identity of the creditor, and the identity of the collateral.5"
Tax liens arise upon assessment of the tax,545 but unless the
tax lien is recorded, it is not valid as to judgment creditors
(among other persons). 546
If a tax lien is subsequent to a judicial lien or is unrecorded
at the time the judicial lien arises, the judicial lien is senior, and
the tax lien is forecloseable in an execution sale. This is
established by I.R.C. section 7425, which has two relevant
provisions. Subparagraph (a) pertains to judicial sales, and
subparagraph (b) pertains to non-judicial sales. Oddly, courts
have held that execution sales are not judicial sales. In a judicial
sale, a court directly orders that land be sold. But a sale
pursuant to an execution served on a sheriff is, apparently, not a
542 26 U.S.C. § 6322 (2000).
" United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1954) ("first in time
is first in right"), superseded by statute, Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
14 Id. at 84.
-5 26 U.S.C. § 6322.
54 Id. § 6323(a). According to section 6323(f)(1)(A), notice of a lien on real
property must be filed "in one office within the State (or the county, or other
governmental subdivision), as designated by the laws of such State, in which the
property subject to the lien is situated. .. "
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court-ordered sale.547 So it is subparagraph (b) that governs
foreclosure of junior tax liens by senior judicial liens. According
to that provision:
Notwithstanding subsection (a) a sale of property on which the
United States has or claims a lien...
(1) shall ... be made subject to and without disturbing such
lien or title, if notice of such lien was filed or such title
recorded in the place provided by law for such filing or
recording more than 30 days before such sale and the
United States is not given notice of such sale ... or
(2) shall have the same effect with respect to the discharge
or divestment of such lien or such title of the United States,
as may be provided with respect to such matters by the local
law of the place where such property is situated, if-
(A) notice of such lien or such title was not filed or
recorded in the place provided by law for such filing
more than 30 days before such sale,
(B) the law makes no provision for such filing, or
(C) notice of such sale is given .... 548
This subsection makes the sensible point that in order to
foreclose the IRS, notice must be given to the IRS. But section
7425(b)(1) also implies that, where the IRS has not filed its notice
more than thirty days before the sale, the IRS is still foreclosed
without notice. When the IRS is foreclosed, we have already seen
that it has a post-sale right to redeem, by virtue of federal law. 549
Where the IRS has filed notice more than thirty days before the
sale, it is non-forecloseable, even where it is made a party to the
foreclosure proceeding.550
547 See Myers v. United States, 647 F.2d 591, 600 n.13 (5th Cir. 1981); Midway
Fin. Corp. v. Walters, No. 84-0289 HMF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15197, at *11 (D.
Haw. July 5, 1991); A.H. & R.S. Coal Corp. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 752, 755
n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1978). But see Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515, 520, 392
N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 419 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (1979) (stating that in CPLR 2003, entitled
"Irregularity in judicial sale" is applicable to executions sales).
548 26 U.S.C. § 7425(b). In addition, section 7425(c)(1) requires notice by
registered or certified mail or personal service twenty-five days before the sale.
Midway Fin. Corp. v. Walters, No. 84-0289, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16887, at *9 (D.
Haw. July 25, 1989).
549 See supra text accompanying note 240.
550 Berlin v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 298, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In Berlin, the
buyer argued that senior judicial liens disappear when a junior lien is foreclosed.
And since the IRS was in the habit of serving a notice of levy on sheriffs, thereby
participating in the proceeds of the sale, the IRS was estopped from denying that its
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Although the IRS submits to the regime of first in time is
first in right, we have mentioned an exception for inchoate liens.
If an earlier lien is not certain as to the identity of the lienor, the
amount of the lien, or the property to which the lien attaches, the
IRS lien is senior, even though it was second in time. After the
Supreme Court invented this doctrine, courts found all sorts of
liens were inchoate. The onslaught was too much for Congress,
which, in 1966, amended the federal tax lien statute in order to
save some (but not all) prior liens from inchoateness. In
particular, the article 9 floating lien was preserved from its
inherent inchoateness."'
One thing not saved were judicial liens on real property. As
we have seen, 52 these have a "dragnet" effect of picking up after-
acquired property that a debtor obtains after docketing a
judgment. Where two or more docketed judgments exist before
debtor acquisition, the liens share pro rata as to the after-
acquired property. In the standard case where JD owns land
when JC dockets, a New York docketing lien is certain as to
lienor, amount of judgment, and property liened. In such cases,
where the IRS files its notice subsequent to docketing, the
docketing lien is clearly senior to the IRS lien. But where both
the docketing and the IRS filing of notice precede debtor
acquisition, the IRS is senior according to the Supreme Court in
United States v. McDermott.5 3  Interestingly, the majority
opinion did not proclaim the docketing lien inchoate. It found
that the IRS won on a different ground.
In McDermott, both the majority and minority of the
Supreme Court were under a mistaken view of the facts. Here is
what they thought was before them:
tl: JC dockets against JD. JD has no real property. (This was
the Supreme Court's error.)
t2 : The IRS files notice of a tax lien.
t3: JD acquires property.
tax lien was a judicial lien. The court disagreed and held that senior tax liens cannot
be foreclosed by junior judicial liens. Id. at 303.
551 The classic study is William Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for
the Next Decade (pts. 1-3), 77 YALE L.J. 228, 605, 1104 (1968).
552 See supra text accompanying notes 373-380.
53 507 U.S. 447, 451 (1993).
[Vol. 82:12911400
2008] CRITIQUE OF MONEY JUDGMENT: PART ONE
t4: JD sells to X. JC and the IRS consent to the sale and agree to
do battle over the proceeds.
55 4
Supposing these to be the facts, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing
for the majority, ruled that the IRS was senior, but not because
JC's lien was inchoate. According to Justice Scalia, the docketing
lien and the tax lien attached to the property at the same time.55
Since the IRS had already filed its notice before the judicial lien
attached to the debtor's real property, the IRS had priority on the
peculiar way I.R.C. section 6323(a) is worded:
We think, however, that under the language of [section] 6323(a)
("shall not be valid as against any ... judgment lien creditor
until notice ... has been filed"), the filing of notice renders the
federal tax lien extant for "first in time" priority purposes
regardless of whether it has yet attached to identifiable
property.5 6
In other words, the meaning of section 6323(a) is that, in
simultaneous attachment cases, the IRS prevails. Is this a
plausible inference to draw from section 6232(a)? It is not,
though much work is needed to vindicate this view.
The exact sentence Justice Scalia quotes says that if the IRS
has a lien, it is not good against lien creditors until notice is
filed. 5 7 Read literally, this sentence could be taken to mean that
all judgment creditors lose, even if prior in time. Consider the
following:
Twelfth Scenario
ti: JC dockets against JD, who owns local real property.
t2: The IRS assesses a tax against JD.
t3: The IRS files notice against JD.
The above sentence from section 6323(a), read in isolation, means
that JC has priority at ti and t2, because the IRS has not filed
notice. But at t3, the IRS lien prevails because no judicial lien is
good against the IRS lien once the IRS has filed notice. Such a
reading assumes the validity of a negative pregnant in section
6323(a), which destroys the first-in-time principle that governs
federal tax lien priorities.
54 McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 945 F.2d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir.
1991), rev'd sub noma. 507 U.S. 447.
"1 507 U.S. at 453.
556 Id.
557 Id.
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Such a reading must be rejected for the following reason.
According to I.R.C. section 6321, if a taxpayer refuses to pay a
tax after demand, "the amount.., shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all [taxpayer] property.., whether real or
personal." We learn further in section 6322 that "the lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is
made." So in our example above, at t 2 the IRS had a lien on D's
property, which at this point is only D's equity interest. JC's lien
is entirely separate and is no longer the taxpayer's property.
JC's lien entirely escapes the jurisdiction of section 6323(a)
because section 6323(a) refers only to taxpayer property
encumbered by the IRS lien. JC's lien is property entirely
unencumbered by the IRS lien. So whatever section 6323(a)
means, it does not upset the principle of "first in time is first in
right." In the Twelfth Scenario, JC prevails. The IRS is junior.
What then does section 6323(a) say about simultaneous
liens? As so often happens at the crucial moments of commercial
law, the sentence comprehends only sequence, not
simultaneity.55 It says nothing at all about simultaneous lien
creation. 559  But section 6323(a) contains exceptions. Justice
Scalia assumes that these exceptions show that Congress
intended a pro-IRS rule in simultaneous creation cases. In fact
this is not so.
Let us examine the exception that Justice Scalia himself
examines. According to section 6232(b), even though the IRS has
filed notice of its lien, certain designated liens still beat the IRS.
One of these is provided in section 6323(c)(1): "a security interest
which came into existence after the tax lien filing but which-
(A) is in qualified property covered by the terms of a written
agreement entered into before tax lien filing and constituting
(i) a commercial transactions financing agreement."56 ° "Qualified
property" means "commercial financing security acquired by the
taxpayer before the 46th day after the date of the tax lien
filing. "561 "Commercial financing security" is defined to include
558 See generally Carlson, supra note 374.
See S. Rock, Inc. v. B & B Auto Supply, 711 F.2d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 1983).
560 A "commercial transaction financing agreement" is defined as an
agreement in the course of trade "to be secured by commercial financing security
acquired by the taxpayer in the ordinary course or his trade or business."
26 U.S.C § 6323(c)(2)(A) (2000).
561 Id. § 6323(c)(2)(B).
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inventory, among other things.562 Putting all this together, if SP
has a security agreement with JD before the IRS notice is filed
and if JD acquires inventory after the IRS notice is filed, SP's
after-acquired security interest in the inventory is senior to the
IRS's after-acquired property tax lien. From this exception
Justice Scalia draws the conclusion that section 6323(a)'s
opening statement means that in all cases where the above
exception and other like exceptions don't apply, the IRS must win
in simultaneous attachment cases.563
In fact, Justice Scalia is logically incorrect. The exception in
section 6232(c)(1) is consistent with two different readings:
(1) Without the exception, the IRS is senior to SP, or (2) Without
the exception, the IRS and SP are tied chronologically and should
share pro rata. Justice Scalia's choice of (1) over (2) was in no
way required. 64
.62 Id. § 6323(c)(2)(C).
6 The majority and the dissent differed strongly on whether the after-acquired
property question had already been answered in United States v. State of Vermont.
377 U.S. 351 (1964). In Vermont, state tax liens attach to real and personal property
as soon as a tax warrant is docketed in like manner as a judgment. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 9818 (2008). Vermont had obtained a lien against the taxpayer and also had
obtained a garnishment of the taxpayer's bank. Thereafter, the IRS obtained a
federal tax lien. The Vermont court ruled that Vermont had a complete priority to
the bank account. Dissenting in U.S. ex rel. IRS v. McDermott, Justice Clarence
Thomas claimed:
[Tihe debtor's interest in the bank account.., could have been uncertain or
indefinite or indefinite from the creditors' perspective. Nevertheless, in
[Vermont], the particular property was "known to be subject to the [state]
lien," simply because that lien, by its terms, applied without limitation to
all property acquired at any time by the debtor.
507 U.S. 447, 459 n.2 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (third
alteration in original). In discussing the bank account, the Vermont court "found no
need even to mention whether the debtor had acquired its property interest in the
deposited funds before or after the notice of the federal lien." Id. at 459. In short,
according to Justice Thomas, Vermont already decided the after-acquired property
question, because the bank account may have had post-lien dollars in it.
A review of the Vermont opinion reveals that the Court was quite oblivious to the
fact that post-lien dollars may have been deposited by the debtor in the bank
account. The opinion does not indicate whether such post-lien dollars existed. It is
highly plausible that the debtor made no deposits in a bank account that had
already been garnished. If post-lien dollars existed, then Vermont did indeed have a
senior lien on after-acquired property. But even this assumes that a bank account is
not just one debt owed by the bank (which varies in size over time) but is many
different debts, some of which were pre-lien debts, some post-lien.
Justice Scalia took the position that there was no after-acquired property aspect in
Vermont. Id. at 450-51 (majority opinion).
)6 Justice Scalia is therefore unfair to the dissent when he wrote:
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A further criticism is that Justice Scalia properly recognizes
that JC could not have a lien on JD's property until JD actually
acquired it,565 and he admonishes the dissent for suggesting
otherwise. 66 But then he himself says otherwise with regard to
the IRS tax lien.567  The tax lien did have existence before JD
acquired the property.6 Thus, the meaning of section 6323(a) is
that "the filing of notice renders the federal tax lien extant for
'first in time' priority purposes regardless of whether it has yet
attached to identifiable property."569  So Justice Scalia's sage
observation about JC's lien is simply forgotten when it is time to
consider the status of the IRS lien prior to JD's acquisition of real
property. Justice Scalia lays bare the fault of the dissent but
fails to apply the same criticism to his own position.
I have said that the Supreme Court did not understand the
facts of the case before it. Here is what really happened:
ti: 0 grants a mortgage to JD to finance the purchase price of
$146,000.
t2: The IRS assesses a tax against JD and has a lien on JD's
mortgage.
t3 : JC dockets against JC for $67,000. This lien attaches to D's
mortgage and has seniority over the IRS's unperfected lien.571
tG: The IRS files notice of its lien.
t5 : JD holds a mortgage foreclosure sale where JD is the buyer.
JD acquires O's equity.5 72
The dissent contends that "there is no persuasive reason for not adopting
as a matter of federal law the well-recognized common-law rule of parity
and giving the Bank an equal interest in the property." As we have
explained, the persuasive reason is the existence of [section] 6323(c), which
displays the assumption that all perfected security interests are defeated
by the by the federal tax lien.
McDermott, 507 U.S. at 454 n.7 (citation omitted). In fact section 6323(c) could well
assume that security interests are merely tied with tax liens and thus consistent
with the dissent's "well-recognized common-law rule of parity."
" 507 U.S. at 452-53 (stating that JC's lien "did not actually attach to the
property at issue here until [JD] acquired rights in that property" and that because
"that occurred after the filing of the federal tax lien, the state lien was not first in
time").
56 See id. at 452 n.5.
567 See id. at 453.
" See id.
569 Id.
570 See William H. Baker, The McDermott Tax Lien Case: And the First Shall Be
Last, 55 LA. L. REV. 879, 885 (1995).
51 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-202 (2008) (originally UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
22-1(2)).
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t6: With consent of JC and the IRS, JD conveys to X who pays
cash for an unencumbered title. The parties agree that JC and
the IRS will receive the proceeds according to their priorities.
Properly, the case does not involve simultaneous attachment of
two liens. Rather JD's mortgage was encumbered in sequence by
the IRS (t2), then by JC (t3). JC, second in time, was first in right
under section 6323(a).573 Thereafter, JD acquired O's equity (at
t5 ). Ordinarily, when a mortgagee bids in, her unencumbered
mortgage merges with the debtor's unencumbered equity,
creating a fee simple in the mortgagee. 4  Here, merger is
prohibited by the liens of JC and the IRS. Therefore, JC's senior
judicial lien survives to encumber part of JD's title. As to the
equity acquired in the foreclosure sale, this was genuine after-
acquired property, in so far as JC and the IRS were concerned.
Under the Supreme Court's holding, ties go to the IRS. The IRS
was senior as to the equity, but nevertheless subordinated to JC,
who had a prior lien on the mortgage portion of JD's title.
Although we are not told the amount X paid for the
unencumbered title, we do know that JC's lien was for about
$67,000575 and JD's mortgage in 1981 was for $146,000.76 If the
mortgage was amortized over 30 years, which is certainly
standard, then there would have been little amortization,
especially since 0 had been in default for some time. Therefore,
it is highly likely that JC could have been paid out entirely from
that portion of X's money which represented the purchase price
of JD's mortgage. And if X paid less than the amount of JD's
mortgage,577 then there would have been no surplus at all to fund
the IRS. It is very likely, then, that JC was first in time and
therefore first in right.
572 See McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 945 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (10th
Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. U.S. ex rel. I.R.S. v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993).
571 The lower court needlessly worried whether a Utah judicial lien could attach
to a vendor's interest following a real estate contract. Id. at 1479 n.5. Indeed, the
Utah Supreme Court would later rule in the negative. Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d
546, 550 (Utah 1991). According to Cannefax, a vendor holds legal title in real estate
in trust for the buyer pending the closing. See id. at 550. Be that as it may, in
McDermott, D held a trust deed to secure payment of the real estate contract, and
JC's lien could attach to this. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1477.
17' This assumes there are no senior mortgages on O's equity.
s5 McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1477.
576 Id.
177 Which may well have been the case, as 1987 was the start of a severe real
estate recession.
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Be that as it may, to quote King Richard, "After our sentence
plaining comes too late."57  "Things without all remedy/Should be
without regard: what's done is done." '579 Thanks to McDermott,
New York JCs can expect to win when genuinely first in time
with regard to already-acquired property, but in simultaneous
attachment cases involving after-acquired property, they lose.
Oddly, McDermott is the mirror image of Farrey v. Sanderfoot,8 °
which concerned the power of a debtor to avoid judicial liens that
impair the homestead exemption.581  There, where JC claims
after-acquired property, JC wins. 582  But where JC competes
against a simultaneous federal tax lien for after-acquired
property, JC loses.583  Both these holdings are absurd. The
Supreme Court has created a topsy-turvy world for New York
JCs claiming a debtor's after-acquired real property.8 4
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have analyzed judicial liens in New York
real property. The law pertaining to such liens has been revealed
to be full of contradictions and idiotic caprice. But in the main,
civilization in New York seems to have struggled along tolerably
well. For all its problems, the real estate regime for judicial liens
is in fact blissfully simple, compared to the personal property
regime. But that particular parade of absurdities must await the
sequel.
578 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 1, sc. 3., at 29 (John Seeley et al.,
eds., Heinemann 2000).
579 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 3, sc. 2, at 50 (The Riverside ed.,
Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1897).
580 500 U.S. 291 (1991); see also Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 314 (1991) (Scalia,
J.) (remanding to determine whether judicial lien was simultaneously created with
the exempt property, making it unavoidable).
581 Farrey, 500 U.S. at 292.
82 Id. at 301.
583 Marine Midland Bank v. Scarpino (In re Scarpino), 113 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir.
1997).
"' In Advantage Title Agency, Inc. v. Karl, 363 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463-64
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), JC and the IRS had docketed and filed notice respectively before
JD inherited property. JD renounced the inheritance. JC, however, claimed that JD
was mentally incompetent when JD renounced (though the renunciation would seem
to be evidence of acute powers of reason). Id. at 464. The court gave summary
judgment to the IRS; even if JD was insane, the IRS won on the strength of the
McDermott holding. Id. at 467.
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It is easy to imagine some reforms to make the system more
rational. I would like to propose six such reforms, all of them
painless.
(1) For starters, the Legislature should repeal CPLR 5203(b),
since section 5236(a) already enables a sale to proceed if an
execution is served while the docketing lien is alive. Section
5203(b) also tolls a docketing lien during the time enforcement is
injunctively stayed. So long as the judgment outlives the
docketing lien, preservation of this feature is desirable, but an
even better idea is to follow the advice of the Office of Court
Administration"' and make the docketing lien coterminous with
enforceability of the judgment itself. Such a reform would permit
repeal of the concept of the action on the judgment, which has
recently proven conceptually confusing and dangerous for JCs. It
would also make advisable changing the rule on levying upon
real property so that, as an alternative to docketing judgments
elsewhere, JC could obtain a lien on real property located outside
the county of the judgment roll simply by serving an execution on
the sheriff.
(2) Another easy reform is to add back into the CPLR a
redemption right, but one that lapses at the time of the execution
sale. This simply borrows from the law of New York mortgages.
(3) Currently, CPLR 5236(c) delegates to JC the job of
creating a list of those entitled to notice of an execution sale.
Such a delegation is undoubtedly unconstitutional. The
Legislature might then step up to the plate and require the
sheriff to establish the list. Furthermore, distribution under
section 5236(g) is limited to JCs who have served executions and
JDs. Although the provision has a wildcard in it, permitting
judges to do whatever they think best, the provision should be
amended to invite anyone with a foreclosed interest to apply for
the surplus.
(4) Another matter that needs attention is the holding in
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Brown.8 6 According to
Brown, JD loses all right to the real estate exemption when a
senior mortgage lender forecloses a judicial lien creditor. 58 7
Rather, the rule should be that JD obtains from the proceeds of a
585 See Memorandum of Office of Court Administration, reprinted in Ch. 123,
1986 N.Y. Laws 3379 (McKinney); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
586 78 A.D.2d 119, 434 N.Y.S.2d 306 (4th Dep't 1980).
587 See id. at 123, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
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mortgage foreclosure the amount of the exemption, up to the
amount of JC's right to a distribution.
(5) Some ancient state cases and some modern federal cases
hold that where JD makes a fraudulent conveyance of real
property to X and JC dockets against JD, JC has a lien against
X's property. This rule, if it still exists, creates havoc for title
searching, since JC's lien does not appear in the docket against
X. To be sure, the title searcher will be able to trace X's rights
back to JD, but what the title searcher will observe is that JD
conveyed to X before JC docketed. The title searcher has no easy
way of determining whether JD's conveyance was fraudulent or
not. Rather, the rule should be that JC must commence an
action against X and publicize it with a notice of pendency. Until
then, JC has not lien against X's property.
(6) Currently, the sheriff may not garnish tenants of JD.
Rather, JC must obtain a receiver to collect rents. There is no
justification for this technicality and it is deserving of abolition.
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